[Alan Carroll]

Just a quick note: There have been 3 fatal RV-10 accidents.

You're right; Dan Lloyd's plane wasn't registered as an RV-10 and so the search didn't find it.

 

[jrs14855]

Lancair

I am just quoting from the LOBO website "2009 saw a large reduction in accidents and fatalaties since 2008-over a 50% reduction. I read the homebuilt accident initial reports several times a week, and it is obvious without getting into much detail that there has been a dramatic improvement in Lancair accident rate satarting in 2009.

 

[Ron Lee]

jrs, I know that but you have to look at the previous years to get a full picture.

 

[John Clark]

Statistics

"Do not put your faith in what statistics say until you have carefully considered what they do not say." ~William W. Watt

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA

 

[Sam Buchanan]

Just ran across this nugget of wisdom while poking around another forum. This is a response to the account of the idiot who landed his Warrior on a New York beach because "they do it in Alaska". The author is Kevin O'Brien:

Look up a paper called "Unskilled and Unaware of It" by a couple of, IIRC, psychologists named Kruger and Dunning. Their findings have been absorbed into pop culture as the Dunning-Kruger effect. Briefly stated, just about everybody thinks he's above average at a given skill (say, piloting), so only the tiny subset of people who actually are above-average -- those whose good judgment comes from experience, perhaps -- are actually correct. Tyros like this guy tend to overestimate themselves and their abilities. They just don't know enough about the scope of the task to know how little they have mastered it. Conversely, true experts UNDERestimate their skills -- they are so aware of the dimensions of the problem that they're naturally modest about their very high level of skill. The line showing the evolution of personal self-estimation of expertise only intersects with the actual growth of expertise at one point.

A logical corollary to this is that, the experienced pilot who underrates his own skills naturally errs in the direction of greater safety. And the novice who overrates his own skills places an obstacle in the way of his becoming an experienced pilot.

 

[Peterk]

Sam

pretty deep Sam! but way cool...thank you. now you've forced me to hunt this research down. as you say, the implications fly far past the aviation industry though indeed they appear applicable. good find!

Pete

 

[John Clark]

Kruger Dunning

Absolutely on point Sam. Here is a good read on the subject:

http://tinyurl.com/47fwd5x

And here is the short version.

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA

 

[Buggsy2]

Nice thread...here's some cold water.

1. Takes work just to come up with defensible statistics of certificated vs. experimental vs RV accident rates. Not impossible, but not trivial.

2. That just quantifies the problem: the different accident rates. Then you have more work to find the causes. Flying skill error (e.g. stall/spin in pattern)? Flying judgement error (e.g. flying into IMC and not trained or equipped)? Mechanical error (which might imply building and/or maintenance error)?

3. Having quantified the problem, and identified the causes, what are the fixes? More pilot skill training? More training in prudence (judgement)? Better building skills?

We can post, speculate, and conference call all we want, but without the grunt work of digging through the available data (principally NTSB reports), it's just opinion.

 

[B25Flyer]

When working with an accident rate as high as we have in Amateur Built Experimental Aircraft... We don't need to spend too much time digging for the reasons. They are well understood. Weather (VFR into IMC), Maneuvering (Buzzing and low level acro), Fuel Management, Take-off and Landings (X-wind) and Poor building/maintenance. Focusing on Aeronautical decision-making and recurrent training will cover most of these.

There is plenty of work to do in these areas and this will cover a big share of the accidents.

When trying to drive the accident rates from the .00001 to .000001, then lots and lots of nit-picky data is needed. We are nowhere close to having that problem...

 

[Peterk]

Just ran across this nugget of wisdom while poking around another forum. This is a response to the account of the idiot who landed his Warrior on a New York beach because "they do it in Alaska". The author is Kevin O'Brien:

Look up a paper called "Unskilled and Unaware of It" by a couple of, IIRC, psychologists named Kruger and Dunning. Their findings have been absorbed into pop culture as the Dunning-Kruger effect. Briefly stated, just about everybody thinks he's above average at a given skill (say, piloting), so only the tiny subset of people who actually are above-average -- those whose good judgment comes from experience, perhaps -- are actually correct. Tyros like this guy tend to overestimate themselves and their abilities. They just don't know enough about the scope of the task to know how little they have mastered it. Conversely, true experts UNDERestimate their skills -- they are so aware of the dimensions of the problem that they're naturally modest about their very high level of skill. The line showing the evolution of personal self-estimation of expertise only intersects with the actual growth of expertise at one point.

A logical corollary to this is that, the experienced pilot who underrates his own skills naturally errs in the direction of greater safety. And the novice who overrates his own skills places an obstacle in the way of his becoming an experienced pilot.

And apparently when they did a second study of the unskilled and pre-armed them with some theory/logic concerning the test...they estimated as well as the over-estimators. So I guess the question is; how do you get the unaware underskilled to participate in training they insist they don't need. I'm gathering that is the point...or am I'm missing something?

 

[Sam Buchanan]

And apparently when they did a second study of the unskilled and pre-armed them with some theory/logic concerning the test...they estimated as well as the over-estimators. So I guess the question is; how do you get the unaware underskilled to participate in training they insist they don't need. I'm gathering that is the point...or am I'm missing something?

That is the problem that must be solved.....and has so far escaped solution due to the very psychology possessed by the unskilled.

Studying stats is fine, but any of us who have hung around airports for awhile know exactly who is involved in accidents and why........

 

[B25Flyer]

That is the problem that must be solved.....and has so far escaped solution due to the very psychology possessed by the unskilled.

Studying stats is fine, but any of us who have hung around airports for awhile know exactly who is involved in accidents and why........

