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2009 Fatal RV Accidents

I'm a fast reader, and do tend to read the NTSB reports every Mon, Wed, and Fri. I don't see the RV's standing out for any special reasons over the others. But I do see many accidents (GA in general) that had to do with engine problems on takeoff, as well as engine failure in flight. Surprisingly, many are simple fuel problems that could have been avoided. Everything from running out of fuel, to taking off with not enough fuel in the tank being used. Then the pilot doesn't switch to the other tank that may have contained fuel, and a lot appear to end up stalling & falling behind some tree line somewhere. So two basics..............making sure you have enough fuel on board, and maintaining airspeed after loss of power are not met.

L.Adamson --- RV6A
 
Just a nit, I would not call running out of fuel (wrong tank, etc) "engine failure."

That is "fuel starvation" or whatever they use. But you are right...inexcusable. That may also go back to judgment. Don't pass up a fuel stop just because it will add 45 minutes to your flight or make you have to overnight short of your destination.
 
Two of the 2009 accidents involved instructors. Since the flights resulted in accidents I have to wonder about the relationship between the "student" and the instructor. Was this some low time instructor with no pertinent experience trying to check someone out in an RV, or alternatively giving a BFR. Get your training with someone "qualified in type" or if not possible, someone who has significant experience in similar aircraft. A Pitts or Extra instructor is a good alternative if you can't find someone with RV experience.

Aerobatics- There have been three fatal accidents that I can think of in the Aerobatic community. Two have been VERY high profile people that were very experienced. Why would anyone think they are better than these people and can get away with a low altitude roll? Get at least ten hours of aerobatic training in a high performance airplane and then do your acro above 5000' agl.

Stall/spin- I believe most of the stall spin accidents in ALL homebuilts would go away if everyone took a good acro course and then explored the corners of the flight envelope on a regular basis. In other words don't make the stalls/slow flight strictly a BFR event, but practice them on a regular basis.
 
Just a nit, I would not call running out of fuel (wrong tank, etc) "engine failure."

That is "fuel starvation" or whatever they use. But you are right...inexcusable. That may also go back to judgment. Don't pass up a fuel stop just because it will add 45 minutes to your flight or make you have to overnight short of your destination.

Yes, I should have said "loss of power".
 
Numbers of RV's flying

It seems the number of RV's flying each year is growing exponetially. So it would be logical to assume the number of accidents should likewise grow. Throw in the fact that these are experimental with a lot of test flying going on we should expect what is happening. I am a survivor of an engine out on take off on my third flight. RV7 survived too. I'm not ready to make conclusions that RV's are more dangerous than whatever without more facts. Remember if there are 4 incidents one year and 6 the next thats a 50% increase which is a lot more impressive than an increase of 2.
 
As some one mentioned about the -9 and the -10 has not had a fatal crash in 20 months while the numbers have probably almost doubled for both of those planes. The -10 crashes are all completely different with the pilot or the pilot's decisions causing the problem. You have Dan's nothing further need to be said here. The one in Texas where the pilot more than likely had a medical problem. The one in Alabama on the way to Sun-n-fun was due to becoming disoriented in IMC. IMO he was not 100% familar with the RV-10 in IMC. Others may know more about it. I really don't know what else you can do safety wise for the RV-9 and RV-10. The are both great flying planes that really don't get pushed to the limit like the other RVs.
 
As some one mentioned about the -9 and the -10 has not had a fatal crash in 20 months while the numbers have probably almost doubled for both of those planes. The -10 crashes are all completely different with the pilot or the pilot's decisions causing the problem. You have Dan's nothing further need to be said here. The one in Texas where the pilot more than likely had a medical problem. The one in Alabama on the way to Sun-n-fun was due to becoming disoriented in IMC. IMO he was not 100% familar with the RV-10 in IMC. Others may know more about it. I really don't know what else you can do safety wise for the RV-9 and RV-10. The are both great flying planes that really don't get pushed to the limit like the other RVs.
Hey Todd:
I push my 9A to the limit every time I fly it.:) At the same time, I hopefully understand what the limits are (granted, they're lower than those of the other RVs). Most important is not to exceed them or my own capabilities.
Glad to hear the 9 and 10 are showing good safety numbers-maybe it will help push down insurance costs.
Terry, CFI
RV-9A N323TP
 
Thinking back to the issue of letting our friends do dumb things: I have several friends who smoke. This, in my mind, is dumb, since it significantly lowers your life expectancy. However, I've learned to live with the fact that they are grown adults and can make their own choices. I tell them from time to time that I think they should stop, but I don't nag them about it. I say my peace and let it go. But I'm not about to stop socializing with them because they puff the cancer sticks. If they are reckless about other people's lives, that's different, but if they're really only risking their own lives, I'm ok with that. They are the ones who have the final say about their own lives.

I guess I'm the same way about flying. I have flying friends who, in my mind, do dumb things. I haven't hesitated to ask them about the risks they take and whether they're comfortable with them. Sometimes they will admit that their judgement is suspect and sometimes they see nothing wrong. I speak my peace and let them go. If it endangers other people or is egregious, then I reevaluate whether I want to socialize with them, and sometimes the answer is "NO" - this happened more than once in 2009.

TODR
 
I guess I'm the same way about flying. I have flying friends who, in my mind, do dumb things. I haven't hesitated to ask them about the risks they take and whether they're comfortable with them. Sometimes they will admit that their judgement is suspect and sometimes they see nothing wrong. I speak my peace and let them go. If it endangers other people or is egregious, then I reevaluate whether I want to socialize with them, and sometimes the answer is "NO" - this happened more than once in 2009.

TODR

If every one did nothing more than this, it would have a profound effect on the accident rate.... Politely challenge people who do stupid things and if they do not respond favorably don't hang with them....

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
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If every one did nothing more than this, it would have a profound effect on the accident rate.... Politely challenge people who do stupid things and if they do not respond favorably don't hang with them....
This is why I like soaring in a club environment - those who do really stupid things tend to hear it from everyone, and friendly critiques of one's flying are just part of the culture. Since our club owns the airport and has the liabilities, it's in our own best interest to run a safe operation.

TODR
 
EAA Chapter 162's President, Dan Masys compiled an excellent overview of the causes of accidents in the GA fleet in our 2009 Second Quarter Newsletter. Here is the link to our newsletter page EAA 162 Newsletters

"FAA Examines Homebuilt Safety" - - Take a look, there are some interesting common threads to the accidents.
 
