Looks like around 25% of accidents have a mechanical cause. It is probably underestimated. I can't do much about the pilot culture, but I can help people build better airplanes.

I don't give a hoot what area you improve...

Dan, you are on the ball as usual. In fact the single largest category of accident in the Experimental category is mechanical failure.

No guys, it's not CFIT, or landing accidents, or low level manouevering, or aerobatics....it's mechanical failure!!!

And mechanical failure is the category of accident most likely to cause injury to third parties and their property (ie. the general public on the ground)....which is what we REALLY need to be worried about if we want to maintain privileges.

But while people are happy to talk ad infinitum about Experimental pilot aptitude and attitude they are not so happy to discuss obvious shortcomings in the build process. And the real truth is that many firewall forward installations in the Experimental category are not amateur built... but amateurishly built. And that applies to RVs as well.

Good instructions and available parts make construction of the airframe in most modern kits largely a matter of assembly....but that's not the case firewall forward. The large range of engine/componentry options means that kit manufacturers cannot provide detailed drawings and components for every FWF combination....thus leaving mechanical neophytes to make largely intuitive decisions. Sure there's ways to obtain the proper knowledge but many builders are so intent on getting their plane finished that they don't avail themselves of that knowledge. And the same goes for maintenance.

And then there's the auto conversions. As a rule of thumb the enthusiasm with which builders embrace the concept of the auto conversion is generally inversely proportional to their understanding of things mechanical. As a consequence the failure rate with home grown auto conversions is just horrific. It's time to call a spade a spade.

If everyone here wants to reduce the accident statistics they should start with the biggest statistic and acknowledge that a lot of Experimental aircraft are flying with very dodgy FWF systems and substandard FWF maintenance. It will not bode well for us if we keep sweeping this matter under the rug.
 
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There is positive action being taken to develop a safety program. You will not see it fully developed this month but it is coming. Give us time.

Points being made in these discussions are being noted for inclusion.
 
Dan, you are on the ball as usual. In fact the single largest category of accident in the Experimental category is mechanical failure.

No guys, it's not CFIT, or landing accidents, or low level manouevering, or aerobatics....it's mechanical failure!!!

And mechanical failure is the category of accident most likely to cause injury to third parties and their property (ie. the general public on the ground)....which is what we REALLY need to be worried about if we want to maintain privileges.

But while people are happy to talk ad infinitum about Experimental pilot aptitude and attitude they are not so happy to discuss obvious shortcomings in the build process. And the real truth is that many firewall forward installations in the Experimental category are not amateur built... but amateurishly built. And that applies to RVs as well.

Good instructions and available parts make construction of the airframe in most modern kits largely a matter of assembly....but that's not the case firewall forward. The large range of engine/componentry options means that kit manufacturers cannot provide detailed drawings and components for every FWF combination....thus leaving mechanical neophytes to make largely intuitive decisions. Sure there's ways to obtain the proper knowledge but many builders are so intent on getting their plane finished that they don't avail themselves of that knowledge. And the same goes for maintenance.

And then there's the auto conversions. As a rule of thumb the enthusiasm with which builders embrace the concept of the auto conversion is generally inversely proportional to their understanding of things mechanical. As a consequence the failure rate with home grown auto conversions is just horrific. It's time to call a spade a spade.

If everyone here wants to reduce the accident statistics they should start with the biggest statistic and acknowledge that a lot of Experimental aircraft are flying with very dodgy FWF systems and substandard FWF maintenance. It will not bode well for us if we keep sweeping this matter under the rug.

It seems mechanical failures are just not as "popular" an issue to talk about as piloting skills. Each time I've raised this subject in these safety related forums it gets passed over with zero responses and we get right back into the "pilot stuff".

Many times when I have offered "suggestions" for questionable items I've seen in the forums it either gets ignored or the item gets rationalized as being OK (usually because it's already finished and now it's to much work to fix). In this case I never could figure out why "you" asked "if this looks OK" in the first place.

People will ask for opinions "how does this look" but what they really want is an affirmation of their work, if you don't give it then they just ignore your suggestions and move on.

I've always offered FREE aircraft safety inspections with the goal of improving the mechanical failure statistic, to date I've had ZERO takers.

