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2009 Fatal RV Accidents

Your are right...

If you are competent in spins and feel it is a benifit to your safety training, you might consider practicing spins in your RV-6? I don't know about your RV-6, but in mine, I tested to 2 turn spins during Phase 1. I've read lots of bad stuff about RV-6 spins, but my experience is that if you are within Van's suggested W&B envelope for acro in the RV-6 (1375#, 68.7-75.3"), 2 turn or less spins are great. I do not enter them below 3K ft AGL, but the altitude loss does not seem to be worse than a C150 aerobat. My RV-6 goes into a spin rather abruptly and spins kind of quick, so it took me by surprise the first time I tried it. When I apply anti spin control, the spin stops immediately. Now that I'm used to it, I find them lots of fun. I've not tried more than a 2 turn spin because of other posts on the topic and I just chicken out. I definitly recommend against trying spins (or any acro) when operating outside of the acro CG limits van's recommends.
I tested to two turns in phase I as well. I do them occasionaly, but not enough to call it practice. As you know, you have to be really committed to start the spin and then hold it until it fully develops. Any amount of release of pressure until it is fully developed and the darn thing just fly's right out of it!
Vans actually makes a statement somewhere that although they do not recommend spinning the 6, they are unaware of any incident or accident that resulted from lack of recovery.
Good stuff.
 
Agreed....

My point was presented poorly, let me try again.

My snap roll was the result of exceeding the critical angle of attack while in sloppy, uncoordinated flight. This is exactly what causes a base to final stall/spin, so in that respect they are the same scenario. In my example, the airplane passed through the incipient stall warning phase so quickly that I was only able to recognize the event after the airplane was fully stalled and rotation had begun. However, because of the relationship I have with my airplane, I responded instantly and correctly without even thinking about it. Which even reinforces my point further - How can a "competent" pilot, one who truly knows the limits of his airplane, possibly allow a "wing wagging, slushing scenerio prior to stall" degrade into a fully developed spin?

My answer - a "competent" pilot most likely will not. If the airplane is giving enough warning for someone on the GROUND to recognize it, what does that say about the pilot?

Points to poor stick and rudder skills.

I am shocked when I hear about these types of accidents. I just cant imagine being so out of touch with the airplane.
 
David,

I must strongly disagree. To say that we can not, and should not, discuss and learn ADM is in a forum like this is wrong.

I believe that ADM can be more effectively taught in a forum like this than basic flying skills.

The costs and time constraints that you accurately mention are exactly why we need to have discussions like this, so that those not in Commercial or Military aviation can learn from some very highly experienced pilots who have that knowledge and experience and can share it here.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

Without diminishing your points, I'd like to add some perspective.

While I agree that commercial and military flying has benefitted much from formal ADM, there is a huge difference between flying as a "process" (commercial and military) and flying as a "skill" (the rest of us). I count many close friends who are current or former military aviators, and I have learned a great deal from many of them, but it was a recent comment from a current KC-135 pilot which spoke volumes. After flying with me in the Hiperbipe he said, "you know, I have thousands of hours in Air Force aircraft, but I really didn't know how to fly until I got checked out in a taildragger". Many other of my friends have also expressed similar sentiments. This is also why the Navy and Air Force test pilot schools will use a variety of light aircraft as test platforms for their students. In fact, I read an article that described an aircraft used in the Navy test pilot syllabus that could quickly humble the hottest F-18 pilots - the Pitts S2.

As it turns out, "heavy iron" is largely flown by numbers on a performance chart - it's largely a process to be managed. On the other hand, those of us with the bug smashers have to "feel" what is happening to fly safely - numbers on a performance chart are a good guide, but don't tell the whole story by a long shot.

The fact is, most military and commercial aviators have as much to learn about "aviating" as the rest of us do about ADM... Let's make sure not to ignore one for the other.
 
I am shocked when I hear about these types of accidents. I just cant imagine being so out of touch with the airplane.

Jon,

I am not picking on you, but this statement points to the root of the problem... We read an accident report about a base to final SSCBD Stall, Spin, Crash, Burn, Die, and surmise, What kind of idiot could do that?

What if you knew the guy and he was just as capable, and current as yourself? Ya see, I have lost lots of really good friends, many of which were far better fliers than I could ever hope to be..... And absolutely capable of doing what ever it was that killed them, had not some other small factor not been loaded in their wagon on that day....

That's why I am in a continuous search for the human factors that caused my friends to bust their butts.... Because if it happened to them, then it certainly could happen to me....

That search, not always, but often, leads to ADM, in short, attitude. I like understanding how things work, and the mind of a pilot provides an endless amount study....

The other reason why ADM intrigues me so much is that I fly nearly 400 hrs per year. I am 51 years old, and there is little chance that my stick and rudder skills will get a whole lot better in the next 25 years that I intend to continue flying, if I can.

I fly in some very high risk aviation environments, Warbirds, Airshow Low level Acro, Homebuilts, First Flights, Multi-engine Flight Instruction... The best chance I have of beating the odds are exploiting every thing that puts another ace in my deck and these kinds of discussions give risk management top of mind awareness for me.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
Jon,

I am not picking on you, but this statement points to the root of the problem... We read an accident report about a base to final SSCBD Stall, Spin, Crash, Burn, Die, and surmise, What kind of idiot could do that?

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

However, we all know of pilots who DO "lock up" when things get out of their comfort zone - THESE are the pilots that come to mind in accident reports, not those that fought and lost a heroic battle with the airplane.
 
Kind of taken out of context....

Jon,

I am not picking on you, but this statement points to the root of the problem... We read an accident report about a base to final SSCBD Stall, Spin, Crash, Burn, Die, and surmise, What kind of idiot could do that?