The solution comes from changing the culture... If we create a culture where those who have poor judgement, poor skills, and poor maintenance/building, are treated as uncool, some will change and some will go away...

Changing culture is really tough, the airlines have been working on CRM since the late 70's... They have made great progress and their safety record shows that, but they still have some Bull Moose, Knuckle Dragging Captains...

 

[Ironflight]

Sam and Doug, we are on the same page! it doesn't make any difference which cause of accidents you choose to "work on" - it is a target rich environment, and any improvement is in the direction of "goodness" - but it will take a culture change to essentially make "those who most need to change, but are least likely to accept that change" socially "uncool".

I have been involved in aviation safety for decades - if anyone has an actual answer to that problem, they should be awarded the Collier Trophy - no one has solved it yet. (Which doesn't mean we should not - and will not - keep trying...)

Paul

 

[Buggsy2]

When working with an accident rate as high as we have in Amateur Built Experimental Aircraft... We don't need to spend too much time digging for the reasons. They are well understood. Weather (VFR into IMC), Maneuvering (Buzzing and low level acro), Fuel Management, Take-off and Landings (X-wind) and Poor building/maintenance. Focusing on Aeronautical decision-making and recurrent training will cover most of these.

The reasons cited are all common to certificated aircraft, including maintenance. So again, why are OBAM aircraft so much more likely to be involved in accidents than factory-built? Yes, we DO need to spend time understanding that. Otherwise it's Ready...Fire...Aim.

 

[Buggsy2]

That is the problem that must be solved.....and has so far escaped solution due to the very psychology possessed by the unskilled.

Studying stats is fine, but any of us who have hung around airports for awhile know exactly who is involved in accidents and why........

That the unskilled and unteachable cannot be reached is relevant, if the goal is to reduce the overall accident rate for OBAM aircraft.

That the unskilled and unteachable cannot be reached is irrelevant, if we the teachable want to learn the factual reasons behind the greatly increased accident rate of OBAM aircraft so we can efficiently teach ourselves. I count myself in that category, as I think readers of this thread do. I don't believe the increased accident rate is due solely to a handful of yahoos, and because I'm not a yahoo, I'm safe. Rather, I'd like to see good evidence--the stats--as to why OBAM aircraft accident at higher rates, and then look to myself to see if I am deficient in those areas.

Is it a building problem, say in fuel systems? Then I'll take extra care in building and testing that. Is it a lack of skill in higher performing aircraft? Then I'll take extra care in getting training for that. But I need to know the reasons for the higher accident numbers.

 

[panhandler1956]

Root cause

I see both sides as well.
I think knowing the data will help us focus on the easy fixes and make some quick gains, but any action at this point is better than nothing (read status quo). Some incremental improvement is needed, whether we hit the bulls eye or not.

Culture is a tough one and the larger the group the longer it takes to change, but over time you can gradual make a change - again incremental. This just means, we need to get on it now.

 

[Peterk]

it will take a culture change to essentially make "those who most need to change,

...there is more to this fascinating Dunning-Kruger research that Sam brought up. It also proved that those who under-estimate their skill level (particularly in the logic area) are also poor at correctly estimating the skill level of the over-estimators without factual support. So in theory, a culture change cannot depend upon either group to initiate or support such a need. "Perception of performance, not reality, influenced decisions about future activities."

The successful safety entities have all been regulated: military, part 121, part 135, NASA, etc. All mandated culture changes. Who will or can mandate to this self-regulated group that guards its freedom to fly as a bill of rights.

On a personal note, I fly an ELSA RV12. There are not fast...they are not good IFR platforms...they cannot pretend they are an F16. They are not designed to take anyone's flying skill to the edge of the envelope. Ironically, these very safety factors are behind the all too common comment, "when I can't get a medical, I'll just fly without one."

And they do.

 

[Jack Tyler]

Some culture change is possible...

...as has been demonstrated many times in many communities, from city governance to corporate settings. GE didn't get to 6 Sigma on autopilot. But it is indeed relevant to ponder on the 'who' and the 'how' of culture change in a self-regulating community.

An earlier poster asked: "So I guess the question is; how do you get the unaware underskilled to participate in training they insist they don't need. I'm gathering that is the point..."

When Walt Disney was designing the first Disneyland, he didn't want an amusement park. He wanted - literally - a Magic Kingdom of sorts. One big piece of that was the culture of the park's staffing (the 'cast' as it later became known). The first Dean of Disney Univesity (basically, the leader of the training dept.), Mike Lane, developed a learning model to create this new kind of employee out of whole cloth. Remember: There was no model to refer back to, and they were training a lightly experienced workforce, not masters' candidates.

Lane came up with a hierarchical 4-step learning model that formed the basic building blocks of every module needing to be mastered by every cast member:
-- unconscious incompetence (the focus of some of this thread's discussion)
-- conscious incompetence (where you'd all like those underskilled, unaware pilots to be)
-- conscious comptence (the person has to 'work' at building and maintaining the competency)
-- unconscious competence (the competence just 'happens', the skill sets are ingrained, which allows the person to move on to higher order conscious incompetencies)

How were folks moved from level 1 to level 2, on their way to building a different kind of culture? Basically, 3 ways: Leadership, peer pressure, and standards enforcement. The less of one, the more of the others.

Jack

 

[dmaib]

Focusing on Aeronautical decision-making and recurrent training will cover most of these.

There is plenty of work to do in these areas and this will cover a big share of the accidents.

My thoughts, exactly. This has been well proven in the military/airline/corporate flight environment. The FAA has been hammering away at Aeronautical Decision Making for a few years now. Getting the horse to drink after it is led to the water is, of course, our challenge.