I suspect in many ways the lack of the right "pilot stuff" is no differenent when it comes to the mechanical "right stuff". The same folks that are too proud to get good training are also too pround to ask for mechanical help when building (fear of criticism?)

As stated before it's not what you know in this business that will kill you, its what you don't know.
 
I suspect in many ways the lack of the right "pilot stuff" is no differenent when it comes to the mechanical "right stuff". The same folks that are too proud to get good training are also too pround to ask for mechanical help when building (fear of criticism?)

And that is why all the emphasis on changing the "culture" of our community. Until attitudes change, there will be no serious attention given by those at risk to mechanical or behavioral problems.
 
Van's comments and statistics

I thought Van's piece on Facebook was well written and insightful (as usual), and he does a good job of clearly charting the issues. His articles are always worth reading.

Regarding the discussion of what to do with statistics, it was somewhat disappointing not to see this explored in more depth, although perhaps this will come. Van's main point seems to be that we shouldn't try to use statistics to argue that there's not really a problem. Instead we should deal directly with the causes of the problem. This strikes me as an important and very valid point, but not the whole story.

Statistics can also be used in a positive sense, to help identify what areas really need attention. This is not nit-picking, but intelligent use of the available data. Regardless of how the details are presented, its seems rather obvious that RVs and other EAB are disproportionately involved in certain types of accidents, compared to the GA fleet as a whole. This is useful information, that could be incorporated into the design of RV-specific training syllabi.
 
Snip...
Van's main point seems to be that we shouldn't try to use statistics to argue that there's not really a problem. Instead we should deal directly with the causes of the problem. This strikes me as an important and very valid point, but not the whole story.

Statistics can also be used in a positive sense, to help identify what areas really need attention. This is not nit-picking, but intelligent use of the available data.
Snip...

I am not proposing that we should ignore the data, we should dig through it. My beef with many is their motivation behind their investigation of the data....

Many are looking in the data for tidbits that they believe "lets them off the hook." A line of reasoning to justify their status quo. We tend to read accident reports the same way... Looking for the one thing that the accident pilot did that we don't do, therefore, I am immune from this threat.

If we look at the statistics, or the accident reports honestly, we will find we have a lot more in common with our deceased brethren than we would like to admit....

Also, we keep wanting to compare A/B aircraft to the GA statistics.... Frankly the GA accident numbers are too high as well. And the accident causes are very similar. I have been through this in the Warbird and Airshow worlds and when we grind up the data we will learn that problems can be improved with better judgement and skills.

The Disney Institute says, "We judge others on their actions and ourselves on our intentions." None of our friends that perished intended to kill themselves. And yet, often we're not surprised based on their actions.

If we had a mirror that would reflect our actions honestly so that we could see ourselves as others do, it would be a pretty lonesome and scary place.

No such mirror exists, but if were going to look in the statistics for data, then let's use that information to find the reflections of our own actions, not just to let ourselves off the hook by looking at the differences....

That is contrary to the nature of a self-assured pilot.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal
 
Many are looking in the data for tidbits that they believe "lets them off the hook." A line of reasoning to justify their status quo. We tend to read accident reports the same way... Looking for the one thing that the accident pilot did that we don't do, therefore, I am immune from this threat.

Perfectly said Doug! As you have said many times, we ALL have to look ourselves in the mirror and see ourselves as part of the problem. Whether the problem is a lack of piloting skill, a lack of judgment, or a problme with our building (and design) skills - the problem all come sback to the human factor. We haev met the enemy, and he is us.

To focus on one area that can be improved to the exclusion of others is counterproductive.

Paul
 
safety

It seems to me that as an early step it should be determined if FAA is including Experimental Exhibition aircraft in their statistics. Are the recent Yak 52 and AN2 accidents, as well as many others, being included to make a case against Amateur Built. Are the Reno Air Racing accidents being included. I believe that any high risk activity aircraft should be placed in a separate category insofar as generating statistics.
As I have stated before, if you look carefully at the daily accident/incident reports, You will find a lot of what I call "fringe" aircraft for lack of a better description. I INCLUDE IN THIS DESCRIPTION ALTERNATIVE ENGINES. Sorry but thats the way I feel. For another very candid opinion read Marc Cooks recent Kitplanes article.
 