What if you knew the guy and he was just as capable, and current as yourself? Ya see, I have lost lots of really good friends, many of which were far better fliers than I could ever hope to be..... And absolutely capable of doing what ever it was that killed them, had not some other small factor not been loaded in their wagon on that day....

That's why I am in a continuous search for the human factors that caused my friends to bust their butts.... Because if it happened to them, then it certainly could happen to me....

That search, not always, but often, leads to ADM, in short, attitude. I like understanding how things work, and the mind of a pilot provides an endless amount study....

The other reason why ADM intrigues me so much is that I fly nearly 400 hrs per year. I am 51 years old, and there is little chance that my stick and rudder skills will get a whole lot better in the next 25 years that I intend to continue flying, if I can.

I fly in some very high risk aviation environments, Warbirds, Airshow Low level Acro, Homebuilts, First Flights, Multi-engine Flight Instruction... The best chance I have of beating the odds are exploiting every thing that puts another ace in my deck and these kinds of discussions give risk management top of mind awareness for me.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

I do get your point. I know it can happen to me, but I am still surprised, and indeed shocked, when I hear about stall/spin accidents.
 
I do get your point. I know it can happen to me, but I am still surprised, and indeed shocked, when I hear about stall/spin accidents.

Jon,

If you agree that it could happen to you, or someone else with good stick and rudder skills, then don't you believe discussing the factors beyond the stick and rudder stuff is a worthwhile exercise?

The first step in that process is acknowledging the risk, that is what started this thread, 18 dead friends in RVs last year.... Too many...

And then following up by discussing stuff like ADM, risk mitigation, recurrent training that includes self critique of both basic flying skills and ADM skills....

That is the whole point of this exercise and I appreciate very much your questions that keep the ball rolling and moving in new directions.

As you can tell I am passionate about this issue. In the Warbird world we have terrible accident statistics. I was the chief of Stand-Eval in the CAF when we had a rash of accidents that was going to ground our fleet because of insurance. Myself and others went on a crusade to change the culture within that community.

It is really tough work, and to some degree it requires a generational shift. We have to teach the young ones well. There is little hope of changing the overcoming the habits of a lifetime in the old hardheads. Most believe, and I hope, that we are making some slow progress in the Warbird world. We have a long way to go however.

Tailwinds,
Doug
 
SPINS

An interesting study is to look at the history of competetion aerobatics in the US in the IAC era. Spins are a part of almost every competetion flight. In 20 years of involvement, I do not recall a single incident or accident involving a spin in a contest. In the Advanced and Unlimited categories spins are frequently done at low altitudes. Conversely, IAC has a horrid record of members spinning into the ground during practice flights. My only explanation is that the contests are a much more disciplined environment, where there is little or no tolerance for showing off. This is at best, a partial explanation.

Regarding the base to final scenario, the top rudder stall/incipient spin is very recoverable in most light aircraft if addressed early enough. In the bottom rudder scenario, if the pilot winds up even slightly inverted, recovery is unlikely, unless the pilot is very proficient in aerobatics.
One article about the 2009 Unlimited Gold Reno Race talks of two cases where there was a momentary loss of control in wake turbulence. Both were non events because of pilot skill. This at 500 m/h a few feet off the ground.
 
Mike - While military aviation does have a subset of missions that GA does not, I believe our ORM process absolutely applies - in fact it applies to hanging Christmas lights on the house, or frying a turkey in a 10 gal vat of boiling peanut oil (and if you have not had this you are missing out...but I digress). ORM can and should be used everywhere to minimize all sorts of avoidable mishaps in and out of aviation. I require all my troops to conduct an ORM evaluation prior to going on leave outside a 300 mile radius..nothing to do with flying. We ask our Mx chiefs to conduct ORM prior to spotting the aircraft on the flight deck (too many guys getting rolled over with a 25,000 lb aircraft). Going hunting for the weekend..conduct ORM. Going to the beach with the kids...ORM (sunburn, undertow, sea life are all potential hazards that can easily be mitigated through a 3 minute discussion with the kids). Going boating...ORM. Point made?

The GA pilot mission could be to get from Pt A to Pt B.. (which has caused a lot of GA pilots to die due to poor fuel management). Unnecessary risk associated with this mission would be to accept weather conditions the pilot has not trained in or the airplane is not equipped to handle. Or choosing a route over mountainous terrain when another less dangerous route exists.

Or the mission might be to practice aerobatics just for fun. Unnecessary risk would be to conduct a loop at 500 ft when the same loop could be done at 5000 ft.

And it is absolutely not impossible to teach ADM or ORM outside a classroom. I'm also a CFI and do this every flight and during every BFR through the use of scenarios - be creative and give your student a cross-country scenario in which fuel management is a critical factor and see how their thought process progresses. Guide them when they go astray. Take the controls from your student and while you distract them with great questions, start a slow descent and see if they catch you and question you about it. Simulate a bird strike at altitude and do not allow them to fly back to home base...evaluate their decisions through discussion. There is so much more to training and mentoring than flying airspeed and altitude but it does take some prep and creative on your part.

As a formally trained test pilot I've had the good fortune to fly a ridiculous number and type of aircraft (including a blimp - which is a lot harder than you might think!) and one thing I've learned - you can teach a monkey to fly any plane well enough (I'm looking in the mirror folks) but it takes a lot of effort to teach them good judgement and it will never be good enough for all circumstances.
 
Because if it happened to them, then it certainly could happen to me....

I reject this idea. Who was the famous guy who flew into a bad thunderstorm in Georgia (?) and died?

I would have to screw up horrendously to have that happen to me.

I have no idea what caused the accidents that result in people saying this, but it probably was not a skill issue.