 

[Peterk]

I promise I won't talk anymore but....lol

I have noticed that formation flying seems to be enjoyed by all homebuilders certainly because it it social and instills a great amount of pride in precision flying. However, each time there is a clinic, the same people sign up and the same minor groups are encouraged not to. If there was a way to encourage "new" formation pilots, think of the discipline and pre-planning that would be "muscle memory" in so many of these above mentioned under-skilled but unaware. Formation flying would make them aware very quickly. And they would move up on Jack's ladder of advancement.

I do think the people that put them on are wonderful, working fools and admire their dedication to those skills. It is that dedication and skill level we are talking about is it not?

I don't believe we (or he FAA) are concerned about the am builts that fly into IMC. I think they are concerned about pre-planning and skill level. Who better to teach and what a wonderful thing to learn.

How we build the encouragement or arm-twist the instruction or pay for the training is something else. But I myself would commit to attending and to forcing additional members to attend. Just a thought...thanks.

 

[pierre smith]

Thanks Jack

Amazing system that Lane developed!

In our Ag aviation world, as I've stated before, we have the PAASS (Professional Aerial Applicator support System) in place that many of us attend annually and benefit from a large insurance premium reduction ( around $1,000 or more).

Our Southeastern branch is trying to mandate that all applicators who want to receive credits for license renewal from the Dept. of Agriculture, must have attended a PAASS presentation. Some grumble that they're being force-fed and that it would be trampling their freedoms. I can see both sides of the matter but the goal is to reduce the annual fatalities and accidents.

How would a mandate be accepted, you think?

Best,

 

[asav8tor]

Van has lost two airplanes that I can think of, one to weather, one to aerobatics.

And...... Van himself ran out of gas in the 3

 

[Ironflight]

Carrots and Sticks

Our Southeastern branch is trying to mandate that all applicators who want to receive credits for license renewal from the Dept. of Agriculture, must have attended a PAASS presentation. Some grumble that they're being force-fed and that it would be trampling their freedoms. I can see both sides of the matter but the goal is to reduce the annual fatalities and accidents.

How would a mandate be accepted, you think?

See, that's the fundamental problem we have here in our little (but growing) corner of aviation - the lack of a "stick"...or even a "carrot". The airlines and military have incredibly good safety records because they are standardized and if you don't conform, you are out the door. That's a "big stick", wielded by those who have something the pilot wants - good pay, cool airplanes, whatever. But in private aviation, the only one wielding a stick is the FAA..."Conform or lose your license" - and what we are trying to avoid here (go back a bunch of pages) is giving them a bigger stick.

So we need a carrot - and the only one that really seems to work for a lot of people who won't admit that they have any problems that they need to solve personally is monetary. Well, I doubt that giving someone a 10% break on their airplane insurance is going to be a huge incentive for someone that pays that much for gas in a week or two of flying. And I doubt that the insurance industry is going to give their service away for free. So that one is out.

The FAA has tried for years to give away "Ego Boosts" in the form of the Wings Programs awards. I don't want to minimize that - it is a good effort, and good people take advantage of it. But it primarily captures the folks that already have the proper attitude towards safety, and those who really need to get it knocked into their heads are the ones who don't participate.

So there's the problem. You can argue all day about whether the cause of the crash is bad weather, lack of transition raining, poor judgment, stupid builder modifications....whatever. The ROOT CAUSE is attitude...unitl you can fix that - figure out a "carrot" to keep the FAA from finding a bigger "stick" - you are not going to make much progress. But I sure will keep trying...

 

[Alan Carroll]

...For example, we have pilots who perform aerobatics, race (usually at low altitude), fly formation even formation aerobatics and any accident from these type activities are included as well as ordinary flight operations in the accident statistics for aviation....

Are accident statistics of automobile racing included in all automobile accident statistics? We know they are not but they are for aviation.

The same holds true for motorcycles.

Are horse racing, steeple chasing, rodeo, jumping etc included in accident statistics relating to ordinary horse riding? I seriously doubt it.....

See, that's the fundamental problem we have here in our little (but growing) corner of aviation - the lack of a "stick"...or even a "carrot". The airlines and military have incredibly good safety records because they are standardized and if you don't conform, you are out the door...

Glenn had an interesting point related to the types of flying done in RVs. Presumably the ultimate goal of airline flying is to make every flight as boring and predictable as possible (at least that's my hope as a passenger). However, this kind of standardization seems incompatible with how RVers tend to use their planes. The fun, freedom, and exhilaration of flying a quick little airplane you built yourself are an undeniable part of the appeal. The homebuilt accident statistics from the Nall report seem to support this. In fact only about 13% of the fatal accidents resulted from fuel issues or flying into IMC.

My question is what's the best way to make fun-flying less risky, without simply prohibiting it? A related question is how to gain public (read FAA) acceptance for the idea that recreational flying in homebuilts is different than just point A to point B transportation, and that this is OK?

 

[gereed75]

wow great comments

and they really help focus the debate.

Getting the hardcore horse to drink is tough. But I think there are a bunch of horses that are'nt so hard core that can be helped at least a little bit - I contend primarily by increasing the community's professionalism (which is generally peer pressure).

In addition, there are a whole bunch of "unconsious incompetents" that will willingly be converted to at least "conscious incompetence" if they can be educated on how dangerous "unconsious incompetence" is and how easily it can be cured for the willing with a bit of readily available training, encouraged again by some additional professionalism (again peer pressure).

Hope I'm not deluding myself.

