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Accidents: Are We Facilitating Them?

Walt

Well Known Member
I copied this from HAI (Helicopter Association International) and thought it to be just as relevent for the experimental world as the Heli world...

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Accidents: Are We Facilitating Them?

I hope the title of this message got your attention. And no, I am not saying the helicopter industry intentionally causes accidents. But are we acting on all the information we possess to prevent accidents?

If you have been in the aviation business for any amount of time, you have either heard or said one of the three following statements:
1. ?If there was going to be an accident, I always knew it would be him/her/them.?
2. ?He/She/They was/were an accident waiting to happen.?
3. ?I knew if he/she/they kept on doing that, it would result in an accident.?

It often seems that we recognize ? but fail to act ? on safety hazards. Accident reports released by the National Transportation Safety Board bear this out when they identify preexisting industry knowledge of unsafe actions and policies that were causal factors to an accident. Sometimes the report even includes evidence that an operator was widely known to be noncompliant with regulations or that a pilot had the reputation of flying in an unsafe manner, sporting nicknames like ?Wild Man? or ?Death Pilot.?

The saddest part is that we usually talk about how we ?knew? that person would cause an accident some day when it is too late ? after the accident ? when lives have been lost and the damage done.

If we in the helicopter industry are so smart ? if we know about hazards and have an uncanny ability to predict accidents ? then why don?t we do something about it? What are our reasons for not breaking the chain of events leading to an accident? Let?s get out in front of this and take a more aggressive approach to safety industry wide. We need to do more to improve our safety record, both as a group and, more importantly, as individuals, one on one with each other.

?But what can I do?? you ask. I have two suggestions:
1.Become more sensitive to indicators that cause you concern
2.Then act on them.

Nobody said it is easy to influence the decision making and risk assessment of third parties. But unless we all try to improve our industry?s safety record, I guarantee that nothing will change. A safety initiative could be an industry-wide effort, with larger operators mentoring smaller operators in safety procedures. Or it could be as simple as a pilot or mechanic talking to a peer when he or she observes something of concern. Some of you might ask, ?Why should I get involved? My safety record is impeccable, and I have a vibrant safety culture in place. Go focus on the other guy, the one who is causing all the problems.?

Well, the most important reason to personally intervene in an unsafe situation is that you might save a life. But the bottom line is that one person?s accident is the industry?s accident. We are all held accountable for each accident, no matter who actually caused it.

Each of us must take the initiative to start that safety conversation with the other pilot, mechanic, or operator. Ask the question that will lead to a beneficial change in his or her thinking. Offer safer alternatives. Make others aware of safety efforts such as the FAA Wings program or HAI?s Accreditation Program. Get them involved in those efforts.

Statistics show that the helicopter industry segments that have the highest accident rates are training and personal flying. These aviators often fly in a less structured environment and don?t benefit from the backup and review that most operators have in place. This makes your one-on-one conversation with them about safety even more important.

At HAI, we have taken initial steps to coordinate with some of the larger operators and leaders in the personal flying and training segments to develop outreach and mentoring programs. One element is a training initiative to teach individuals and companies how to mentor others in our industry toward safe practices in a one-on-one environment.

When I give presentations or chair workshops on safety, I am always happy to see those in attendance. Just by coming, they are showing their interest in working toward a safer industry. However, the people we really need to speak to are usually not in the room. Accordingly, I view the people who attend safety workshops or programs as disciples who need to communicate the safety message to those who didn?t come. Who better to spread that safety message than those who work in the field each day, observing those activities that concern us all and can result in an accident.

As you go through your day, keep your eyes and ears tuned to events around you. If you observe something that concerns you, walk across the ramp or room and introduce yourself to that person. Start a conversation. You might save some lives.
 
Thanks for the post, Walt.

It's hard enough when it's a clear cut issue and when the observer is "secure" in his or her level of experience. It's still harder when something just goes against the grain of the observer's judgement and experience, and/or if the observer has less experience.

It's uncomfortable to say something...but there are different ways to say something, and a comment or a question may help someone make the change they need. I like the way it's put in the post: "start a conversation." For me, that's a lot easier, and in the whole more effective, than "tell them why they're wrong." Still hard, but very worthwhile. The times I've managed to say something, I haven't regretted it. The times I haven't managed (regarding flying or otherwise, safety-wise), I sometimes have.
 