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RV Safety

I have been in the process of building / finishing a 10 over the past couple of years. I know that in my own experience, I have not flown nearly enough to remain current. My last flight was 4 months ago and that was as a passenger for a demonstration flight with a friend. Any free time I have, I am in the hangar building. With previous planes I have owned, I always flew at least once a week and felt very comfortable and confident in piloting a plane. I think it will take a while to get that back.:eek:

Mark
 
Mark, you're very honest.....

....about your rustiness and more should be that forthcoming.

I trained roughly 80 transition students in my -6A and some were really terrible....hadn't flown in months/years, since all their time and money was spent building and the flying neglected.

I then started recommending that they get some dual in a 150 or other airplane with light, quick controls before coming to see me. This helped a lot but the original intent for transition training was to take up-to-speed pilots and help them learn the RV's so that their first flight in it would have minimal risk and the program as a whole is really successful.

Best,
 
Flydoc's post highlights another interesting note... There were no first flight accidents in RV's... This is typically a very high risk activity in the homebuilt world. Anyone wonder why that is?

I would wager this is a place where the RV culture is a good thing rather than a bad thing. Generally the construction quality is higher than other homebuilts. I believe this is because within our community the culture is that builders help other builders and that raises the level of quality....

If we could adapt the culture of low tolerance for poor workmanship into low tolerance for poor airmanship, there would be fewer accidents....

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
Flydoc's post highlights another interesting note... There were no first flight accidents in RV's... This is typically a very high risk activity in the homebuilt world. Anyone wonder why that is?

I would wager this is a place where the RV culture is a good thing rather than a bad thing. Generally the construction quality is higher than other homebuilts. I believe this is because within our community the culture is that builders help other builders and that raises the level of quality....

If we could adapt the culture of low tolerance for poor workmanship into low tolerance for poor airmanship, there would be fewer accidents....

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

This should be our motto for the year!
 
If we could adapt the culture of low tolerance for poor workmanship into low tolerance for poor airmanship, there would be fewer accidents....


This should be our motto for the year!

I could not agree more.

Piloting an airplane is not like riding a bicycle. One can have years of experience and after a 6 week lay off, it takes an hour or so to get the gyros spun up and begin to feel comfortable again in the air. A weekly flight, if just to shoot a few landings, goes a long way toward keeping fit to fly.

This is a major problem due to time and money constraints and I do not have a ready answer. Perhaps an awareness of the need to get a thorough check out when resuming flying is part of the answer.
 
If we could adapt the culture of low tolerance for poor workmanship into low tolerance for poor airmanship, there would be fewer accidents....




I could not agree more.

Piloting an airplane is not like riding a bicycle. One can have years of experience and after a 6 week lay off, it takes an hour or so to get the gyros spun up and begin to feel comfortable again in the air. A weekly flight, if just to shoot a few landings, goes a long way toward keeping fit to fly.

This is a major problem due to time and money constraints and I do not have a ready answer. Perhaps an awareness of the need to get a thorough check out when resuming flying is part of the answer.

Many, many of the avoidable RV accidents I'm aware of are not due to rusty stick-n-rudder skills but instead are the result of reckless airmanship on the part of someone who should have known better...

The demarcation between aviation exuberance and destructive behavior is often unchallenged until after we have lost another pilot......
 
Many, many of the avoidable RV accidents I'm aware of are not due to rusty stick-n-rudder skills but instead are the result of reckless airmanship on the part of someone who should have known better...
Amen, and amen, brother Sam. IMO most accidents are the result of attitude, not lack of skills or knowledge. The real cause of many accidents is long in the past, and an accident is merely the manifestation of a careless or reckless attitude and behavior.
 
Those last couple of posts have hit the nail squarely on the head in my opinion. If you look at the nine or ten fatal accidents that started this thread, only a couple might have been prevented had the person at the controls been better with the old stick and rudder. Most were failures of judgment, which to me is the single most important attribute of a good aviator.

Most of the top test pilots I have known have been very quiet, reserved guys - you'd never knew what they did for a living if you met them at a school or church function. They know how dangerous aviation can be if you don't treat it with respect, and have long ago given up taking chances for thrill's sake. They also have studied (extensively) the things that kill pilots - forewarned is forearmed, but you have to pay attention to the lessons!

Paul
 
...If you look at the nine or ten fatal accidents that started this thread, only a couple might have been prevented had the person at the controls been better with the old stick and rudder. Most were failures of judgment, which to me is the single most important attribute of a good aviator...Paul

I've followed this thread for a while and have seen some pretty good advice mixed in with a bunch of... shall we say, not so good (adding 10 knots to the approach speed, for instance). Your post above has me pretty confused. Using the data from your earlier post (below), I see only the first 3 (VFR to IFR) as "poor judgement" - all the rest should have been accomplished safely (i.e. without death or injury) with the appropriate stick and rudder skills.

So before I insert my foot prematurely, can you elaborate?

VFR in IFR conditions - 3
Loss of Control on takeoff - 2
Los of Control on Landing - 1
Low Level Aerobatics - 2
Low Level Stall - 4
Formation gone wrong - 1
 
Using the data from your earlier post (below), I see only the first 3 (VFR to IFR) as "poor judgement" - all the rest should have been accomplished safely (i.e. without death or injury) with the appropriate stick and rudder skills.

VFR in IFR conditions - 3
Loss of Control on takeoff - 2
Los of Control on Landing - 1
Low Level Aerobatics - 2
Low Level Stall - 4
Formation gone wrong - 1
I'll make a try at this though others better qualified will respond.

* Loss of control, T/O or Landing: I knew a guy who wrecked an Ercoupe by landing long and running of the end of the (3000 ft) runway; plane flipped over and was destroyed, pilot mostly unharmed. Look, someone who can't land a Coupe properly should have the judgment to recognize that and do something about it: more instruction, fly with another Coupe pilot, just get more yoke time themselves.
* Low level Aero: sure, again, the airshow performers can do this "safely"...just like the airline pilots can safely handle bad IMC and icing because of their training and equipment. Us amateur, weekend-warriors should have a clue and not do that stuff. Low-level acro in an RV? Stupid, unless you're Bob Hoover.
* Low level stall: to generalize, may not be exactly lack of skill as lack of awareness. If you keep your airspeed (and AOA if so equipped) in the proper limit you won't stall. If you start making steep or skidding turns to "make the runway" and fail to keep track of airspeed, isn't that a lack of awareness and good judgment? The average skill but good judgment pilot will just go-around.
* Formation: yeah, we've all probably done this with our buddies. It's stupid to do with no training, and worse with no talking and discussing beforehand. Again, bad judgment.