PS: I don't disagree that some (unknown percentage but probably low) accidents are skills related.
 
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Of course I do...

Jon,

If you agree that it could happen to you, or someone else with good stick and rudder skills, then don't you believe discussing the factors beyond the stick and rudder stuff is a worthwhile exercise?

Tailwinds,
Doug

...and I am glad you are passionate about it!
 
I reject this idea. Who was the famous guy who flew into a bad thunderstorm in Georgia (?) and died?

I would have to screw up horrendously to have that happen to me.

I have no idea what caused the accidents that result in people saying this, but it probably was not a skill issue.

PS: I don't disagree that some (unknown percentage but probably low) accidents are skills related.

Ron,

You have picked a perfect example.....

The guy that crashed in the thunderstorm was Scott Crossfield.... He could fly the crate your airplane came in... He flew some of the most dangerous and scary airplanes ever built and he pulled it off, just to get himself killed in a Cessna 210 picking his way thru a line of thunderstorms.....

So how does that happen, and what if Scott could come back and talk to us, what would he say????

I met him a couple of times and he was a class act. I would bet a weeks wages that he would be the first to say that all of us need to be ever vigilant about our ADM and our arrogance. If we think that an airplane can't get us, or if we let your guard down and begin to think we have this aviation thing figured out..... Someone will get hurt....

So what are the traps that catch pilots? They have never changed. Thunderstorms, X-winds, Formation, buzzing, acro, etc, etc, etc.... All of these risks can be managed, what gets us is arrogance....

As pilots we have to have a high level of self confidence to load our family and friends in an airplane built in a garage....

A pilot has to have a high level of self confidence to think that when the engine quits, which it will some day, we can squeeze our airplane into some small pasture, parking lot, or golf course, and then fire up our cell phone and call flight service to tell them we are safe and sound on the ground.....

As pilots we must have that level of self confidence and yet keep that self confidence in check so that we become so arrogant as to think we can handle the thunderstorm that killed Crossfield, or the crosswind that killed several RV pilots last year, or the blown formation joinup that killed another RV pilot last year or do roll at low altitude like a pilot has done a hundred times before at altitude, or a few miles of scuzzy weather to get to the good weather at the destination....

These are the examples of risks where pilots were unable to manage the balance between self confidence and arrogance, last year...

I know what I would call anyone that thinks they have that delicate balance between self confidence and arrogance all squared away.... It isn't self confident....

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
I think the Crosssfield accident is also an example of how outcomes can be affected by the quantity and quality of information available. You can sometimes make logical decisions based on bad or limited information and have bad outcomes. Here is a portion of the NTSB report on his accident:

"At 10:18 am, the pilot checked-in with Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and was subsequently handled by four sectors. The accident airplane was cleared to 11,000 feet. The pilot was not issued weather advisories or related SIGMETS, according to Atlanta ARTCC voice communications. At 11:09:28 am, the pilot asked to deviate to the south due to weather. Atlanta ARTCC approved the turn to the south, but radar contact was lost at 11:10:02 am at 5,500 feet. Recorded radar data indicate that the accident airplane entered a level 6 thunderstorm prior to the loss of radar contact."

The complete advisory can be found here http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2006/060427a.htm[/URL

All the flying skill in the world did not save him from a lack of information. I don't know if the 210 he was flying had weather radar or XM Weather.
 
All the flying skill in the world did not save him from a lack of information. I don't know if the 210 he was flying had weather radar or XM Weather.

Yes he had XM and you accurately highlight another hazard in our business. The information we get from all our electronic gizmos is so precise that we presume it to be as accurate as it is precise....

For example, XM Nexrad data might be couple minutes old when we get it, and add the 5 minute cycle time and it could be 7 minutes old when the next image comes down. The entire life of a thunderstorm cell is about 30 minutes. But the developing stage might only show light precip, or nothing at all on radar. I have been flying next to big cells with nothing depicted on XM and then the next update shows a big red blob.... This was believed to be a factor in Crossfield's accident.

Another example. I have a Zaon, and at first it was connected to my -396 for display.. The problem was on the 396 screen the traffic is displayed very precisely, even though the bearing and range are just approximations. I disconnected the link and now display it on the unit sitting on the glareshield. It justs point a general direction with an estimated range. This is a much better human machine interface (HMI) than that 396 display because of the disparity between the accuracy and the precision.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
Good thread! Crossfield /XM comment:

I also wondered if he had some sort of XM system on board. The NTSB must not have known if he had on-board weather, other than lightning. They were maybe being specific about the panel mount stuff, but it would seem they would have mentioned if he had a handheld XM on board. Only that he had an account:

"The pilot obtained several weather briefings before departure. At that time, the current weather along the route of flight showed significant convective activity and a moving squall line, and the forecast predicted significant thunderstorm activity along the planned route of flight. The pilot also discussed the weather with an acquaintance, mentioning that he might need to work his way around some weather. On the basis of the weather information obtained by the pilot and his comments regarding the weather, the pilot was aware before departure that he would likely encounter adverse weather along the planned route of flight; however, by the time the airplane encountered the weather, the pilot had been airborne for over an hour and had not requested any updated weather information from air traffic controllers. The airplane was equipped with a BF Goodrich WX-950 Stormscope, which has some ability to depict the location and frequency of lightning strikes in the vicinity of the airplane; however, the investigation could not determine if and how this equipment may have been used during the flight. The airplane was not configured to display satellite weather information on its global positioning systems."