This is part of the Saftey Management System process that will be coming to general aviation at some time in the future.

It is already part of the IS-BAO certification process and can work well.

The problem is that it flys in the face of human nature to ignore close calls rather than document them and understand why they happened. This is why it is so hard for an individual who doesn't report to a defined management system with independant oversight.

Even though we are part of the largely unregulated experimental segment, we can learn a few things from the "real world" of risk management.

Good luck to us all!
 
Ok, I'll ask the question. Why is this a concern right now? Can you quote for me a source that says accident rates are increasing, or that the system is failing due to accident rates?

Flying small airplanes will never be a zero risk proposition. Just like motorcycle riding, surfing, skydiving or mountain climbing will never be a zero risk proposition. To expect to be able to reduce the accident rates by orders of magnitude will require changes that I don't believe I am willing to undertake , because they would Take too much away from the activity I enjoy passionately.

Reading the article above, I just wonder how this process would be handled. What's going to happen? Would a certified airplane flyer going to come into my hangar and insist that I quit flying my "dangerous" experimental? Is the daylight, never-fly-inverted C-172 pilot going to conduct an intervention with me because I occasionally fly aerobatics?

I'm a safe pilot who enjoys a wide range of flying activities. In my qualified opinion, to make the large scale changes in accident rates, I see restrictions on our flying freedom.

Just my observation.
 
Low pass, your concerns are off in my opinion. Accident causal factors are well-documented and can be reduced dramatically by having people not make avoidable fatal mistakes.

Perhaps you are correct in that MANDATING whatever to reduce these causal factors is either impossible or grossly costly or freedom inhibiting.

But it need not come to that.

If you have not, look at RVFlightSafety.org and if RV pilots studied the problem areas and made the necessary changes in "behavior" (for lack of a better word), then RV accident rates could plummet.
 
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Thanks for the post, Walt.

<snip>

The times I've managed to say something, I haven't regretted it. The times I haven't managed (regarding flying or otherwise, safety-wise), I sometimes have.

Man, I wish I'd said something two weeks ago at Moontown. What I saw that Saturday made me uncomfortable. The same thing occurred on Sunday and killed two people.

In the past, and particularly with pilots I already have a relationship with, I've been reasonably successful with the approach of "What you're doing makes me uncomfortable - if one thing goes wrong when you ____, I think you'll be in a very tough spot." or somethng like that. Saying "Stop that, you're going to kill yourself.", sometimes (usually?) causes the person to stonewall.
 
For those who have been around for a while and seen a few tragedies and near misses, there is very little that gets the attention of the less experienced pilots than when an old salt takes them aside and says "I've done what you were just doing and one day things didn't go exactly as planned. It is only by the grace of God that I'm hear to talk about it today. You might want to take a few minutes to reconsider the risks involved."

Yes, an old salt made just such a recommendation to me some three decades ago when he had watched me doing something unwise. He never raised his voice, never told me that what I was doing was wrong, but rather he showed me risks which I had not evaluated. In short, he didn't assault my ego but rather worded his suggestion in such a manner that I had an easy way out without losing face. I paused, reflected, and never did it again. I don't think I ever thanked him properly for so gently educating me.
 
LIKE!

Most of these posts are good comments that I would be happy to use a LIKE button on the site in lieu of a BS...."I Agree". At least equally, a DISLIKE button would improve lots of sites, forums, etc.
 
Although I have no professional civilian aviation experience - only personal - I believe this is a big difference in military training. The military is big on CRM, hazardous attitudes, risk management, etc. Civilian sector seems to be realizing the importance as well.

The biggest take away from my military aviation experience reference this subject isn't walking around like a cop looking for infractions, corrections, etc., but rather in my own personal habits and standards I try to maintain. Always trying to maintain tighter tolerances in my flight standards and procedures, always working to improve my performance, communications, knowledge, etc.

Anyone can fly an airplane or a helicopter, but to truly be skilled in all aspects of airmanship takes constant work and learning. I always enjoy meeting professionals whether here or at the field. Makes me realize that aviation is constant learning, never static - and that's why I love it!
 
It's not easy.