 

[B25Flyer]

The reasons cited are all common to certificated aircraft, including maintenance. So again, why are OBAM aircraft so much more likely to be involved in accidents than factory-built? Yes, we DO need to spend time understanding that. Otherwise it's Ready...Fire...Aim.

The reason is the culture of the homebuilt community is much different than the spam can community...

One difference in our culture is a a group, we have a much larger appetite for risk. Because of that we tend to participate in higher risk activities, like acro and formation. And we are more likely to fly closer to the edge.... All of this contributes to higher accident rates.

But you are correct, the reasons are common to all aspects of aviation.

And it is pretty well understood, but apparently not so well communicated.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

 

[DanH]

Looks like around 25% of accidents have a mechanical cause. It is probably underestimated. I can't do much about the pilot culture, but I can help people build better airplanes.

I don't give a hoot what area you improve...

 

[jrs14855]

stainless

The late John Thorp said that statistically an aluminum firewall was ok. You won't find me with anything but stainless components thru/on the firewall, steel if stainless is not available. Much of the firewall "stuff" in the various catalogs is aluminum

 

[Ironflight]

Looks like around 25% of accidents have a mechanical cause. It is probably underestimated. I can't do much about the pilot culture, but I can help people build better airplanes.

And, among other things, building better airplanes will help the situation. I bet though, if you look at those cases, a lot more accidents are caused by loss of engine power due to lack of fuel supply than are caused by FWF fire/firewall burn through. Granted the thought of burning to death in the cockpit due to a FWF fire is terrifying, but I doubt that it is a statistically significant event that needs complete focus. Yes, building a good firewall is a great idea, and I am a proponent of attacking ALL accident cause - because we fix them one at a time - but focusing on one statistically small cause at the expense of others isn't as productive.

Now if we have a panel of experts, each of which has an area of expertise on which they like to focus, that's great - but each expert needs to support the others in tackling their areas - not fight about which is moe important - that just diverts everyone's attecntion, and nothign gets done. That's how government fails to work - everyone argues for their position, so nothing ever gets solved.

Paul

 

[WhiskeyMike]

Just Looking for Context...

The safety article that Van wrote, and which was referenced by the OP, says...

?...the FAA has reviewed the history of EAB accidents which showed a fatal accident rate around 6 to 8 time higher than overall GA, and that this rate had not improved in recent years. The FAA also pointed out that they expect EAB accident to be somewhat higher than GA because of the very nature of this aviation activity. (Uncertified designs, amateur construction, no production QC, etc.) This consideration aside, their consensus is that the rate is inexcusably high and must be improved.?

This seems to be saying that the fatal accident rate for EAB has historically been 6 to 8 times higher than overall GA, and that the rate has not changed in recent years. So there?s been NO increase in the accident rate, and NO decrease. Please correct me if I?m off base...

 

[MontanaMike]

Risk Management and Accountability

Bump probably unnecessary on this topic....I flew to Helena today and received my temp. Experimental Repairman, and could not get this safety thread out of my mind.

In a former job I assisted in introducing risk management and accountability into a group of individuals whose culture was of competence, confidence and independence, and which just like our group of experimental aircraft builders and pilots, had that image reinforced with every successful mission they completed, despite occasionally what they considered acceptable failures, and which acceptability was placed in dispute by those who were being held accountable for the entire operation. Unhappiness and resistance aplenty. The chief obstacle became defensiveness, which is exactly the same reaction that I, MontanaMike, have been experiencing regarding this safety problem, and hopefully coming to grips with, in the best interests of this group.

AOPA and probably even the EAA do not have accurate hours of successful experimental flight hours, I know they do not have any idea that I flew 125 hours this past years without an accident, most on untrackable auto fuel, but the AOPA Nall Report statistics being inaccurate is not a defense. Several of my early flights did not make me proud, nor did they necessarily reflect well on the RV community, but I do not consider anything I did "stupid". My deficiencies were not purposeful, so my defensiveness kicked in and the shields went up. Yet I know that if I have an accident, some on this site will call me stupid. I repeat,--- an "accident". This name calling has no place in the safety discussion.

With the high-speed employees I refer to above, I had complete authority to accompany the accountability for which we as management were being held. However, in this experimental world, imposition of the many great suggestions discussed here has to be voluntary, unless they are imposed by the factory as a condition of kit sales, or by the FAA in a blanket manner. In my view, the DAR Inspection and Repairman Application experiences are a great place to start a builder on a safer path. As Repairman, I would like to have access to all available RV equipment and airframe failure information, as the DARs also should, and not just factory letters. Alan Carrol posted 152 fatal RV accidents over 35 years, not including non-fatals, so there is a huge database available for research. This RV-specific information would be helpful in addressing the 25% Dan referred to.

I know at least one builder who is not flying, and many including myself have found themselves in this dangerous situation due to financial or logistical factors. I tried to cure this defect by spending 20 hours with Seager, with a little success, yet how many identify this problem for themselves and get right with currency and proficiency during the excitement of completing ther build? After 125 hours in the 6, I can testify that this is not an aircraft for anyone who has let their flying skills deteriorate. Has this been an accident factor? Is that information available?

I applaud those who have volunteered to work on this issue. We should all drop the shields and do something, anything, to help. I surrender.

Sorry for the rambling, it has been a long winter.

Mike Bauer
RV6 N918MB

 

[RV10inOz]

My 20c worth from down under, should get me 21cents of yours nowdays!

Take all the Experimental accidents, remove all the prangs which were attributable to CFIT from weather, and all the handling issues where it was certain not to be a unique handling fault, and lump them all onto the GA statistics. Then compare.