As I have stated before, if you look carefully at the daily accident/incident reports, You will find a lot of what I call "fringe" aircraft for lack of a better description.

Good point. Consider how many two-place "ultralight trainers" which once flew unregistered are now registered in the Light Sport. They show up in the crash stats now, but not before, so up goes the rate.
 
Suggestions/Brainstorming

Like many, I've been reading this thread with great interest and brainstorming my own take on the issue. For full disclosure, my background: active military fighter pilot, RV-6 builder/flyer, and longtime private pilot.

To help improve safety, I think it would be good to have some outside agency or method to help with "accountability" with my RV flying and maintenance. What I mean by that is that we currently have a tremendous amount of freedom and really quite little regulation of our building, maintaining, and flying activities (especially when compared to a military flying operation). That's good, and I like that! But we all know that improving the statistics is not likely to happen by just trusting people to behave differently - there needs to be some method of accountability. I do NOT want that to be through the heavy hand of the federal government, FAA or otherwise. What's needed is a formal program of ongoing maintenance, training, and proficiency reviews that people can voluntarily comply with. Ideally, complying with those programs would earn you something tangible for your trouble - i.e., maybe a break on insurance rates? At a minimum, you or your aircraft ought to be able to be "certified" IAW those independent standards.

This concept is akin to the EAA's Technical Counselor and Flight Advisor programs, but those are geared towards construction and first flights - I would propose something more for ongoing operation. In addition to the already-discussed formal transition training syllabus, some ideas might be:

1) A formally constructed program of pilot currency events (this idea comes from how we do it in the military). Events might be simulated engine-out patterns, no-flap patterns, crosswind landings, short-field landings, even just a minimum amount of time logged in the past 30/60/90 days. Kind of like the FAA's currency requirements, just more extensive and tuned to the capabilities and activities of your aircraft. To maintain "current and qualified", you log those events in an online logbook that your insurance company has access to. If you maintain currency, maybe you save money on your premiums or at least have bragging rights. All voluntary, of course, and enter fraudulent data at your own legal peril.

2) Same idea is possible with maintenance. Set up an online program where you put in information on maintenance events. A database could be built with all the common components that are installed on RVs and you specify what is in your aircraft. As an extra bonus, you'll get informed on all service bulletins that apply to your machine, and you can log when you complied with them. This creates a semi-independent system that verifies that your aircraft is "current and qualified". This could also build a strong database that can be used for deeper analysis into mechanical failures - even those that DON'T result in accidents. Again, stay current and certified and maybe you get a discount on your premium, or at least you increase the resale value of your machine. Essentially, this is kind of just duplicating the FAA's process of airworthiness directives, but does it without the legal burden and overhead of a federal bureaucracy.

Anyway, just some brainstorming as the community is discussing ideas. I'm used to having accountability in my flying for the USAF, so I'm comfortable with it in my private flying. I just need it to be done in a way that avoids restricting my freedom or increases my costs to the point that its unaffordable or no fun to participate in sport aviation anymore.

Cheers,

Jordan "Gadget" Grant
Normally at Red Baron Airpark, Mountain Home, ID
(Currently at Bagram AB, Afghanistan)
 
It seems mechanical failures are just not as "popular" an issue to talk about as piloting skills. Each time I've raised this subject in these safety related forums it gets passed over with zero responses and we get right back into the "pilot stuff".

Walt, I've noticed exactly the same thing. People in the Experimental movement are extremely reluctant to acknowledge the obvious truth... that the FWF systems on many Experimental aircraft are way below the standard of certificated aircraft. And many of those who understand the problem are hesitant to discuss it in a public forum. They just don't want to hang the dirty underwear on the line for everyone to see.
 
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....and along those lines...

...are the DAR's. When the light sport rule was enacted for those "heavy" ultralights to be grandfathered by a certain time, I saw three ultralights "inspected" for $400 a pop by a guy who only wanted to see paperwork! N numbers were on ,registration papers in hand..."Thank you...have a good day"... was all the 'inspection' amounted to!

If we had more 'Mel's and 'Vic's' to painstakingly inspect our/new builds with a lot of scrutiny in the FWF area, I'm convinced that we'd have less guys jumping from a burning plane (the RV-8 comes to mind) or augering in shortly after takeoff.