Reminds me of a death certificate, which will list the immediate cause of death then the antecedent causes. Or, you may see news of a gunshot victim; what you don't know is the vic was a druggie involved in a deal gone bad.
 
And this is exactly why these discussions are hard to have over the internet - While I certainly agree that landing long and crashing has some significant elements of "poor decision making", it is the lack of stick and rudder skills that got him there in the first place. Therefore, the "cause" was failing to make the airplane do what was required. Using your logic (which is not wrong), the "cause" of the Ercoupe crash was the "poor decision" to remain a pilot.

While both are very important, we are pilots first, managers second. If you can not keep the airspeed right and touch down at the correct spot, "managing" the situation is not likely to help.
 
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I've followed this thread for a while and have seen some pretty good advice mixed in with a bunch of... shall we say, not so good (adding 10 knots to the approach speed, for instance). Your post above has me pretty confused. Using the data from your earlier post (below), I see only the first 3 (VFR to IFR) as "poor judgment" - all the rest should have been accomplished safely (i.e. without death or injury) with the appropriate stick and rudder skills.

So before I insert my foot prematurely, can you elaborate?

VFR in IFR conditions - 3
Loss of Control on takeoff - 2
Los of Control on Landing - 1
Low Level Aerobatics - 2
Low Level Stall - 4
Formation gone wrong - 1

OK Mike, I'll go back and revise a few thoughts. I can give you at least a couple of the Low Level Stalls as poor flying technique (although when I read the actual reports, a couple of them stuck out as "how did you get in that situation in the first place?"), as well as the LOC's on T/O and Lndg (although taking off with conditions beyond what you are ready to handle is, in my book, a sign of bad judgment). But Low Level Acro and the particular Formation accident last year were defacto evidence of bad judgment.

No one is immune from bad judgment BTW, including myself, lest anyone think that I am trying to be preachy. The first step to avoiding bad judgment is to admit that it CAN happen to you, just as it has happened to countless other pilots, both experienced and inexperienced. Once we recognize our own fallibility, we can proceed from that point with a a potential for safer operations.

Paul
 
Paul,

I don?t think you?re being preachy, and I certainly am not immune to bad decision making in the cockpit, but I do think we are missing the true causes of crashes. This would not itself be a problem, but if we focus on the wrong cause of them, we get the wrong solution. See, I?m one of those people who hear of someone killed by falling off a roof and disagrees? For it was not the fall that kills, but the massive trauma after hitting the ground. So it is with that frame of reference that I hear of the ?sure fire? fixes for aviation accidents and shake my head. Stall on base to final turn? Conventional wisdom seems to be ?Just add 10 knots? and avoid the whole problem! Sure, until you land long and run off the end of the runway. Why not practice some stall identification and recovery? Why not learn to use your feet and keep the ball centered? That would actually solve a problem.

Although both are vitally important traits to have, I would suggest that basic airmanship goes a lot further than good decision making, yet we rarely push that. Funny how we so often advocate adding more rules and limits in an attempt to insulate us from the unknown, yet we wonder why people crash when the unknown arrives and we can?t handle it.

I think that it is great to discuss accidents and try using these tragedies as learning tools, but I also think that as adults, our decision making skills are pretty much set in stone. What is NOT set in stone is our stick and rudder skills, so I think the emphasis should be to get out there and fly ? put yourself in an ?uncomfortable? situation often enough that it becomes comfortable. In other words, push your limits until you find new limits.

That?s how to get safe.
 
We all lack judgement, we choose to fly!

One could argue, and several have with me, that every time I fly my machine my judgement is suspect. Ha!
From well before the point of start up, every action all of us take in our airplanes has some form of decision making or judgement involved. Managing our decisions becomes better with training, currency, and education. That can not be argued!
Even a "no-fault" mechanical failure can have a good out come, or a bad one, depending on the judgment and decisions followed.
We tend to look at these things as right, or wrong. They did the right thing, and lived, or the wrong thing, and died. I dont think it is that black and white and the NTSB reports are merely opinions of findings and statements of relative fact, observed or deduced. They tell part of a story, to the best of thier ability.

If I never flew below my glide range to the nearest airport, never took a route that would not allow me to make a forced landing in a field or airport, never flew in changing weather, my judgement would be much better. But I dont. That would take the fun out of it. So, I make a decision that is not the safest I could make. Is that poor judgement?
 
If I never flew below my glide range to the nearest airport, never took a route that would not allow me to make a forced landing in a field or airport, never flew in changing weather, my judgement would be much better. But I dont. That would take the fun out of it. So, I make a decision that is not the safest I could make. Is that poor judgement?

Jon,

My answer to your question Jon is no. You have recognized the risk, evaluated it, compared it to the reward and made a decision. That is a textbook risk mitigation strategy. The last step (that you are probably already doing) would be to seek out ways to mitigate the risks you accept.

Many people operate under the illusion that they are skillful enough and the RV is good enough that flying is safe. They are unwilling to acknowledge the risks associated with flying, and especially the kinds of flying that we typically do in RVs.

My entire objective with this discussion is to cause people to acknowledge the risk in the flying we do. Decide which activities are worth the risk. Stop doing the ones that are not. And seek ways to mitigate the risks in the ones we choose to do.....

Everybody says they want to read accident reports to learn from other people's mistakes. Ask any CFI what the FAA definition of learning is, "Learning occurs when a change of behavior takes place."

Put it in that context and people are less excited about learning because nobody wants to change their behavior.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
I think that it is great to discuss accidents and try using these tragedies as learning tools, but I also think that as adults, our decision making skills are pretty much set in stone. What is NOT set in stone is our stick and rudder skills, so I think the emphasis should be to get out there and fly ? put yourself in an ?uncomfortable? situation often enough that it becomes comfortable. In other words, push your limits until you find new limits.

I'm sorry Mike, but we are going to have to agree to disagree on this - one of the most important parts of my jobs is training my people to make and use better judgment on a continuing basis. Improvement in judgment is measurable and verifiable. It comes with experience as well as mentoring.

I will not argue that airplane handling skills aren't important - they are, and need to be improved as well. But if you are convinced that you can never learn better judgment, then you are selling yourself short. The limits that you push do not have to be physical - they can be mental as well.