Why? Because the folk who are killing themselves by means of fuel running out then stall and spin or VFR into IMC etc etc etc, those same accidents would have occured in a C172/PA28/V35B.

Only then can you truly see what dangers lurk statistically in Experimental.

Anyone got the data to manipulate properly?

 

[Peterk]

Regulation

In the US, only the Nuclear Power industry is more regulated than aviation. The FAA, as always, will do what they feel necessary and as usual we will react as we feel necessary. I do think it odd that skydiving has minimal regulation and fatalities are quite common yet there is no rush by regulators to fix it or else. Perhaps because it usually only involves one soul and seldom damages property. Are skydivers besieged by personality analysis? Of course not. Their mistake is accepted as their mistake and jumps continue. The public does not write their congressman and complain about skydivers. They DO complain about the possibility of a "homemade" airplane hitting THEIR house. All federal agencies are reactionary. Like other agencies they are influenced most heavily by professional lobbyists. Our best hope is the EAA. Rather than try to convince each other that we can solve this internally, I suggest we all push the EAA to build a consensus with the FAA. Mr Hightower needs to be involved of course as I would suspect he already is. The EAA has served us well in the past on this subject and I trust them to do so again. AOPA on the other hand is a waste of time.

 

[gereed75]

this remains a great thread

yes there are a lot of people with habits that will be hard to reach, but just look at two other current threads on this board - the "turn back one" and the "approach speeds" one.

If these don't illustrate the value of putting out some well researched and proven standards for emergency procedures and standard ops, I don't know what ever will.

How many accidents avoided and lives saved might such an effort yield?? Don't really know. One or two a year would be great. And the other more intangible benefits are many. It's all good.

By the way Montana Mike, anyone with a grass strip and a Montana "Trout Creek" address would be a very welcome voluntary addition to our effort.

Fly on

 

[flyboy1963]

When do we start 'self-regulating'?

It is heartening to see that after 14 pages, the interest in safety hasn't waned.
I am absorbing all the comments, and see a common thread where we want to know what is killing GA, and A/B pilots specifically. Do the stats tell the whole story?..even if we had extensive and accurate ones?
As others way smarter than I have noted, Cockpit Resource Management, or risk management, sounds like airline talk, but in many ways, we practice this every day when we get in a car and drive to work. ( we ensure we have enough gas, and air in the tires before hitting the freeway at 70 mph!)
I think we also need to look at pilot behaviour and decision-making, 'judgement', in addition to stick& rudder and weather coping skills. Some of these can be taught, some perhaps not.

When I look at the dozens of YouTube videos, which are out there for all to see, it concerns me.
The pilot may in fact be supremely qualified, in a well-maintained craft; It is not a criticism of the individual, but our community as a whole when we fail to address actions that could just as easily end up as a fatal accident, as a super-cool video.
I think we've all seen them. Examples? A very highly skilled pilot crankin' & bankin' down a river below treetop height. I would hate to see this end with him clipping the mast of an unseen sailboat, or catching a zip-line cable that some kids strung across the river. Aerobatics in and thru clouds. Amazing short landings, but approaches that are only a few feet above the scrub brush. There are no margins of safety in any of these operations; they are all right at the edge of the envelope.
At best they could end up as an insurance claim that raises rates for all of us. At worst, property damage and/or the injury or death of the operator or persons on the ground, with the expected regulatory backlash.

 

[John Clark]

How will it play at the hearing?

It is heartening to see that after 14 pages, the interest in safety hasn't waned.
I am absorbing all the comments, and see a common thread where we want to know what is killing GA, and A/B pilots specifically. Do the stats tell the whole story?..even if we had extensive and accurate ones? <snip>

The fixation on stats by some concerns me. Yes, we need to gather information to help understand the issue, but they will never tell the whole story. I really get the feeling that there are people that are in denial and/or think that they can get off the hook by "proving" that it doesn't apply to them. News flash! We are all on the hook here. If changes aren't made the FAA, or worse, the insurance companies, are going to fix the problem their way.

The video issue has always chapped my hide. People post some really stupid aeronautical acts on YouTube. In my early airline training a ground instructor, discussing planning and risk management, said "Just ask yourself how it is going to sound at the the hearing". Think how you would feel when your video is played for the administrative law judge at your revocation hearing.

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA

 

[WhiskeyMike]

I think we all have to be a little careful here. Let’s not forget that the FAA is asserting specific statistics as a justification to indict the A/B community and threaten its existence! Given this context I do not see how it is a fixation or a denial to ascertain how complete and/or accurate these statistics are. Nor should we imply anything less than sincere motives to those daring to raise legitimate questions. I for one have several questions.

Despite the fact that the fatal accident rate for A/B today is generally consistent with what it has been historically, why has the FAA only now (in 2011) decided that this rate is “inexcusably high and must be improved”? On this question Van opines as follows: “When our A-B community was very small, our accident numbers then were not as noticeable; not high enough to noticeably affect the overall tally. Now that we are becoming a larger portion of GA, our numbers are becoming too noticeable. This probably explains why the FAA, AOPA, etc. are now becoming more concerned and involved.” Is this the FAA’s sole motivation? Perhaps - although Van seems to couch this reasoning with a “probably”. As was previously mentioned by an earlier post, aviation is one of the most highly regulated activities in the U.S. The “they were always a bunch of unsafe yahoo’s, but now there’s just too many of them to ignore” argument doesn’t strike me as plausible in such a heavily regulated environment.