Additional detail:

"The pilot had an active weather account with XM Satellite Radio and subscribed to the basic weather package (XM Wx Aviator LT). According to XM Satellite Radio, no outages or interruptions of service were encountered on the day of the accident. XM Satellite Radio does not have the ability to track its product's location or to identify if and when a subscriber accesses or uses its weather products. The airplane was not modified with the required antenna and datalink receiver to display satellite weather information, according to airplane maintenance records and FAA documentation."
 
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The many passionate post concerning ADM are thought provoking, and I find myself in violent agreement with much of it. However, if we can put that on the shelf for just a moment, is there anyone out there who thinks stick and rudder skills good enough to pass a checkride or BFR is really "good enough"?

I am passionate about stick and rudder skills because I have grown rapidly over the years while other pilots I know have remained stagnant. I am passionate about stick and rudder skills because I know there are CFI's out there that instruct that the rudder pedals are only to be used on the ground (sad, but true). I am passionate about stick and rudder skills because you can never be "good enough".

It is my belief that superior stick and rudder skills are developed by finding the edges of the performance envelope and getting comfortable there. Increasing the envelope means you have a large margin to go to when operating in your normal environment. As an example, given two otherwise equally qualified pilots and aircraft; one based at a short narrow strip, and the other on a 300x10,000 concrete former military base, who has the upper hand in a "normal" landing scenario? Who has the upper hand in a forced landing scenario? I contend it's the same guy - the one used to flying closer to the limit of the aircraft capabilities.

Perhaps presenting ADM and "skills" as competing with each other has polarized this discussion somewhat. There really should not be two camps, but should be interwoven as two very important aspects of flying safety as a whole. In retrospect, my original delivery method was polarizing and argumentative, however, my original intent was to point out that conventional wisdom, developed by decades of FAA mandated training, seems to focus on risk avoidance at the expense of developing superior stick and rudder skills.

You may have 1000 hours in your RV, but if that time was logged going cross country while on autopilot, all the ADM skills in the world go right out the window if you cannot comfortably fly at minimum airspeed while trying to thread your way into a soccer field after the engine quits.

So to sum up, I think the appropriate response to reading accident reports is a careful evaluation of your own skills rather than a blanket plea to constrict our personal limits. While restraint might be good advice for some pilots, I think most of us would greatly benefit from expanding our knowledge of the airplane. I think most of us need the larger safety margin afforded by knowing the exact size of the envelope, and finally, I know I will benefit from more stick and rudder skills, because I am not yet "good enough".
 
Time to address the broader issue

There have been 118 posts on this safety thread to date and predictably not ONE of them has dealt with the issue of poor workmanship and the implications thereof for flight accidents/fatalities. As a group we're all gung ho about preaching good airmanship but obviously much more reluctant to preach the importance of good workmanship based on sound knowledge.

The data within the 2008 Nall report indicates that aircraft "mechanical failures" accounted for more accidents than any other accident type for both GA generally (GA), and for Amateur-built specifically (AB).

For GA generally, 15.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. For AB specifically, 20.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. This data clearly says to me that AB aircraft are substantially more prone to mechanical failure than certificated aircraft...despite the fact that the average age of the certificated GA fleet is perhaps 2 decades older than the AB fleet.

The data confirms that many amateur builders have not developed the skill set to safely instal and subsequently maintain their powerplants.

By comparison "Manoeuvering" accidents (those low altitude stunts largely blamed by many for the poor Amateur-built crash record) accounted for only 6.6% of all GA prangs and only 9.3% of AB prangs.

The famous Dan Lloyd RV10 accident is an incident that fully highlights the problem. In that case the facts when they fully emerged quite clearly indicated that the cause of the fatality was appalling workmanship and flawed design decisions. And yet people continue to throw up the accident as another example of poor pilotage.

I'm coming to the conclusion that it is easier for many people in the RV community to critisise the extent of poor airmanship than it is for them to acknowledge the extent of poor build quality (particularly FWF).

To fly safely you need a safe plane to start with. All the prudent no-go decisions in the world may count for nothing if that single donk up front subsequently quits over inhospitable terrain.
 
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Bob,

You've echoed several of my beliefs in your reply, which is precisely why I'm so grateful to have a good friend that is an A&P based on my field. I use him to hopefully lower my chance of a mechanical failure forward of the firewall.

  • He looks over my cowling every time I take it off (I pay him with lunch usually). And usually he finds something to address that I didn't catch.
  • He does the annuals, even though I can legally do them. (I pay him, and he always finds something.)
  • He oversees ALL my firewall forward work (I help and always learn something, but I don't feel qualified to be the only set of eyes that decides how things should be under the cowl). Maybe in another decade or so....
I'll work on the lawnmower engine and the scooter's engine, but not the airplane's (without professional help). Too much riding it.

I tell non-flying friends that our family's plane is amatuer built, but the engine is professionally maintained.

b,
d
 
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Excellent suggestion ...

That's a good idea, Doug. I've thought about it a lot over the years of building. Yeah, I built the plane ... but I don't know a darned thing about the engine. I hooked wire A to connection B, and everything works ... but that's not exactly peace of mind for me.

I've considered asking the A&P/IA on our field to join me for my first condition inspection. I'd pay him, of course, and would feel MUCH better when I'm done, knowing that someone who knows intimately the innards of an engine has lent a hand.

My only concern is that the time he has visited my hangar and nosed around, he just grins like a kid in a candy store. "Man, I LOVE a brand-new plane ... you should see what I usually have to work on..." :D
 
Toolbuilder, I agree that lots of work needs to be done on basic stick and rudder skills.... But whatever level the skills are at, whether it be, not good enough to fly, or so good that I think I could never inadvertently stall an airplane, ADM or judgment is a major factor in that equation. Good pilots work tirelessly on both in an endless journey of self improvement and self awarness.