Paul
 
Superior Judgement

Hmmm, isn't there some expression about "using superior judgement in order to avoid having to call upon superior skills"?
As an instructor, I feel fairly confident in my ability to teach good mechanical skills. As Paul suggests, we're also charged with teaching good aeronautical decision making skills. The really difficult challenge comes in assessing these two important elements, especially in a limited time frame. For example, it's pretty hard for even a stranger coming to me for a BFR to hide poor stick skills. While I can try and drill down to assess their ADM skills, I really can't be exactly sure about things like attitude, willingness to take risk, etc. , especially during an evaluation that only lasts a couple of hours.
Perhaps anyone willing to fly a high performance plane built in a garage already has a high tolerance for risk. Maybe that's part of the problem. Maybe the accident reports suggest that this is the part of the pilot population that needs the most sharpening of stick skills, as Mike suggests, and the most sharpening of ADM skills, as Paul suggests. I'm all for that.
Terry, CFI
RV-9A N323TP
 
I will never have the training and skills of a military trained pilot...an airline trained pilot or a Bob Hoover. Regardless, I honestly believe that I am a very safe pilot. Why, because I make up for all that expensive training with better than average judgment.

I have on rare occasions been too high/fast on final. Poor airmanship? Maybe. But it is easy to go around. Judgment

I often use the term "weather wuss" in my trip reports. That is because weather remains a major factor in long trips. Even that area has been improved slowly with experience.

I documented how I improved my abilities in this post:

http://tinyurl.com/5mphdw

I still think that the main problem is judgment. Regardless, if we could reduce RV fatalities 50% think of how many more fathers/husbands would stay around.
 
Hmmm, isn't there some expression about "using superior judgement in order to avoid having to call upon superior skills"?
As an instructor, I feel fairly confident in my ability to teach good mechanical skills. As Paul suggests, we're also charged with teaching good aeronautical decision making skills. The really difficult challenge comes in assessing these two important elements, especially in a limited time frame. For example, it's pretty hard for even a stranger coming to me for a BFR to hide poor stick skills. While I can try and drill down to assess their ADM skills, I really can't be exactly sure about things like attitude, willingness to take risk, etc. , especially during an evaluation that only lasts a couple of hours.
Perhaps anyone willing to fly a high performance plane built in a garage already has a high tolerance for risk. Maybe that's part of the problem. Maybe the accident reports suggest that this is the part of the pilot population that needs the most sharpening of stick skills, as Mike suggests, and the most sharpening of ADM skills, as Paul suggests. I'm all for that.
Terry, CFI
RV-9A N323TP

Teaching aeronautical decision making skills in this non structured environment of genera aviation is next to impossible. People do whatever they want, frequently without consequence, and the only time their ADM skills are improved is if they survive a really scary event. How many times have you heard the comment "I will never do that again".

In a structured flying environment, much decision making is not that, it is following established policy, procedure or regulation. There are times when that policy, procedure or regulation become an issue if it does not fit a particular situation that is out of the ordinary - and that's when ADM kicks in and even then it is not a learned thing, it is more dependent on experience and sometimes raw skill. Later introspection into such a decision may lead to suggestions on how to not do this or to do that, but much of it is fleeting and difficult to quantify. It is like writing policy that accommodates common sense.

Getting back to the flying we do here; yes, there are cowboys with locked down mind sets that are screwing up the accident statistics and they may be much of the problem. But without doubt, so is lack of basic flying skills. Anyone who unintentionally stalls an airplane is not spun up, period, and that comes from being out of touch with the cockpit. In this day of high operating costs, family obligations, and other financial and time constraints, it is a problem. Some of the guys showing up at OSH fly 20 hours a year and much of that time is to and from the event, it is apparent in the tension of their radio calls and their extreme nervousness in the air.

I wish I had a simple answer to this and the GA cowboy issue because some of these flights do end up not good. Maybe it is an overall ADM issue - like I should not be doing this or what am I doing here? Perhaps such a question does pop up just before the cowboy augers.
 
I'm sorry Mike, but we are going to have to agree to disagree on this - one of the most important parts of my jobs is training my people to make and use better judgment on a continuing basis. Improvement in judgment is measurable and verifiable. It comes with experience as well as mentoring.

I will not argue that airplane handling skills aren't important - they are, and need to be improved as well. But if you are convinced that you can never learn better judgment, then you are selling yourself short. The limits that you push do not have to be physical - they can be mental as well.

Paul

I think you can teach people to identify and evaluate risk, but cannot ensure they use that information. "You can lead a horse to water..." and all that. I think that decision making is very closely related to common sense, and if you have a syllabus that can improve that, the world could sure use it! Further, if the response to a risk scenario is always to limit their experience to it, that is not helpful either. For instance, some people HATE stalls, so they avoid it except for when forced to perform them on a BFR. So by heeding some of the advice in this thread (and current FAA training), one might conclude the proper corrective action is to make sure you don't ever stall. My opinion is exactly the opposite - do stalls until the slightest tickle of the stick is burned into your brain; do them until you can recover without even thinking about it. At this point, stalls, even very close to the ground, are far less dangerous. Of course, with such an advanced understanding of stalls, they are far less likely to develop in the first place. Such an understanding allows maximum performance of the airplane while still retaining a significant margin of safety. Contrast this with the often used "just go faster" method. In this case, who is exercising better judgment?
Judgment is very important, no doubt, but so is expanding your comfort zone in the airplane.
 
Paul has it right on. In my 25 years of Naval Aviation the vast majority of mishap reports list as 'a' primary casual factor some form of failure of judgement of the Aircraft Commander, PIC or entire crew. What we've learned is that an awful lot of mishaps occur with some of our most skilled aviators at the controls because their judgement didn't match their skill (at the time) and they couldn't recognize the delta. You could be the absolute best stick in the business and still end up a lawn dart if your judgement is out to lunch, however; if your judgement is keen and your skill is mediocre your chances of survival are much, much better. One of our biggest killers and I believe for GA pilots as well is COMPLACENCY which everyone of us capable of falling victim too.