It’s no secret that A/B has enemies. Just a couple of years ago the FAA aggressively sought to limit A/B by altering the 51% rules in draconian fashion. They would have been successful if not for the well organized political response/resistance they received. And it’s heartwarming to lean that AOPA (GAMA’s mouthpiece) has now become “concerned and involved” regarding the serious safety issue posed by A/B. I’m sure their “concerns” are completely unrelated to the fact that the dramatic growth of A/B over the last 20+ years has come at a painful expense to certified aircraft sales. If A/B activities and influence decline, would theirs not surely rise?

Look, I believe that everyone involved in A/B wants the accident rate to go down, and I’ve not seen anyone on this thread say anything to the contrary. After all, every life is precious, and who has more of a stake in safety than those actually risking life and limb? I fully support these discussions and ideas to enhance safety across the board. But I also find the timing and actors involved with this “assault” on A/B more than coincidental, and as a result a political response may be appropriate and necessary IN ADDITION to increased safety awareness and activities!

 

[Peterk]

Nailed

And it’s heartwarming to learn that AOPA (GAMA’s mouthpiece) has now become “concerned and involved” regarding the serious safety issue posed by A/B. I’m sure their “concerns” are completely unrelated to the fact that the dramatic growth of A/B over the last 20+ years has come at a painful expense to certified aircraft sales. If A/B activities and influence decline, would theirs not surely rise?

Unfortunately, I think W/M has it nailed. If you will remember, AOPA/GAMA was "heartwarmly" opposed to the new LSA category for the very same reasons. EAA came to the rescue then and they did again with the 51st rule. Very nice post...thank you.

Pete

 

[Mark Burns]

Exactly how I was feeling!

I think we all have to be a little careful here. Let?s not forget that the FAA is asserting specific statistics as a justification to indict the A/B community and threaten its existence! Given this context I do not see how it is a fixation or a denial to ascertain how complete and/or accurate these statistics are. Nor should we imply anything less than sincere motives to those daring to raise legitimate questions. I for one have several questions.

Despite the fact that the fatal accident rate for A/B today is generally consistent with what it has been historically, why has the FAA only now (in 2011) decided that this rate is ?inexcusably high and must be improved?? On this question Van opines as follows: ?When our A-B community was very small, our accident numbers then were not as noticeable; not high enough to noticeably affect the overall tally. Now that we are becoming a larger portion of GA, our numbers are becoming too noticeable. This probably explains why the FAA, AOPA, etc. are now becoming more concerned and involved.? Is this the FAA?s sole motivation? Perhaps - although Van seems to couch this reasoning with a ?probably?. As was previously mentioned by an earlier post, aviation is one of the most highly regulated activities in the U.S. The ?they were always a bunch of unsafe yahoo?s, but now there?s just too many of them to ignore? argument doesn?t strike me as plausible in such a heavily regulated environment.

It?s no secret that A/B has enemies. Just a couple of years ago the FAA aggressively sought to limit A/B by altering the 51% rules in draconian fashion. They would have been successful if not for the well organized political response/resistance they received. And it?s heartwarming to lean that AOPA (GAMA?s mouthpiece) has now become ?concerned and involved? regarding the serious safety issue posed by A/B. I?m sure their ?concerns? are completely unrelated to the fact that the dramatic growth of A/B over the last 20+ years has come at a painful expense to certified aircraft sales. If A/B activities and influence decline, would theirs not surely rise?

Look, I believe that everyone involved in A/B wants the accident rate to go down, and I?ve not seen anyone on this thread say anything to the contrary. After all, every life is precious, and who has more of a stake in safety than those actually risking life and limb? I fully support these discussions and ideas to enhance safety across the board. But I also find the timing and actors involved with this ?assault? on A/B more than coincidental, and as a result a political response may be appropriate and necessary IN ADDITION to increased safety awareness and activities!

Bill,
I agree with you 100%

 

[B25Flyer]

Whiskey Mike,

If you think the AB crowd is under assault, come visit the Warbird World... The FAA is actively pursuing the Warbird community...

One of the areas where they are really turning up the heat is operating limitations. Anyone certifying a new Exp/Exhibition Warbird going forward will have some draconian operating limitations. These new operating limitations preclude landing at airports in congested areas... To land at an airport in a congested area requires a special operating limitation issued by the local FSDO and in some cases has been a one way in, one way out with no pattern procedure....

I predict this is one of the ways they will come after the A/B community. Anything we can do to keep our freinds alive will also make ourselves a smaller target and demonstrate some efforts to improve our situation will give EAA ammunition when they are fighting our cause in DC.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

 

[David-aviator]

Whiskey Mike,

If you think the AB crowd is under assault, come visit the Warbird World... The FAA is actively pursuing the Warbird community...

One of the areas where they are really turning up the heat is operating limitations. Anyone certifying a new Exp/Exhibition Warbird going forward will have some draconian operating limitations. These new operating limitations preclude landing at airports in congested areas... To land at an airport in a congested area requires a special operating limitation issued by the local FSDO and in some cases has been a one way in, one way out with no pattern procedure....

I predict this is one of the ways they will come after the A/B community. Anything we can do to keep our freinds alive will also make ourselves a smaller target and demonstrate some efforts to improve our situation will give EAA ammunition when they are fighting our cause in DC.

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

Safety of flight - they won't rest until everything is locked up tight like flying for an airline. What an incredibly boring prospect!

There was a noticeable absence of war birds at the SW Florida Charlotte County air show in March this year. I've been there several times in previous years with a friend, now near 90, who flew 51's in WWII. Last year he even managed to talk his way into sitting in one for a few pictures. He was most disappointed this year - none were present. I wonder if "special operating limitations" kept them away.