With regard to maintenance and workmanship, I yield to those qualified to discuss the issues in that area, and encourage that discussion here as well.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
....The famous Dan Lloyd RV10 accident is an incident that fully highlights the problem. In that case the facts when they fully emerged quite clearly indicated that the cause of the fatality was appalling workmanship and flawed design decisions. And yet people continue to throw up the accident as another example of poor pilotage....

The Lloyd accident would have been a non-event if he had elected to land in any of corn fields in the area. Instead he landed going into a road from the side and flipped over on it.

Yes, the event was started with a mechanical failure of sorts, but it did not have to end the way it did. The last part was pilot controllable and it is a mystery why it ended the way it did.

I don't place all that much stock in government statistics. They have a difficult time getting anything right.
 
I've considered asking the A&P/IA on our field to join me for my first condition inspection. I'd pay him, of course, and would feel MUCH better when I'm done, knowing that someone who knows intimately the innards of an engine has lent a hand.

My only concern is that the time he has visited my hangar and nosed around, he just grins like a kid in a candy store. "Man, I LOVE a brand-new plane ... you should see what I usually have to work on..." :D

Don,

I think you just answered your own question......

Tailwinds,
Doug
 
The Chain

The Lloyd accident would have been a non-event if he had elected to land in any of corn fields in the area. Instead he landed going into a road from the side and flipped over on it.

Yes, the event was started with a mechanical failure of sorts, but it did not have to end the way it did. The last part was pilot controllable and it is a mystery why it ended the way it did.

I don't place all that much stock in government statistics. They have a difficult time getting anything right.

Any aircraft accident/incident/crash, is the result of a chain of events. The Dan Lloyd event is a perfect example. The chain started months or years before the crash in the form of poor engineering decisions and being in a rush to go flying. The list of inoperative or uncalibrated equipment combined with the lack of training was frightening. The final link was the emergency landing. This, I suspect, involved trying to "save that airplane" rather than landing in an open corn field.

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA
 
What do I do myself?

Well...

Yesterday I spent about an hour and a half practicing basic stick and rudder skills. Part of good decision making for me includes realizing that some of my flying time should be spent practicing basic skills, not just going out and flying around or getting from point A to point B. I'm still a new pilot (only about 225 hours over three years).

Before the flight I made a detailed checklist of skills to review and tasks to accomplish. It mostly included stuff like a flight review, but also a few that might not be. Some of them were inspired by reading the articles in the Safety section of Van's Airforce, http://www.vansairforce.net/safety.htm. After the flight I spent some time reviewing the list, sort of grading myself and how I did, and noting where I need to improve.

One of my resolutions for this year is to do a "general practice" flight like this on a regular basis. I want to keep sharp, and hopefully get a bit sharper.

Also, regarding the other side of the issue -- decision making skills...

Before going to the airport I also wrote down a list of questions regarding the plane that I fly (not an RV yet) and spent some time discussing them with the guy I rent my plane from. He spent several years flying for the company that builds the plane, and wrote the ASA book about the plane. I'm lucky to have access to such a good resource.

So for me, I try to practice my basic skills, and improve the information I have that allows me to make good decisions. Hopefully, this process is an exercise in good decision making, so that that my good decision making skills are not getting rusty either. Hopefully, they're getting better.
 
Thanks Doug

First of all, thank you Doug (and the others) for what I think is the most enlightened internet forum discussion I have read on aviation safety. It is refreshing to see people face the statistics squarely and deal with some sobering realities.

When I first started into flying and then into RV building, I too was concerned with the apparent unusually high numbers of deaths amongst RVers considering the relatively few airplanes that were flying at the time. I too figured that the raw probabilities of me dying in my (someday-to-be-completed) RV were unpleasantly possible.

I noted that may of the crashes seemed to result from pilots doing stupid things - exercising poor ADM. But I wonder, how many fatalities result from the engineering decisions that are made when our airplanes are designed and built? I am not singling out RVs in this, but since we are airplane builders here, don't we make decisions and trade-offs in the building of our aircraft that may leave us vulnerable? Airplanes have to be light and small to fly, but how light and how small? What if we chose to put more weight into safety systems at the expense of payload or performance? Could we make our airplanes more survivable in a crash?

By trade, I am an embedded software engineer - I develop software for machines that operate in real time, and I specialize in aircraft and defense related software development. I have many times toyed with ideas about how to reduce crash consequences through software controlled systems. Like, how about a system that fires a set of small one time use rockets to slow an aircraft just before impact? Or a system that mixes a chemical into the fuel tanks just before an impact to inert the fuel thus avoiding or reducing the fire after the crash? What about airbags and crushable foam around the pilot? What about a better method of getting a pilot out of the airplane and into a parachute than currently exists? What about NASCAR-like flamesuits?

Let's say any of these systems or others existed - what amount of performance would you be willing to give up or how much would you be willing to pay to have a decent chance of surviving a crash?
  • One hundred pounds of payload?
  • Fifty knots less top speed?
  • 500 extra building hours?
  • 400 miles less cruising range?
  • $20,000 extra cost to build?

???
 
Stick shaker

Let's say any of these systems or others existed - what amount of performance would you be willing to give up or how much would you be willing to pay to have a decent chance of surviving a crash?
  • One hundred pounds of payload?
  • Fifty knots less top speed?
  • 500 extra building hours?
  • 400 miles less cruising range?
  • $20,000 extra cost to build?

???
How about something that weighs say 1/2 pound, costs $50, is assembled by a homebuilder and prevents a crash to begin with? Somebody find or design us a stick shaker that hooks up to our AOA or stall warning systems. I have no idea how the real ones work, but when I flew the new AT-6 Texan simulator at Vance AFB few months ago, it made me instinctively relax pressure on the stick immediately and I didn't even know it was there until it activated. It amazes me how effective it is. Maybe an eccentric wobble wheel device driven by a small electric motor? On a lighter note, how about an electric fence charger hooked up to the stick? :) Seriously, I believe a shaker could save people from some of those base to final crashes.
 