Our mishap rates have steadily declined over the past 20 years through aggressive mentoring, Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, and more recently (10 years) Operational Risk Management (ORM) training on a recurring basis for all Naval Aviators and aircrewman. We cannot fly without risk - this is a given. We can however discipline ourselves to follow a process for assessing risk, and implementing controls and decisions to minimize those risks. Through this process our judgement will in fact become more focused, reasoned and responsive - especially when it is time critical in flight. It is however difficult to develop better judgement in a vacuum - some form of feedback is required to ensure the pilot is moving forward and not backward in their progress. Its easier for me in my squadron cause I set policy, hold STANDARDIZATION boards, conduct flight reviews and spot check my aviators whenever I want to. For GA pilots, and I said this in another thread, we need to police ourselves and each other better and not be hesitant to call the guy in the hangar next to us out on the carpet when we see him/her do something really stupid.

Our ORM process is divided into a set of 4 principles and a 5 step process.

The principles are:

1. Accept no unnecessary risk (why fly under the bridge when flying over it gets me to the same place)
2. Accept risk ONLY when the benefit outweighs the cost (do I really need to launch from the ship at 0300 in dense fog and 30 ft seas just to meet some arbitrary monthly flight hour requirement?)
3. Make risk decisions at the appropriate level (who gets to decide todays mission is worth the loss of the crew and airplane?)
4. Mitigate most risk through proper planning (route planning, weather diverts, fuel management, terrain considerations, enemy capabilities, my currency and proficiency, personal distractions, aircraft performance, etc..)

so before we fly we define our mission, inventory our equipment, discuss our human factors issues, and assess the environment (terrain, weather, threats, etc..) then we look at the principles above and ensure we can accept the mission within those principles. Once we decide we can, we follow these steps to ensure we've managed the associated risk:

1. Identify the hazards (Enemy action, weather, MidAir, CFIT, Runway Incursions, etc)
2. Assess the Risk (each hazard is categorized by its probability and severity - hi/med/lo)
3. Make Risk Decisions (apply the 4 principles to each risk - any violations of principles requires a change of mission profile/time/crew or other factor)
4. Implement controls (wait till daytime, file IFR, increase weather minimums, set altitude minimums for route, increase weapons stand-off ranges etc..)
5. Supervise the process during the flight.

This seems like a complicated and lengthy process but it really isn't when you practice it. We do this during a mission brief in about 10 minutes and in real time during flight in about 30 seconds. There is no reason why any of us can't use this process when flying GA. I do. Its simple, effective and it will when used EVERY flight help you develop better and more instinctive good judgement..I PROMISE YOU!

FWIW

Ken
 
So by heeding some of the advice in this thread (and current FAA training), one might conclude the proper corrective action is to make sure you don't ever stall. My opinion is exactly the opposite - do stalls until the slightest tickle of the stick is burned into your brain; do them until you can recover without even thinking about it. ....
Judgment is very important, no doubt, but so is expanding your comfort zone in the airplane.
I agree completely. Every primary flight student should get lots of training in stalls, spins, and unusual attitude recovery. BFRs and/or annual flight reviews should cover most if not all of these. Stall recognition and recovery should be second nature.

Spins, in particular, should be practiced frequently. Instructors and students should brief on spin recovery before every flight where stalls are to be conducted, and instructors should occasionally consider putting in pro-spin controls at or near one of the stalls and then having the student recover (chutes are not required by the FARs for spin training). There's nothing like the surprise of having the aircraft spin without yourself putting in the pro-spin inputs.

Unusual attitude recovery is similarly useful. How many of us practice it annually? Eyes closed, head down, hands off the stick, instructor takes the airplane until the student is told "recover". It's very disorienting when you think that you're fairly level and instead when you look up, there's nothing but sky visible.

I suppose my focus on spins is because of my work towards my CFI-G. Gliders spend a LOT of time very near stall speed and in 30-45 deg banks and spin training is a major focus. However, any aircraft in the pattern is set up for the dreaded stall/spin problem.

TODR
 
I agree completely. Every primary flight student should get lots of training in stalls, spins, and unusual attitude recovery. BFRs and/or annual flight reviews should cover most if not all of these. Stall recognition and recovery should be second nature.

Spins, in particular, should be practiced frequently. Instructors and students should brief on spin recovery before every flight where stalls are to be conducted, and instructors should occasionally consider putting in pro-spin controls at or near one of the stalls and then having the student recover (chutes are not required by the FARs for spin training). There's nothing like the surprise of having the aircraft spin without yourself putting in the pro-spin inputs.

Unusual attitude recovery is similarly useful. How many of us practice it annually? Eyes closed, head down, hands off the stick, instructor takes the airplane until the student is told "recover". It's very disorienting when you think that you're fairly level and instead when you look up, there's nothing but sky visible.

I suppose my focus on spins is because of my work towards my CFI-G. Gliders spend a LOT of time very near stall speed and in 30-45 deg banks and spin training is a major focus. However, any aircraft in the pattern is set up for the dreaded stall/spin problem.

TODR

The emphasis has to be on stall recognition, recovery, and avoidance. There is no such thing as spin recovery in the traffic pattern.
 
Most stall spin accidents happen at low altitude....

I agree completely. Every primary flight student should get lots of training in stalls, spins, and unusual attitude recovery. BFRs and/or annual flight reviews should cover most if not all of these. Stall recognition and recovery should be second nature.

Spins, in particular, should be practiced frequently. Instructors and students should brief on spin recovery before every flight where stalls are to be conducted, and instructors should occasionally consider putting in pro-spin controls at or near one of the stalls and then having the student recover (chutes are not required by the FARs for spin training). There's nothing like the surprise of having the aircraft spin without yourself putting in the pro-spin inputs.

Unusual attitude recovery is similarly useful. How many of us practice it annually? Eyes closed, head down, hands off the stick, instructor takes the airplane until the student is told "recover". It's very disorienting when you think that you're fairly level and instead when you look up, there's nothing but sky visible.

I suppose my focus on spins is because of my work towards my CFI-G. Gliders spend a LOT of time very near stall speed and in 30-45 deg banks and spin training is a major focus. However, any aircraft in the pattern is set up for the dreaded stall/spin problem.

TODR

All the spin training in the world wont help you if you stall/spin on base to final, where most of the deadly accidents have occured. Your in the ground before you can recover. Recognizing the onset of a stall is where I focus my training.
I spun my 6 in phase I. It is shocking how fast you loose altitude.
It is not recommended for the 6 and I do not practice them in that airplane. I do practice stalls all the time.
It takes a lot to spin an RV, almost a purposeful effort. You have to be really slow, cross controlled, and out of your head to do it, but it seems to still happen. I would suggest that if you have allowed yourself to get that slow in that kind of attitude, you have other training issues.
 