As a 42 year ag pilot/CFI, I've witnessed many causal factors, both in GA and Ag aviation. To that end, we have the PAASS program..Professional aerial applicator Support System, whereby pro ag pilots conduct half day seminars at our State and National conventions. Nevertheless, by last count in September, we already had 4 fatalities and 45 accidents THIS YEAR!

One of the big difficulties in intervening, is that events often happen out of sight of anyone capable of intervening.

Keep on trying though.
 
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This subject bothers me

For obvious reasons I think, this subject bothers me greatly. It deals with gray areas and not clear good or bad; the mission, experience and judgement of the offending pilot; and the experience, judgement and prejudices of the offended observer. I do not pal around with other pilots for one thing and I would not walk up to perfect strangers and start telling them about their flying and what I didn't like about it anymore than I would follow a car and when it stopped, tell the driver what I though about their driving. I do not think the social laws of mutual respect and tolerance for human coexistence would work very well with that kind of offensive behavior.

I have a case study for you to consider.

Many years ago my wife Jeanine and I were in a very long race with several over night stops with group activities. We were in an adventurous moment of our lives. There was an older man flying a Bonanza with his wife in the race that had flown around the world twice and held many world records published in the NAA record book. Over the span of a couple of days we became friends for the duration of the mutual experience. There was a leg of the race between Litchfield, IL and Dayton, OH where the weather was questionable because of ceilings and visibility and IFR flight was cause for disqualification. Racers could take off whenever they wanted to but if they tookoff the clock started for them and it did not stop until they reached the finish line at Dayton. We all hung around for a time after our earlier flight in from Memphis until we each made our launch decision. More than half of the field did not launch until the next day and that was the minimum percentage required to extend the possibility of launch into the next day. In the middle of that tightening set of requirements and weather reports and we both chose to launch on what was possibly the only day that we could. After Jeanine and I passed Shelbyville, IN, I was forced lower and lower until I faced the wall of white and had to turn back. We landed at Shelbyville and waited until conditions improved with the clock running. A couple of hours later conditions improved enough to complete the flight under marginal conditions. When we arrived I was concerned that there might be a claim that we flew too low but the man that parked us did not seem bothered by our one shot bare minimum arrival. He said about an earlier arrival, that he never saw a plane come in so low before and he said it in a way that revealed that it was a very scary close call.

Dayton was a required overnight stop and more than half of the racers were still in Litchfield, IL. There was a planned group dinner at Wright Patterson AFB and a lot of lively conversation took place amongst the racers and organizers that had made it in to Dayton. The bonanza pilot and I talked about how bad the conditions were on the Litchfield to Dayton Leg. He made a bravado statement that was burned into my mind "We had to go so low to get in here that you can see the green on our landing gear from the trees."

The next morning we were still faced with fog and barely got on our way to the next stop in North Carolina before the smart gamblers started arriving from Illinois.

IMG_zps6eebbdcb.jpg


After we got to Wilkes County Airport in North Carolina the last leg of the race to Frederick, MD was cancelled but a party there was still on. I said no way were we going to an airport with mixed collection of other airplanes in IMC and darkening conditions for a party. I called, made reservations for Jeanine and I and kept the motel on the line while I offered the phone to the rest of the pilots in the room - there were no takers even though I said things that made it more than an casual offer and emphasized it to the Bonanza pilot.

When we arrived the next day, which still required an instrument approach to around 600 ft as I recall, we learned that the bonanza was missing, and later that they had hit a tree on a ridge and both were killed on impact.

Did I facilitate the crash? I don't think so.

Bob Axsom
 
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The risk takers seem to be much more popular

and many of us think they are having so much more fun. Some like to push the limits a little too far. When I see the risk takers, "I just think they must be high time pilots and know what they are doing or I am am just inferior." I am happy being safe and cautious and definitely not Top Gun material. I have noticed on many forums that if you are on the safety/fly by the rules side you get ignored alot. That is okay too.

I went to a fly-in with the family on Sat and on the way back practiced some various stalls. Pretty boring for the family, but good for me. Note: Power off/full flap stall/wing drop in a fully loaded -10 on the base to final turn is not the place and time to figure out the correct input. It is not a Cessna 172 like many of us learned to fly!
 