I'm an EAA tech inspector but there's a limit to what we can see all the way through completion and first flight.

Best,
 
Correct Pierre. While I have never witnessed it, I have heard from reliable sources that they have had a plane inspected where the DAR basically did not look at the plane.

While making sure that your FAA required paperwork is in order is important, my opinion is that it is secondary to having a knowledgeable person inspect the things that can kill you eg: Controls, FWF, Fuel system

Actually, DAR inspection is really too late. This level of examination needs to be given the due respect during the building process.
 
Perhaps the FAA should also do a bit of introspection as well.

For example: the local FAA "inspector" comes out to do an "airworthiness inspection" of your aircraft, and all they look at is the paperwork?

I posted this early in this discussion, it's not just the DAR's doing it but the FAA does the same thing! I personally witnessed the above.
 
hmmm

I would never dispute that more "eyes on" are a good thing. Particularly well trained and qualified eyes aware of what high standard construction looks like.

But it is the builder who certifies "safe for flight". I suspect that most in the FAA (who inspected my plane with a cursory glance at build quality) and most DAR's, are cognizant of the legal liability of saying "that is good quality and is safe for flight". Even by saying something is substandard puts them in the box to then say what is an acceptable standard which then implies that they said it was safe for flight (and possibly makes them liable when it fails).

I know how the FAA dealt with it in my case - they said "it is your experiment, paperwork looks good, see ya". Not a problem, that is what I expected.

How do practicing DAR's deal with this liability question?? Are they insured??

Again it sounds like the ultimate resposibility for our members safety will fall on us, the actual builders and fellow community members, who presumably will not be afraid of legal ramifications, just the well being of fellow members. It is one of the steps (taking better care of fellow members) that we can do better to address the problem.
 
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I am not proposing that we should ignore the data, we should dig through it. My beef with many is their motivation behind their investigation of the data....

Many are looking in the data for tidbits that they believe "lets them off the hook." A line of reasoning to justify their status quo. We tend to read accident reports the same way... Looking for the one thing that the accident pilot did that we don't do, therefore, I am immune from this threat.

If we look at the statistics, or the accident reports honestly, we will find we have a lot more in common with our deceased brethren than we would like to admit....

I'd certainly agree with this.

In terms of honest assessment, I also think we also need to acknowledge that EAB flying sometimes involves risks that the most GA pilots encounter infrequently if at all. Not much aerobatics, formation, high speed passes, etc. being done by Cessnas and Pipers. We also have a much higher rate of mechanical problems, as has been pointed out. The effect of these risks is reflected rather clearly in the statistics as reported by AOPA , and can be read in the accident reports.

Its certainly true that EAB also suffers the same types of accidents as GA, which points to the need for better overall skills and judgement. The means of managing risks related to typical GA accidents are well known and frequently discussed, even if not always well practiced. Management of the additional risks often encountered by EAB seems to get a lot less attention. Van himself has been the leader in this area, through his various RVator articles on safety. As I recall, those articles frequently focused on the same areas that appear to be disproportionately reflected in the EAB accident statistics, such as flight testing, aerobatics, modifications to designed aircraft systems, etc.
 
Statistics may misleading....

The current 2 week FAA list of EXP accidents and aircraft models is as follows:

LANCAIR 360
S12 XL
BEARHAWK
AVID FLYER
XTREMEAIR GMBH SBACK 342
GP-4
ZENITH 701
RANS S-65S
SONEX
LANCAIR 360
MIDJET MUSTANG I
S-12XL AIRAILE
PAZMANY PL-1
WSK-MIELEC AN-2
ZENITH CH701
SONEX
ZENITH CH750

This is just a sampling of about 2 weeks of events but I think it is interesting there are no RV's, the most populated experimental flying, on it. It was not a good period for Lancair and Zenith. You would think with the number of RV's flying there would be a proportional number of reportable events, but they are missing. Good work, RV aviators!!

I am skeptical of General Aviation statistics. The estimate of hours flown is just that and actual hours flown verses accidents per type of aircraft could be way off. How does the FAA account for aircraft that do not fly at all - out of annual - they sit in their hangars gathering dust, not flying hours. We have several such aircraft here at this very small airport.