Our ORM process is divided into a set of 4 principles and a 5 step process.

The principles are:

1. Accept no unnecessary risk (why fly under the bridge when flying over it gets me to the same place)
2. Accept risk ONLY when the benefit outweighs the cost (do I really need to launch from the ship at 0300 in dense fog and 30 ft seas just to meet some arbitrary monthly flight hour requirement?)
3. Make risk decisions at the appropriate level (who gets to decide todays mission is worth the loss of the crew and airplane?)
4. Mitigate most risk through proper planning (route planning, weather diverts, fuel management, terrain considerations, enemy capabilities, my currency and proficiency, personal distractions, aircraft performance, etc..)

so before we fly we define our mission, inventory our equipment, discuss our human factors issues, and assess the environment (terrain, weather, threats, etc..) then we look at the principles above and ensure we can accept the mission within those principles. Once we decide we can, we follow these steps to ensure we've managed the associated risk:

1. Identify the hazards (Enemy action, weather, MidAir, CFIT, Runway Incursions, etc)
2. Assess the Risk (each hazard is categorized by its probability and severity - hi/med/lo)
3. Make Risk Decisions (apply the 4 principles to each risk - any violations of principles requires a change of mission profile/time/crew or other factor)
4. Implement controls (wait till daytime, file IFR, increase weather minimums, set altitude minimums for route, increase weapons stand-off ranges etc..)
5. Supervise the process during the flight.

Ken

Ken, please don't take my response as argumentative, but the mission of a military aviator is far different than most of us GA types. For instance, your #1 principle - "Accept no unnecessary risk " is what this thread is all about. Unfortunately, with no "mission", the only appropriate action is in fact inaction. Crosswind component too risky for your personal limits? ...avoid them. Talking on the radio causes task saturation? don't go to towered airports. etc.

Very few of us have a compelling reason to fly, so the strict application of the "4 principles and 5 steps" as described above will direct the GA pilot to curl up into the fetal position and stay in bed.

I guess my main problem with this thread (and flight training in general) is the true lack of emphasis on really bonding with the airplane. My opinion in this matter is formed from personal experience. While I'm still a very new pilot, I have progressed a tremendous amount since my experience with my Hiperbipe. To say the airplane challenged my skills at first would be the understatement of the year. It was (is) a very unforgiving airplane if mishandled and my senses were so far insulated from what the airplane was telling me, I might as well have been flying in a full body cast. However, after 200+ hours the machine is now a part of me. I know how fast I'm going just by feel, I "hear" the airplane yelling at me just as it's about to stall, and the hairs on my neck start to tingle when the wheels are just about to touch the runway... In short, the airplane is essentially hard wired into my senses. This relationship is in sharp contrast to earlier on in our time together, when I almost sold the airplane because it was "too risky" for me to fly. So, bucking much of the wisdom found throughout this thread, I steeled myself to master this evil airplane - no matter what - and did. Now I'm as comfortable upside down as right side up. I'm comfortable making base to final turn at more than 60 degrees of bank, and if wind shear or wake turbulence rolls me on my back right above the threshold, I know I won't instinctively "pull" to recover. My skill set with this airplane is broad enough to handle many surprises - perhaps not all, but I easily handle things today that would have killed me 200 hours ago. Stick and rudder skills are to thank for that. Decision making skills are not to be diminished, but the only way to avoid the unknown events of flying is to stay on the ground... For the rest of us that fly, we better have good stick and rudder skills when the unknown slaps us in the face.

My hope is that in a response to a thread like this, people go fly more challenging missions, not less. We need to find out where the "real" limits are, because the world does not revolve around the artificial limits we set for ourselves.
 
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There is merit to stall awareness/avoidance and spin training.

One of the flaws in our stall training is in practice we approach the stall with a very slow reduction in airspeed. What we seldom, if at all, practice is getting slow and then giving a tug to unhook the airplane. This is an entirely different entry, and depending on the airplane it can have little or no warning.

The 23012 wing on the RVs has never been noted for its great stall characteristics. The Corsair when thru lots of design work to get the airfoil to provide adequate stall warning for a yank and bank fighter.

Some T-6s are very prone to this phenomenon. The slightest stick movement going over the top of a loop, when a little slow and they will snap instantly....

The spin training will involve more aggressive entries that give a better idea how an airplane reacts to a tug from a pilot startled by a bird or some wake turbulence in the base to final turn.

So as Steve Gustafson of the Aeroshell teams says in his southern drawl... "Just be real nice to it and don't pi$$ it off."

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
All the spin training in the world wont help you if you stall/spin on base to final, where most of the deadly accidents have occured. Your in the ground before you can recover...

This is a generally accepted, safe statement... But not entirely true. Many factors contribute to a safe recovery from this situation. How high are you? Is it a full turn? half, quarter? What type of airplane?

I was up cutting toilet paper rolls once and pulled so hard in a left turn (had to get the "kill") that the airplane snap rolled 180 degrees to the right - it went from a vertical bank left to right in the blink of an eye. However, I unloaded the wing and stomped on the rudder halfway through and got it stopped in an instant. This was in essence a "base to final" stall scenario. Though I was nice and high when this happened, there was no noticeable altitude loss.

Avoiding the base-final stall/spin through proper stick and rudder skills is what we strive for, no doubt, and it deserves a healthy amount of respect. However, it is not always a death sentence if one knows how to handle an airplane. After all, Sean Tucker performs low altitude stall/spin maneuvers all the time... And it isn't the waiver issued by the FAA that makes it safe - it's stick and rudder skills.
 
Paul has it right on. In my 25 years of Naval Aviation the vast majority of mishap reports list as 'a' primary casual factor some form of failure of judgement of the Aircraft Commander, PIC or entire crew. What we've learned is that an awful lot of mishaps occur with some of our most skilled aviators at the controls because their judgement didn't match their skill (at the time) and they couldn't recognize the delta. You could be the absolute best stick in the business and still end up a lawn dart if your judgement is out to lunch, however; if your judgement is keen and your skill is mediocre your chances of survival are much, much better. One of our biggest killers and I believe for GA pilots as well is COMPLACENCY which everyone of us capable of falling victim too.

Our mishap rates have steadily declined over the past 20 years.....

FWIW

Ken

Interesting post, Ken. It wasn't always like that in the Navy or Air Force.