To offer you a little encouragement...

You gentlemen may have already saved some lives. Mine for instance? There was a thread last summer about preparing for Oshkosh. One suggestion was to load the RV up with the weight you'd be carrying and fly a simulated Ripon - Fisk arrival. I did that and even though I had done c.g. testing during phase 1, I still learned a few things about how the 7 handles. I was able to experiment with partial flap settings and simulated forced turns at slow speeds. Then we loaded the airplane with the actual gear and the spouse and I went up and did it again. Then we launched. On arrival day, I had a stearman turn in front of me at Ripon. In spite of flying less than 80 - 85 mph with a bit of flaps out, I gained on him. We were just at the 1/2 mile in-trail minimun distance when we reached Fisk. Thankfully, the "Rock your Wings" guys gave him and I a choice of runways. He choose one so I chose the other to get out from behind him. Unfortunately, when the rock your wings call came on base, there was an airplane stopped dead on 35L, another airplane on final and me about to turn final. The tower was asking the guy to clear the runway, but it wasn't going to happen soon enough. I was now about 2/3 of the way down final... muttering "c'mon clear the runway" under my breath, then, just as I was about to go around the tower blurted out, blue & white low wing on final... go around or take 35R. By this time I was only a few hundred feet above the threshold and my mind was already in high gear. There was traffic everywhere, and getting back in line back at Ripon had its own high risks as the conga line had filled quickly, (based on the radio traffic). Feeling wary but cognizant of the RV's aft but within limits c.g., I made the decision to slip over to the taxiway, (35R). I glanced over my right shoulder to check six and used the minimum bank necessary, and just as I was about to flair the tower told me... "RV GO AROUND, NO NEVER MIND YOU'RE OKAY, I thought you were still lined up on 35 L"! Anyway, my somewhat destabilized approach resulted in a carrier landing any Navy pilot would be proud of. But thanks to you guys, I was ready for the situation and pulled it off, even though it took some low level banking to do it. Some will no doubt question my decision not to go around, but it was a judgement call based on the other traffic behind and beside me as well as coming in from the other directions. I felt this decision was the best one and I would do it again. I knew I could do it because I had practiced for it. This was my third time piloting in to OSH so I wasn't a rookie. The point of the story is that if we listen to the experienced among us and humble ourselves a bit, we might just survive to enjoy this hobby for a long time.
 
How about something that weighs say 1/2 pound, costs $50, is assembled by a homebuilder and prevents a crash to begin with? Somebody find or design us a stick shaker that hooks up to our AOA or stall warning systems. I have no idea how the real ones work, but when I flew the new AT-6 Texan simulator at Vance AFB few months ago, it made me instinctively relax pressure on the stick immediately and I didn't even know it was there until it activated. It amazes me how effective it is. Maybe an eccentric wobble wheel device driven by a small electric motor? On a lighter note, how about an electric fence charger hooked up to the stick? :) Seriously, I believe a shaker could save people from some of those base to final crashes.

To my mind an audio signal output from an AOA feeding the pilot's headset would be the way to go. An example would be something that gives zero input (quiet) when AOA is in the "green", begins clicking once it enters the "yellow" and clicks faster as it approaches "red", and once you hit red you get a solid tone. A set up like this would be unnoticeable to the pilot and not "clutter" the environment unless the AOA approaches a condition that warrants some attention. Glider drivers routinely use audio input for variometers and other instrumentation to monitor KEY information while keeping their heads up and eyes outside the cockpit where they belong. Integrating the audio input into the decsion making process becomes very easy and instinctive in a short period of time. When I read about stall/spin "in the pattern" type of accidents I think about this, and it sure seems like it could provide the critical "heads up" regarding a deteriorating situation that the distracted pilot needs to correct BEFORE things really go south.

I thought I read on this forum that GRT was working on something along these lines (or was it AFS?). Since the AOA's for GRT, AFS and Dynon are electronic in nature how difficult could it be to add this feature?

Lastly, this type of input to the pilot should not be viewed as an alternative to ADM or pilot proficiency, but I believe that something simple and inexpensive like this would be used, and would save lives!
 
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Bob,

You've echoed several of my beliefs in your reply, which is precisely why I'm so grateful to have a good friend that is an A&P based on my field. I use him to hopefully lower my chance of a mechanical failure forward of the firewall.

  • He looks over my cowling every time I take it off (I pay him with lunch usually). And usually he finds something to address that I didn't catch.
  • He does the annuals, even though I can legally do them. (I pay him, and he always finds something.)
  • He oversees ALL my firewall forward work (I help and always learn something, but I don't feel qualified to be the only set of eyes that decides how things should be under the cowl). Maybe in another decade or so....
I'll work on the lawnmower engine and the scooter's engine, but not the airplane's (without professional help). Too much riding it.

I tell non-flying friends that our family's plane is amatuer built, but the engine is professionally maintained.

b,
d

I've been an aircraft judge for the Sport Aircraft Association of Australia (Experimental category controlling body) for a number of years now. I'm also a Technical Counsellor. Over the years I've seen a LOT of RV engine installations and to be honest much of what I see causes me considerable anxiety.

Dependent on engine and induction choices, many builders find themselves largely left to their own devices when it comes to FWF installation....and many are simply not up to the challenge either resulting from lack of research or poor mechanical comprehension.