At the gathering I observed this jet zipping around the airport. It looked like a mini F-15 and put on quite a show and then it occurred to me, it was a drone. This went on and on for at least an hour with a number of airplanes, all drones. I saw them later, some were quite large. Great performance by RC guys, but is this what air shows are coming to? If this is what the future holds - no pilots or real airplanes - count me out. I'm going fishing. We paid $18 each to mill around with a hoard of people who came to eat hot dogs, the air show part was not up past standards.

We are most fortunate to do what we do with apparent FAA endorsement to this point. It is possible AOPA has planted like minded individuals in the FAA to whittle away at those privileges. Government and big business can be very devious and with a smile, like we are here to help you (save yourself). I had thought EAA and AOPA had some sort of raport going on but that may be window dressing. Most successful leaders today are smooth and pleasant but can have a secret agenda not in our best interest.

We do need to fly safer, that would take the heat off.

I am glad guys like Van are on these committees to report what it going on.

 

[B25Flyer]

The Ops would not have been the problem at your airshow. The limitations only apply to newly certified airplanes for now, so if you have op limits there is no change, but make any change and you will end up with the new ones and be screwed.....

Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

 

[dmaib]

Let?s not forget that the FAA is asserting specific statistics as a justification to indict the A/B community and threaten its existence!

I am not buying the notion that the FAA has an agenda to threaten the existence of the A/B community. A genuine concern about bringing down the accident rate is one thing, a conspiracy to shut us down is quite another thing, and seems very unlikely to me. Are there individuals out there that would argue that "home made" airplanes, jet skis, motorcycles, SUV's, flight schools, etc., etc., etc., should be "outlawed"? Sure there are.
I think the A/B community is held in higher esteem now than at any time in it's history, but we must work together to address this issue, whether we think it is a real issue or not. Perception tends to become "reality" in the minds of people.

 

[Peterk]

You're right

I am not buying the notion that the FAA has an agenda to threaten the existence of the A/B community.

No, I'm not either. The FAA agenda is like every other government agency, it is driven by professional lobbyists. AOPA/GAMA has an agenda to push (believe it) and the EAA/VAN's, etc have an agenda as well. Fortunately for us this is not the EAA's first rodeo. And if you don't believe this to be true, tell me who Roy LaHood and Randy Babbitt will be working for when their terms expire. It won't be as PR director of the Warbirds Society.

 

[Buggsy2]

The fixation on stats by some concerns me. Yes, we need to gather information to help understand the issue, but they will never tell the whole story. I really get the feeling that there are people that are in denial and/or think that they can get off the hook by "proving" that it doesn't apply to them.

As a proponent of "stats" in this thread let me explain why I think they are crucial. First, "stats" are a mathematical technique of examining data to determine patterns, insights, and what-not. I do not propose they we calculate statistics and then stop there. The point of statistics is to use them as a tool to gain insight into the underlying phenomena: in this case, why is the OBAM accident rate several times higher than the certificated aircraft accident rate?

First, stats can tell you if there is a problem at all. Maybe the apparent large different in accident rates is nothing more than a problem with the data. Second, stats can point out non-intuitive causes of the difference. Time and again as a hydraulic computer modeling engineer I've seen intuition fail, and real causes only be understood with measurement, not speculation.

Assuming the accident rate for OBAM aircraft is 6-8 times greater than certificated, I find it hard to believe that the explanation is we are simply composed of 6-8 times the number of yahoos, idiots, and reckless fools. As many posts in this thread have pointed out, we probably can't reach the fools anyway. OK, but I still want to know the causes of the increased accident rate because in a few years I will be flying my OBAM airplane--God willing--and want to know how to reduce my chances of an accident.

 

[Buggsy2]

I can't let this by...but please don't interpret my comments as personal attacks on anybody.

Let?s not forget that the FAA is asserting specific statistics as a justification to indict the A/B community and threaten its existence!

The FAA has a legitimate role as cop, if someone in the greater aviation community is getting reckless. Statistically, that would be us now.

Is this the FAA?s sole motivation? Perhaps - although Van seems to couch this reasoning with a ?probably?.

Because Van doesn't really know, and as the careful engineer he is, he won't definitely state something as true or false, until he definitely knows.

Just a couple of years ago the FAA aggressively sought to limit A/B by altering the 51% rules in draconian fashion.

I saw that as the FAA trying to limit the fraudulent building activities...10 days to taxi, or whatever it's called. I and others welcomed the FAA's actions because the fraudsters were threatening all of us.

the dramatic growth of A/B over the last 20+ years has come at a painful expense to certified aircraft sales. If A/B activities and influence decline, would theirs not surely rise?

Very unlikely, IMO. New aircraft are several times the cost of kitbuilt aircraft, and often less performance. If A/B (OBAM) aircraft were outlawed tomorrow I wouldn't rush out and buy a new airplane, or even another used airplane.

 

[John Clark]

Data Collection

Two issues, first, I said "Yes, we need to gather information to help understand the issue, but they will never tell the whole story". My point being that we need to go after this in several ways simultaneously. Stats are good, but I really got the impression from some people that we should not do anything until all the stats were in and collated. We can accomplish a lot while the number crunching is in process. My second concern is that if you had every report ever filed on E-AB incidents/accidents, you still wouldn't have the complete picture. Plenty of "events" involving scary situations and/or damage that were never reported to anyone.

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA

 

[RV8R999]

so what is the limit of acceptable loss? What if we only had 1 AB accident each year - Would this be considered an acceptable loss rate given the inherent risks? If we say it is not acceptable then we are unrealistic. If we agree 1 accident is acceptable then the next question becomes - what about 2?