A very good friend resigned from the Navy over safety issues in the '60's. He was an A4 pilot with a couple cruise experiences and the accident rate in that airplane was very bad. To quote regarding the design of the A4 -

"The Skyhawk was designed by Douglas Aircraft's Ed Heinemann in response to a U.S. Navy call for a jet-powered attack aircraft to replace the older AD Skyraider.[1] Heinemann opted for a design that would minimize its size, weight, and complexity. The result was an aircraft that weighed only half of the Navy's weight specification. It had a wing so compact that it did not need to be folded for carrier stowage. The diminutive Skyhawk soon received the nicknames "Scooter", "Kiddiecar", "Bantam Bomber", "Tinker Toy Bomber", and, on account of its nimble performance, "Heinemann's Hot-Rod"."

The airplane was so light, it did not have a battery. If the alternator failed at night, the flight was over and that's exactly what happened to his commander during a night launch, the carrier ran over him and that was it. Was the A4 fleet ever grounded because it was not designed to be a night fighter - I don't think so.

The point here being, there was a time when decision making for the pilot was out of his hands. You were along for the ride like everyone else. Same was true in the USAF. It was very difficult to get anyone's attention above the local level because upper level policy and design matters were like in concrete. The KC-135 water wagon lost more thrust with a loss of water injection on one side than if an engine failed, but no one wanted to discuss the matter notwithstanding that the electric water pumps failed more often that did an engine.

What does that have to do with the subject of RV safety? Not much, actually, except to show that looking to the military for guidance has its limitations. It was my experience the mission always took precedence over safety. During peace time, safety was on the surface but when the shooting starts, the mission comes first even to the extend of one way missions. Crews and aircraft were expendable when Russia was the enemy.

I maintain the focus here has to be on basic flying skills because so many guys do not fly enough to stay proficient. ADM is important, no question, but we do not have the luxury of class room training as do military and airline operations. I dare say, unless the pilot is a current CFI or a professional in the military or commercial transportation, he does not know much about ADM. How could he with the cost and time constraints of training for the typical new pilot?

When I do a BFR with anyone the emphasis is on basic flying skills. There simply isn't enough time to get into ADM at the expense of passing up an opportunity to work on flying the airplane safely.
 
With all due respect...

This is a generally accepted, safe statement... But not entirely true. Many factors contribute to a safe recovery from this situation. How high are you? Is it a full turn? half, quarter? What type of airplane?

I was up cutting toilet paper rolls once and pulled so hard in a left turn (had to get the "kill") that the airplane snap rolled 180 degrees to the right - it went from a vertical bank left to right in the blink of an eye. However, I unloaded the wing and stomped on the rudder halfway through and got it stopped in an instant. This was in essence a "base to final" stall scenario. Though I was nice and high when this happened, there was no noticeable altitude loss.

Avoiding the base-final stall/spin through proper stick and rudder skills is what we strive for, no doubt, and it deserves a healthy amount of respect. However, it is not always a death sentence if one knows how to handle an airplane. After all, Sean Tucker performs low altitude stall/spin maneuvers all the time... And it isn't the waiver issued by the FAA that makes it safe - it's stick and rudder skills.

An accelerated stall, your snap roll, is not a typical base to final scenerio at all. Read the accident reports. Most witness report a wing wagging, slushing scenerio prior to stall, a low speed event, low g event.
I have seen Sean's act, held the ribbon for him once. He may recover from a low altitude spin, but I have never seen him enter one at pattern altitude.
I believe it is a death sentence in an RV as I have never heard of anyone recovering from a base to final spin. Of course, nobody would probably advertise they did it.
I am sure it depends on the type of airplane, absolutely, but this discussion is about RV safety. I have spun my 6. There is no way I could recover from a base to final spin at pattern altitude in an RV regardless of my stick and rudder skills. I lost 500' in the 1st 1/4 turn, and you cant stop and recover nose down.
 
The emphasis has to be on stall recognition, recovery, and avoidance. There is no such thing as spin recovery in the traffic pattern.
I agree that the emphasis should be on stalls. If the airplane doesn't stall, it won't spin, period. Stall recognition, prevention and recovery is more important than spin training. I've seen too many pilots afraid of stalling and get WAY too aggressive in recovery.

But if the airplane approaches an incipient spin, even in the patten, you should just give up since there's no spin recovery in the pattern? I'm not going to, nor am I going to teach my students to. We hear about the pattern stall/spin accidents where there was no recovery since the NTSB investigates them, but we don't hear about all the recoveries since they have happier endings.

Part of the importance of spin training - to me, anyway - is to understand what a spin looks like, what the airplane feels like when it is starting to enter it and how to recover. Does the student / pilot know how to use the rudder in an incipient stall/spin? If you don't practice it, you aren't going to know what it looks and feels like and how you can recover with the minimum loss of altitude. Spin training isn't all about letting the aircraft get into a nice autorotating spin and recovering (although it is fun), it's also about proper recovery from spin entry and incipient spins. I practice spin entry both for the pattern turn scenario and from thermaling (sailplanes only).

Spins are a bit like many other issues in safety, aircraft or otherwise. You can say "never stall, and you never need to worry about spinning". To me, this is a lot like "there's no need for VFR pilots to get instrument training, since they should never fly into IMC."

Besides not stalling the other thing you can do is keep the ball centered / yawstring straight. RVs don't seem to require a lot of rudder to stay coordinated in turns, but this is not true of all aircraft.

TODR
 
Airplanes Spin differently....

I agree that the emphasis should be on stalls. If the airplane doesn't stall, it won't spin, period. Stall recognition, prevention and recovery is more important than spin training. I've seen too many pilots afraid of stalling and get WAY too aggressive in recovery.

But if the airplane approaches an incipient spin, even in the patten, you should just give up since there's no spin recovery in the pattern? I'm not going to, nor am I going to teach my students to. We hear about the pattern stall/spin accidents where there was no recovery since the NTSB investigates them, but we don't hear about all the recoveries since they have happier endings.

Part of the importance of spin training - to me, anyway - is to understand what a spin looks like, what the airplane feels like when it is starting to enter it and how to recover. Does the student / pilot know how to use the rudder in an incipient stall/spin? If you don't practice it, you aren't going to know what it looks and feels like and how you can recover with the minimum loss of altitude. Spin training isn't all about letting the aircraft get into a nice autorotating spin and recovering (although it is fun), it's also about proper recovery from spin entry and incipient spins. I practice spin entry both for the pattern turn scenario and from thermaling (sailplanes only).