One of the most disconcerting practices I see is builders attempting to make the hoses and fittings supplied with a Vans FWF kit fit an engine configuration that is not stock Vans. The prime example of that is when they buy the Vans carburetted Lycoming FWF kit and attempt to use all the fuel hoses on a vertical induction fuel injected engine.

The smart players replace some of the hoses but many don't (penny pinching). Instead of optimising the fuel line routes for best safety (and getting the hoses fabricated to fit) many simply work backwards and let the fuel hose length determine the route. That results in some shocking decisions.....hoses too close to the exhaust....hoses abrading on other fixtures....insufficient hose length between the moving engine and the stationary engine mount.....excessive bend radius (really common).

Incidentally, in respect of the latter I find very few builders who even know that the recommended minimum bend radius on Teflon fuel hose is considerably larger than the minimum bend radius on conventional rubber fuel hoses. Some builders don't even know whether the hoses supplied with their FWF kit (or supplied by the engine manufacturer) are in fact Teflon or rubber.

And many amateur builders wouldn't have a clue whether their "Teflon" hoses are conductive PTFE or non-conductive. If they buy Teflon hoses from their local hydraulic hose shop there's every chance it will be non-conductive and not suitable for use in an aircraft. For futher information on this topic I recommend this Sacramento Sky Ranch article here.

http://www.sacskyranch.com/statichose.htm

Builders who are worried about safety should start at the start.....and instal their own power plants in accordance with best aviation practices. And if they have any doubts whatsoever about what "best practices" might be then they should heed Doug Reeve's excellent advice and pay a practicing LAME to check everything out very thoroughly.
 
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My take on the Dan Lloyd story....

...now that I have 25 hours in my -10, is something like this:

The -10 has an enormous amount of downward pitch upon reduced throttle and it really takes muscle to hold it from pitching downward....so much so, that I'd probably be unwilling to fly it if the trim malfunctioned/lost battery power. As it is, I often use two hands during the flare, it's that heavy with full flaps and no power.

I took an hour of instrument refresher in Dublin, Ga. yesterday, and the RV can be a handful going from slow flight to cruise and back again....I worked my buns off to keep heading, altitude and trim madly at the same time.

If Dan had a power failure, the pitch down would be huge, resulting in a heckuva airspeed, and the resulting ball of aluminum. The aftermath of that wreck was really a very balled up airplane which obviously had a lot of energy/speed on impact.

My best recommendation is to be absolutely familiar with your airplane's pitch attitude during slow flight and approaches. You should be able to reduce power to your usual pattern settings and put the nose exactly where it needs to be for 90, 80 MPH, etc and use the airspeed indicator to verify. Knowing the exact pitch attitude will help you avoid those stall/spin accidents we read about.

Take-off and departure stalls can be avoided by the same principles....don't allow the nose to pitch up if you've forgotten to take out all the up trim you had for landing and stall the airplane. Know the allowable climb pitch limits visually as well and hold the airplane where it needs to be, regardless of the amount of muscle it takes. I had to push with force, under the hood, when I was asked to go from 90MPH to cruise, without going vertical!! Believe me, a -10 with no trim would be a real handful.

Best,
 
Remember that Dan also shifted his battery on this flight. I did a simple calculation of weight and balance and my best quesstimate is that he moved his CG forward by 2.75". That is a lot and if you are not ready for it when the engine quits it could be troublesome. He was probably not ready for the additional stick force required from the CG shift since his CG had always been shifted further back than most due to the light engine. Mine on the other hand is further foward than most but still in Van's range.
 
AOPA web page to show landing accidents

AOPA Has a page that maps landing accidents. You can sort by aircraft type. The different RV series are broken out seperately. Check it out.
 
Wow...I read all 14 pages of this post and I loved the way it moved from subject to subject while keeping with the intended purpose...Very rare to have a tread to do that often without drifting into limbo.

I will share my comments with a few bullet points

-first of all...not all acrobatic pilots have a dead wish. Most look at the art of flying and the ability to fly in different attitudes while keeping full control of the aircraft at all times. We want to excell in flying and perform our manuevers very smooth and with art in mind.

- An acrobatic pilot is full aware at all times of the rules and regulations, airspace, etc afecting the typ of flying since his/her airman privileges depend on them. When we fly, we ususally do in our FAA provided practice area. We issue NOTAM"s to make all aware and we talk to ATC...we dont impose onto others, we dont abuse the airspace....We could, but we choose not to because it promotes irresponsible behavior. I in the other hand, have witnessed many ga flyiers flight into airport airpsace completelly unannounced, unaware of the NOTAM and creating a safety issue for us....

- Communicate! Let yourself know where you are if at any airport area.

- Read FAR 91.303. If you depart from the scope of that regulation, you need a waiver issued by the FAA. no if or buts.

- For all of you who attend airshows and like to do flyovers and formation flying over the crowd this does apply to you http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/8900.1/v03 tech admin/chapter 06/03_006_001.pdf Read 2(a) this is where you will get busted by the FAA!!

- You need an FAA form 8710-7 signed or you will be busted by the FAA. Dont get caught with your pants down.

- For IAC sanctioned events, we are not required an 8710-7.

- An acrobatic pilot dont do any unusual attitude flying below 1,500 feet. that's our safety cushion.

- Bill Finigan definition of control flying: You depart control flying when you loose the ability to make the aircraft do what you want. When this happens, you better have airpace below in order to apply your emergency recover tecnique.

- A show pilot that goes down all the way to the deck has a license issued by an ACE and posses a low level flight priviledge after he has shown and proven to his peers and the FAA he can perform safely.

- Yes is is cool to buss the field 6' above the ground at 180 mph pitch up and roll tight and probably very safe to do 9 out of 10 times. But there will be that one day that a downdraft or quick wind shift that will eat that little cushion between you and the ground and kill yourself.