What is the number of AB fatalities as a function of active AB pilots? I'd bet it is a very, very low %. What is the acceptable limit? Who cares if it is more than some other group. Too many variables to compare fairly.

I say allow easier access to qualified instructors, continue to beat the drum in every venue possible, visibly show the FAA we are active and concerned, be committed enough to police ourselves and the guy next to us and if after all that a very low % of folks still end up a lawn dart - chalk it up to fate, bad luck, or a cleansing of the gene pool and move on.

If we truly want dramatically reduced accidents then the answer is well known and have been in place for a long, long time as has been mentioned several times. The airlines and the military do it very well. You do not want to have the imposition to your freedoms these organizations require to keep their safety numbers so good. In my squadron of 46 pilots, they are each required to attend 2 hours of training every Friday morning, attend 4 hour long Safety Stand-Down Seminars once each qtr, they have mandatory emergency procedure training every 180 days, a 100 question open book test and 80 question closed book test annually in which they must score at least an 85% or greater. They have tactics check-rides, annual standardization check rides, annual instrument training and check-rides (which includes 1 day of instrument ground school). Every single flight is a graded event with a 2-3 hour pre-flight briefing, at least a 1 hour debrief, followed by at least 30 minutes of logging the data. We have very stringent currency and periodicity requirements for flying at night, landing on the ship, flying formation, shooting weapons, flying on NVGs, flying specific tactics..when these lapse a check pilot is required to get them back up to speed which includes a very thorough briefing with tons of questions. Now try to imagine waking up on a beautiful Saturday morning ready to take your RV-X for a spin and realizing you haven't flown your required 20 hours in the last month and are now required to prepare a two hour brief, answer a bunch of hard questions, get grilled by an instructor, fly, 2 hour debrief and sign a strongly worded grade sheet - if you (we) are not ready for that kind of scrutiny then I suggest we find ways to accept some of what happens when we fly with the freedoms we do. Vent over...sorry

I worry more about driving to and from work...now this is scary!

 

[Captain Avgas]

Close to the edge

If you'd like to see the MOST AMAZING example of flying with "attitude" (a word used often in this thread) then this video of wingsuit flying is a must see. It's a high quality video and the scenes of flying through narrow ravines at high speed will just blow you away.

This is pure flying in it's simplest form for adventurous young folk....fast, energetic, exhilarating, and very close to the edge (literally). In fact some may describe it as (dare I say it)...totally unsafe.

Is it relevant to this thread....probably. But if not, it sure provides some light relief in the middle of a heavyweight topic.

http://biggeekdad.com/2011/03/wingsuit-flying/

 

[Jack Tyler]

A brief segway: Those who find this thread useful reading will want to read Van's 'next installment'. It's at: http://www.facebook.com/notes/vans-aircraft-inc/vans-safety-column/215423255134721 It's also good to see him ID several more topics on this same theme that he'll address later. (Am I the only one who wonders how a guy so good at being a designer, engineer and businessman can also be such a thoughtful, lean and crisply clear author? Quite a rare combo...)

One overarching theme here is 'Oh, what to do...!?' For all the well-written posts and thoughtful debate between stats, anecdotal events and confessions, there's actually very little action planning evident. If we were sitting around a table in a Community Center or a corporate meeting room, I'd bet well before now in the discussion someone would dare to approach the white board and ask the group to sketch out the beginnings of an action plan.

It occurs to me there's a lot that can be done. Here are a few statements I'd like to see written on the white board:
-- Stats chewing and debating aside, we seem to have a consensus that there are weak pilots flying RVs, A/B aircraft and GA planes in general. What can we do about it? That goes at the top of the white board.
-- In the past, it has struck me as hypocritical that Vans (I mean the biz, not just the owner) would be espousing safety at the same that there is such a paucity of mfgr. endorsed transition training instructor pilots being promoted, let alone a formal programmatic approach to this issue. A formal approach would include a suggested syllabus, an effort at assembling an inventory of (at the least, regional) instructors familiar with RVs, and a mechanism for keeping that instructor group informed (occasional email link?) on pertinent issues. It's reassuring to see that Vans (the man, not the biz) is now headed in that direction - see earlier link.
-- I notice an implied assumption in many of these posts that the 'unconscious incompetent' pilot population consists solely or mostly of thick-skinned, uncaring pilots in self-denial - a group of 'horse refusing to drink' pilots. I think that group is much more heterogeneous than that. And based on my limited experience, this assumption tends to hide one of the unconscious incompetent pilot groups that offers the most opportunity for reducing accident rates: the non-current or barely current pilot. As an example (to go back to Paul's reference to the Wings program), in my area (St. Pete, FL) those programs would draw large crowds every time. And among the attendees I knew, it was easy for me to recognize the '1 hr/month renter' pilots from my field (SPG). I wonder what would happen if a simple, one calendar year, 'basics only' syllabus was offered to everyone (but intended for the low-time and low hours/month pilots) as a training benchmark. What would happen if one of the local CFI's would do a quarterly chalk talk on that syllabus, and how its tasks tie into accident rates.
-- Similarly, I wonder what the impact would be if the suggested syllabus for instructor pilots that Vans is drafting became a defacto RV syllabus, in the sense that it was published, referenced in discussions, discussed at fly-ins, etc. among this VAF community. How could that not establish a bit of a benchmark related to currency? And to an extent, to competency?

I've used up a lot of space (and your time here), the main reason being that I believe this group could fill out (and then act on) a fairly full white board. This isn't just about insurmountable challenges like 'changing attitudes' or slicing stats to everyone's common agreement. It's about small, incremental steps towards agreed upon goals. Lots of low-hanging fruit out there...

Jack