I believe the number of EXP hours flown could be understated and the number of certified aircraft hours flown over stated. We do not know for sure what the risk factor is.

That's not to say flying safety is under control, it is not. But the current emphasis on "something has to be done about EXP's" may be over stated.
 
Hi David,
Aren't we still missing an RV that we suspect may have gone down near the Grand Canyon in the last few weeks? It may have been more than 2 weeks ago?
I am impressed that we didn't have any weather related fatalities related to Sun & Fun with the associated bad weather. Like you said, Good Job, ladies and gentlemen!
In regards to weather flying David, I believe that last year you and some others may have posted some explanations of your decision making when it comes to planning cross country flights and I found them invaluable. Especially when they included the weather and radar overlays associated with the planned trip. It helped me plan my recent trip to Utah and I stayed on the ground 3 days rather than push the weather. Louise Hose has also graciously shared a recent experience. I would encourage anyone to participate and learn from these. TKATC's coast to coast trip was also enlightening. You have really helped educated me and I appreciate it.

Joe
 
I just received a post card in the mail from the FAA asking me to complete a survey accounting for all my flight hours in the past year. I bet this is how they do it. I threw it away.
 
accidents

Regarding Davids post of the 17 accidents. The AN2 is not a homebuilt(BIG Russian production biplane). Four "accidents" resulted in minor damage and are unlikely to meet the FAA definition of accidents. The GP4 and Bearhawk were a ground collision.
Regarding mechanical issues I have looked at probably hundreds of RV's and it is extremely rare to see one with really bad workmanship. Unpainted/not quite finished does not count. One other example I don't recall EVER seeing a Glasair III that I did not rate good to outstanding. The airplanes that I think have the majority of mechanical issues are the very old homebuilts that have probably changed hands many times. They may have been a derilict that was rescued by someone who really doesn't know what their doing. Baby Ace, S**** Playboy, very old Pitts would be examples, all thirty plus years old.
The remainder of MOST of the mechanical issues are mostly not quite ultralights, the fringe airplanes that I described earlier. Yes the mechanical situation could be improved significantly, but how does one reach the fringe group??
 
I just received a post card in the mail from the FAA asking me to complete a survey accounting for all my flight hours in the past year. I bet this is how they do it. I threw it away.

I filled mine out. Why did you throw yours away?:confused:
 
I filled mine out. Why did you throw yours away?:confused:

I have nothing to hide. I have filled mine out every year. They know exactly how many hours my plane has flown. Makes the statistics better by providing them data. Based on the 175 responses in this thread, I think a lot of people want better statistics.
 
I just received a post card in the mail from the FAA asking me to complete a survey accounting for all my flight hours in the past year. I bet this is how they do it. I threw it away.

So now your 70 non-accident hours won't get counted.......

That just makes the next accident look worse.
 
So now your 70 non-accident hours won't get counted.......

That just makes the next accident look worse.

That's the problem with the gov't. They ask questions and don't explain what they plan to do with the data, I would have probably pitched it too...

Knowing what I know now, I might play along, but 'less is better' has always been my philosophy when dealing with large bureaucracies.

Another reason to take care of the problem 'in house'.
 
Thanks for putting it up

And I'm thrilled to have this forum for support


N Norman
Bi.png
 
My 20c worth from down under, should get me 21cents of yours nowdays!

Take all the Experimental accidents, remove all the prangs which were attributable to CFIT from weather, and all the handling issues where it was certain not to be a unique handling fault, and lump them all onto the GA statistics. Then compare.

Why? Because the folk who are killing themselves by means of fuel running out then stall and spin or VFR into IMC etc etc etc, those same accidents would have occured in a C172/PA28/V35B.

Only then can you truly see what dangers lurk statistically in Experimental.

Anyone got the data to manipulate properly?
I just went back and read this thread. There are a lot of interest comments but this is probably the most on target.

We who have built and/or fly an RV don't realize how lucky we are. A friend who built SOTRV (Something Other Than an RV) got to the point where it was time to install his fuel system. The manual literally stated, "Now is the time to think about installing your fuel system." Absolutely nothing in there had anything to do with the fuel system. He contacted Cessna (He built a high wing bush plane) and some trusted aviation engineers and came up with a good solution.

