Maximum effort for minimum return
As a former Air Force wing chief of safety I know what a thankless job the safety business can be. Most of the time the best thing that can happen is nothing bad. I'm sure our colleagues in the FAA often feel the same way.
...But freedom isn't free. I'm not ready to relax on risk reduction and I hope the FAA isn't either.
-Matt
402BD
Matt gave a great perspective from the point of view of a GA pilot and AF wing chief of safety. Let me chime in from the point of view of a GA pilot, airline instructor, and retired Air Force Chief of Aviation Safety.
On my watch, the Air Force had 3 record safety years (see Robert Goyer's article in FLYING). In one of those years, we didn't crash or destroy a single aircraft. Our Class A mishap rate* hovered around 1.0 per 100,000 flying hours. That's phenomenal! From my chair at the AF Safety Center, I attributed the lion's share of credit to Wing safety chiefs like Matt, supported by leaders at all levels.
*Class A mishap: fatality, permanent total disability, aircraft destroyed, or more than $2 million in damage.
But aside from my normal job of implementing AF-level mishap prevention programs, my "task" was to continue finding innovative programs, methods, processes, and tools to keep reducing mishaps. We implemented Military FOQA and ASAP programs in some of our fleets, expanding slowly over time. ASAP fits well for our 'airline-like' mobility and transport fleets, but is a round hole for the fighter/bomber force's square peg...but the USAF is solving that too.
My point? It takes ever-increasing effort and dollars to chip away at what few mishaps you have. The real benefit comes from reduced mishap damages and injuries at the Class B and C level. Those don't sound important, but I believe a Class B or C mishap was really an avoided or prevented Class A mishap. In that scope, I see incredible success (and savings to the taxpayer).
My next point: To NOT expend this effort is criminal, because ZERO mishaps must always remain the goal. 'Close to zero' is not close enough. I know: Aviation is inherently dangerous, and we'll never remove all the risk, but what a difference it makes when we find a way to save one more life or aircraft. We don't always know when that 'save' took place: Like Matt alluded, you can fly a week's worth of sorties without a single mishap, but have no idea whether your safety program had anything to do with it. I'm OK with that, 'cause no news truly is good news.
My third point: I concur with one general sentiment expressed throughout this thread---there is such a thing as too much. Like the AF Safety Center, the FAA has an obligation to find ways to drive mishaps down. However, when those efforts stifle or impede the efforts of conscientious aircraft owners, operators, builders, and pilots...when the policies seek to address risks or hazards that simply don't exist...then the governing safety agency and policy has overstepped their sphere of responsibility.
My final point: Paul and Mike are discussing risk management from leader/commander level. Risk Management involves identifying risks, considering/devising/selecting mitigation tactics, implementing those tactics, measuring their effectiveness, and determining whether all the risk was addressed...and quantifying what risk remains. The person must decide whether the REMAINING risk is acceptable. That is critical. In their jobs at NASA and in the fire department, Paul and Mike got the risk down to what they considered acceptable. I am certain they also faced situations where they made 'no-go' decisions.
As pilots, we are no different.