- Fly within your capabilities. You have nothing to prove to no one and if you decide to fly in any unusual attitude, do so with plenty airspace below you the few first times and if possible with someone qualified.

- About Scott and his accident over GA in his Cessna 210. A few thing that should have happen before the flight were overlooked. #1 his IFR license was not current. #2 there is no prove he ever checked the weather (no duats, never talked to a briefer, no printed records, etc...)

- I fly SE aircraft all the time on my business. It does not matter if it is a brand new factory delivery or my Granpa's 1930's aircraft. My attitude towards SE aircraft is always the same...I always fly on an emergency since there is only one screw in the front. When flying my Pitts S2B for fun, this is a great attitude to have since that thing glides like a brick.

- It does not matter who you are or how much seat time you have or what you fly or do in life. If you dont go IN prepared and be ready to back it up when something happens, you will be behind the curved ball before turning that master switch to the "ON" position.

- Thanks to the original author of this tread for making us think!

My .02 cents (sorry about my english and grammar. Still a foreigner!!!!)
 
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I stumbled on this thread tonight and was interested in the comments made about the Dan Lloyd accident.

While the accident report details the appalling lack of oversight and understanding on many things mechanical, structural and on the paperwork parts, there is no conclusive evidence IMO that any of these were the direct cause of the actual accident. People may wish to believe something different but the facts presented in the final report really leave us with no definitive cause- just lots of questions.

I wrote the following back in July 2009 here on the Dan Lloyd accident thread:

"I looked over most of the data here and some things don't fit together. All the witnesses state that the engine appeared to be running right up to impact. The propeller analysis says the prop was NOT turning at impact. Somebody is mistaken. Given the position of where one blade was found, this would seem to support the conclusion that the prop was not likely turning at impact.

Tox says no CO present. Seems unlikely that the aircraft was on fire prior to impact.

The photo of the contactor connection doesn't allow us to conclude much. The aircraft was absolutely destroyed in the impact judging from the photos. The cable to the contactor could easily have been pulled out of the lug on impact.

The photos of the terrain suggest that there were plenty of open fields to put a plane down in the event of a power loss.

The GPS data is most telling IMO along with the witness statements. GS was down to about 60 knots while the aircraft was in a very tight, banked turn at very low altitude, over 1.5 miles from the airport. Why, we'll never know. In the last 39 seconds before impact, the turn radius tightens up to about 450ft. In the last 10-15 seconds speed bleeds from 90 to 60 knots. If the aircraft was in clean configuration and banked as sharply as the witnesses state with speed bleeding back that rapidly, a stall was imminent. Even with full flap, the aircraft was likely to stall performing this banked turn at such low speed. The last 4-5 seconds saw a loss of altitude of 150-200 feet. Why was he maneuvering at about 200 feet AGL for the last minute of flight so far from the runway?

Best fit is simply a stall while performing a very tight turn at low altitude IMO. Wings level just prior to impact from witness statements suggests the pilot was not incapacitated but perhaps attempting to recover too late. Given that the aircraft slid about 100 feet, this suggests that the impact angle was towards the lower side of the 35-60 degrees estimated and that the final GPS GS report of 71 knots makes sense.

Additional items I noticed on the weight and balance report was that it included the weight of 10 quarts of oil. Perhaps this would have been a clue to an experienced person signing off the aircraft that the whole report was bogus since these engines hold about half that amount. Second, the rear baggage bulkheads were not found at the site. Either not installed or consumed by the fire. These are structural and must be installed for flight."

I absolutely agree with many of the posts here that building everything right and having other pairs of eyes on your project is very important. We want to stack the deck in our favor as much as possible. Shortcuts are rarely a good idea in aviation.
 
Experimental planes should be required to have a AOA

Lets face it. not everybody knows how to fly from the seat of their own pants. AOA YES!!.. I always favored a airspeed dial that displayed 0 to 60 on 100 degrees of the dial face and lets say a stall speed for 55MPH always be at the TOP of the dial so the NEEDLE always pointed up. Old friend of mine said when he flew the bombers from yesteryear the engineers gauges' faces were turnable so you could actually turn every guage in the plumbers section so the needles always pointed UP for the normal operating position. This made it easy to do a eye scan rather than remorize every normal setting. How TRUE!! Just my thoughts Ron in Oregon
 
Climbing onto my soap box

Lets face it. not everybody knows how to fly from the seat of their own pants. AOA YES!!.. I always favored a airspeed dial that displayed 0 to 60 on 100 degrees of the dial face and lets say a stall speed for 55MPH always be at the TOP of the dial so the NEEDLE always pointed up. Old friend of mine said when he flew the bombers from yesteryear the engineers gauges' faces were turnable so you could actually turn every guage in the plumbers section so the needles always pointed UP for the normal operating position. This made it easy to do a eye scan rather than remorize every normal setting. How TRUE!! Just my thoughts Ron in Oregon

As a certified duffer and, I suppose, "seat of the pants pilot" I have to comment. The push to replace skills with technology is getting us in trouble. Back when I was doing primary training it was my practice to familiarize the student with how to fly by actually looking outside and listening to the airplane. In fact, sometimes I would cover the panel with a black cloth that carried in my bag of tricks. It is amazing how, in very little time, a student could nail an airspeed by sound and pitch alone. We need to keep the very basic skills sharp. I am not down on technology, just on people that depend on it as the be all, end all, answer. I have to wonder how many base to final, stall-spins have been created by people looking at the airspeed, AOA, and power settings with the AOA blaring in their headset when listening to the airplane and looking outside may have saved the day. <<rant off>>

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA
 
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