We in the post pre-punched RV world have it made. Follow the instructions, including the FwF instructions and all should be good.

My question is this, if you remove the RV's from the accident numbers, what happens to the trend? Are we so much better than the adjusted norm (remove the times listed in the quote above) that we are driving the numbers down? If we remove the RV's from the stats, do the numbers jump up?

I'm not trying to say we don't have a problem but maybe we should figure out how large a problem we are talking about and maybe we can help builders of SOTRV's be successful first, if RV's are the safety outliers.
 
I just went back and read this thread. There are a lot of interest comments but this is probably the most on target.

We who have built and/or fly an RV don't realize how lucky we are. A friend who built SOTRV (Something Other Than an RV) got to the point where it was time to install his fuel system. The manual literally stated, "Now is the time to think about installing your fuel system." Absolutely nothing in there had anything to do with the fuel system. He contacted Cessna (He built a high wing bush plane) and some trusted aviation engineers and came up with a good solution.

We in the post pre-punched RV world have it made. Follow the instructions, including the FwF instructions and all should be good.

My question is this, if you remove the RV's from the accident numbers, what happens to the trend? Are we so much better than the adjusted norm (remove the times listed in the quote above) that we are driving the numbers down? If we remove the RV's from the stats, do the numbers jump up?

I'm not trying to say we don't have a problem but maybe we should figure out how large a problem we are talking about and maybe we can help builders of SOTRV's be successful first, if RV's are the safety outliers.

Hey Bill, go back and read the last six months or so of Ron Wantaja's articles in KP, and you can probably do the math pretty simply - if you really want to know the answer. Lots of folks here are ready to jump on the safety wagon "if only they had the data to prove.... (whatever)". Well, Ron collected it and put it out there in a very readable format - one article for each "type" of popular kit. It is illuminating, and while you can argue who has the "worst" problem (pointless, in my book, except to point fingers), there are places that we can make gains. Why not make them?

Paul
 
Hey Bill, go back and read the last six months or so of Ron Wantaja's articles in KP, and you can probably do the math pretty simply - if you really want to know the answer...
Already read them and thought they were outstanding.

Call me a Doubting Thomas on this issue. Like my other hobbies, I accept the risk and have the damaged spine to prove it.

I'm not sure why the FAA wants to get involved? Is it because of the few well publicized accidents has caused some political fallout or are the numbers really that bad. The EAB crash in Vegas and the LancAir that killed a jogger in Myrtle Beach after an engine failure come to mind.

Not that one accident or death is acceptable or excusable; I didn't see a smoking gun in those articles. That is once the aircraft finished its Phase I and a pilot new to the type logged some time. Sometimes when both of those factors come together, it can get very ugly. Based on what I have read and heard on the issue, this is where we should concentrate our efforts.

If this gang wants to focus on anything, it is the inspections prior to the first flight and pilot preparation. Who here had volunteered as a First Flight or Technical Advisor?

In the 15 years I have been associated with the Charlotte EAA chapter, we have not had a single accident. (Taxi incidents excluded.) Our chapter has such a reputation with the Charlotte FSDO that if an aircraft gets past our Tech Inspectors, they will just go through the paperwork. However, try presenting one without our inspector forms and you are going to have a long day.

After the Phase I is completed, the plane can probably safe fly for a few years before things start to wear out. (Do not take this comment as a reason to skip your annual condition inspection!) Is there an age (years and hours) when the aircraft should go through a more complete inspection than the simple checklists most of us use? Maybe require an A&P signoff every X-number of years or hours?
 
Paul, I do not have access to the articles and data you are referring to, however if you or someone who does can take this data and remove all the truly typical GA prangs out and show even these basic numbers it might be a telling tale.

I am not wanting to formulate questions to get the answers I want to hear, which is a classic for statistical surveys, but more so a true reflection of where the risks actually hide.

For a given period, say 5 years, you need as a starting point;
1. total GA accidents and hours flown
2. total experimental accidents and hours flown.
3. experimental accidents that are not typical GA accidents that just happened to be in an experimental aircraft.
4. of these how many were in the first 30 hours/100 hours

Regards

David Brown