Spins are a bit like many other issues in safety, aircraft or otherwise. You can say "never stall, and you never need to worry about spinning". To me, this is a lot like "there's no need for VFR pilots to get instrument training, since they should never fly into IMC."

Besides not stalling the other thing you can do is keep the ball centered / yawstring straight. RVs don't seem to require a lot of rudder to stay coordinated in turns, but this is not true of all aircraft.

TODR

So, how do you practice spinning in an aicraft prohibited from spins? You can practice in another type, but that will behave differently.
I do practice spins in my Bucker, a pussycat in spins, and they are fun. However, I dont know if that skill set translates to my RV. I am sure it doesnt hurt.
Your other points are well taken and yes, there is no substitute for any kind of practice or training, spins or otherwise.
 
So, how do you practice spinning in an aicraft prohibited from spins? You can practice in another type, but that will behave differently.
I do practice spins in my Bucker, a pussycat in spins, and they are fun. However, I dont know if that skill set translates to my RV. I am sure it doesnt hurt.
Your other points are well taken and yes, there is no substitute for any kind of practice or training, spins or otherwise.

If you are competent in spins and feel it is a benifit to your safety training, you might consider practicing spins in your RV-6? I don't know about your RV-6, but in mine, I tested to 2 turn spins during Phase 1. I've read lots of bad stuff about RV-6 spins, but my experience is that if you are within Van's suggested W&B envelope for acro in the RV-6 (1375#, 68.7-75.3"), 2 turn or less spins are great. I do not enter them below 3K ft AGL, but the altitude loss does not seem to be worse than a C150 aerobat. My RV-6 goes into a spin rather abruptly and spins kind of quick, so it took me by surprise the first time I tried it. When I apply anti spin control, the spin stops immediately. Now that I'm used to it, I find them lots of fun. I've not tried more than a 2 turn spin because of other posts on the topic and I just chicken out. I definitly recommend against trying spins (or any acro) when operating outside of the acro CG limits van's recommends.
 
So, how do you practice spinning in an aicraft prohibited from spins? You can practice in another type, but that will behave differently.
Excellent point. Unfortunately I don't think there is a good answer. My suggestion would be at some point, getting practice spinning in different aircraft. The Citabria and Decathalon are fairly widely available for instruction and spin nicely. Also try spinning at different CGs, since that will affect spin characteristics. (When we practice spinning in the ASK21, we normally use one more tail weight than the chart calls for, in order to allow the glider to get in a nice fully developed spin.)

TODR
 
I maintain the focus here has to be on basic flying skills because so many guys do not fly enough to stay proficient. ADM is important, no question, but we do not have the luxury of class room training as do military and airline operations. I dare say, unless the pilot is a current CFI or a professional in the military or commercial transportation, he does not know much about ADM. How could he with the cost and time constraints of training for the typical new pilot?

David,

I must strongly disagree. To say that we can not, and should not, discuss and learn ADM is in a forum like this is wrong.

I believe that ADM can be more effectively taught in a forum like this than basic flying skills.

The costs and time constraints that you accurately mention are exactly why we need to have discussions like this, so that those not in Commercial or Military aviation can learn from some very highly experienced pilots who have that knowledge and experience and can share it here.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
So, how do you practice spinning in an aicraft prohibited from spins? You can practice in another type, but that will behave differently.

The reason why spin training transfers between most airplanes is because most are very spin resistant. The big deal about spin training is that unless you have done enough spins to be somewhat comfortable, when it happens, even if intentional, some folks brain locks up.

If a pilot has been taught PARE and completes any 2 of the steps, most GA airplanes will stop spinning. If they lock up and keep pulling the stick back and try to stop the spin with outside aileron, it will tighten up.

Being able to recognize and react are the keys steps and that skill is very transferable....

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

PS
PARE = Power-idle Ailerons-neutral Rudder-opposite Elevator-neutral.

Power to idle and Let go works in most airplanes, but in the T-6 with an Aft CG it doesn't so I teach PARE.
 
The reason why spin training transfers between most airplanes is because most are very spin resistant. The big deal about spin training is that unless you have done enough spins to be somewhat comfortable, when it happens, even if intentional, some folks brain locks up.

If a pilot has been taught PARE and completes any 2 of the steps, most GA airplanes will stop spinning. If they lock up and keep pulling the stick back and try to stop the spin with outside aileron, it will tighten up.

Being able to recognize and react are the keys steps and that skill is very transferable....

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

PS
PARE = Power-idle Ailerons-neutral Rudder-opposite Elevator-neutral.

Power to idle and Let go works in most airplanes, but in the T-6 with an Aft CG it doesn't so I teach PARE.

I'll bet you remember the T-37 Bold Face...

:D

Edit - whups, you may not - had a moment of LysDexia and saw, "B52Flyer" instead of "B25Flyer"

Anyway, it's a bit different but PARE would have recovered them, too.
 
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judgement - great advice - ADM

.... You could be the absolute best stick in the business and still end up a lawn dart if your judgement is out to lunch, however; if your judgement is keen and your skill is mediocre your chances of survival are much, much better. ...

Ken
Gents, I really appreciate you guys taking the time to share your experience and wisdom.

I found this interesting presentation on Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) here: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sour...PeoAUZmYKvz9jY5Dw&sig2=caUvzrDszAJy0sdkMIyErw
 
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An accelerated stall, your snap roll, is not a typical base to final scenerio at all. Read the accident reports. Most witness report a wing wagging, slushing scenerio prior to stall, a low speed event, low g event...

My point was presented poorly, let me try again.

My snap roll was the result of exceeding the critical angle of attack while in sloppy, uncoordinated flight. This is exactly what causes a base to final stall/spin, so in that respect they are the same scenario. In my example, the airplane passed through the incipient stall warning phase so quickly that I was only able to recognize the event after the airplane was fully stalled and rotation had begun. However, because of the relationship I have with my airplane, I responded instantly and correctly without even thinking about it. Which even reinforces my point further - How can a "competent" pilot, one who truly knows the limits of his airplane, possibly allow a "wing wagging, slushing scenerio prior to stall" degrade into a fully developed spin?

My answer - a "competent" pilot most likely will not. If the airplane is giving enough warning for someone on the GROUND to recognize it, what does that say about the pilot?

Points to poor stick and rudder skills.
 
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