The biggest take away from my military aviation experience reference this subject isn't walking around like a cop looking for infractions, corrections, etc., but rather in my own personal habits and standards I try to maintain. Always trying to maintain tighter tolerances in my flight standards and procedures, always working to improve my performance, communications, knowledge, etc.

This seems to get to the heart of the situation. I think that most pilots carry with them pride in their accomplishments and the conviction that they are right (or at least are "within their rights"). In most cases this conviction is justified, but in a few cases its not. Its easy and even comforting to recognize flaws in other pilots' thinking, but much harder to critically examine your own flying habits, and harder still to welcome the criticism of others.
 
Every person here gets to die, there are no exceptions, it is just a matter of time, where, and the circumstances.

In aviation the process can be advanced with an attitude of it won't happen to me, addiction to risky behavior, inability to be humble, ignoring clear warning signs, and simple carelessness. That's how it is. It is a consequence of personal freedom and the rules of nature.

For those who believe this is intolerable the answer is regulation (less freedom) and attempts at attitude adjustment of the offending individuals. Humans, being what they are with the afore mentioned characteristics, resist such efforts. So eventually, some predictably end up not here sooner than the rest of us.

I do not have a problem with that outcome except for the submissive wife who goes with them sooner than she should. Perhaps there should be a program to educate people to not fly with persons destined to do themselves in and let the imbeciles have at it. I do not have a problem with idiots doing themselves in an airplane.

That being said, there is also an element of catastrophe beyond the control of anyone. That is the a risk factor one must except be it the pilot or passenger. This business is not risk free and never will be. But then neither is being born risk free. We live and will die and sometimes the end is not of our choosing but it is coming one way or another.
 
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Low pass, your concerns are off in my opinion. Accident causal factors are well-documented and can be reduced dramatically by having people not make avoidable fatal mistakes.

No, Low Pass is spot on. You nor any program will EVER, EVER, EVER prevent people from making avoidable mistakes. As long people are free thinking and free to make decisions, mistake are unavoidable - Thankfully.
 
Walt Disney's first law: "Wishing will make it so".

"I do not have a problem with idiots doing themselves in an airplane."

Frankly, neither do I - except, it affects me.
If they had insurance, my insurance goes up.
My former employer used to let me fly my plane on business trips. Then, another pilot, on a business trip, had a mid-air with an Air Force Tanker. Ten fatalities. Seems this pilot was flying under VFR, but was going in and out of the clouds for fun, enjoying his freedom. He was so brazen that he had documented this behavior in previous flights in his logbook. Air Force sent my employer a bill for their airplane. Employer's response: no more business flying for me.

Today we live in a country where 52% of the voters are willing to impose their will on the other 48% on many issues which could be characterized as "individual freedom". Pilots are less than 1% of the population. I shudder to think of the rules and regulations that would have been imposed on us, by demand of the other 99%, if the accident I mentioned above had been a 747 with 300 people instead of 10. But I sadly admit that I haven't got a clue what to do about it.

"We have met the enemy, and he is us" - Walt Kelly
 
"I do not have a problem with idiots doing themselves in an airplane."

Frankly, neither do I - except, it affects me.
If they had insurance, my insurance goes up.

Funny, my insurance rates have gone down significantly 3 years in a row and are lower than I've ever paid in over 20 years of GA flying.

When I look up I still see blue sky...I do not believe it is falling.
 
"Funny, my insurance rates have gone down significantly 3 years in a row and are lower than I've ever paid in over 20 years of GA flying."

Insurance companies love time in type, so I would hope your rates would trend lower. So have mine. But the insurance companies are also controlling their risk, by limiting what they offer to E-AB. When I was a part-owner of a C182, we carried $5M smooth in liability. When I asked my agent about limits higher than $100K/passenger for the -10, she said "no way". I guess she assumed I didn't want to go to Lloyd's.

Q: Does anyone have liability limits more than $100K per passenger?
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"When I look up I still see blue sky...I do not believe it is falling."

I pretty much agree, although I personally suffered the loss of flying on business trips, as described above. But I fear that we're just one accident like the one in Cerritos (sp?) away; that another one of these and the regulators will descend on GA thick and heavy. And that's what I don't know what to do about.
 
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