[Webb]

I'm of the belief that stupidity should be painful, and quite often it is. Perhaps we should start tells others to fly smart instead of fly safe.

And Paul, I think you do care......otherwise you wouldn't have made such provocative statements. I'm not you and can't truly know how you feel, but I suspect you're peaved at others actions that show they only use their head for something to mount a headset on. If peaved isn't right, disgust probably works.

 

[Ironflight]

I'm of the belief that stupidity should be painful, and quite often it is. Perhaps we should start tells others to fly smart instead of fly safe.

And Paul, I think you do care......otherwise you wouldn't have made such provocative statements. I'm not you and can't truly know how you feel, but I suspect you're peaved at others actions that show they only use their head for something to mount a headset on. If peaved isn't right, disgust probably works.

I never intended to get into a batttle of semantics, and "Care" can have so many conotations. I am "concerned" about the affects of one's actions on others, and bothered when those actions adversely affect us all. I've spent a quarter of a century in emergency services, and I've seen those affects. But each individual chooses for themselves.

Personally, I think many great ideas have come out in this thread, and that is sufficient. Ideas and messages get spread around - they soak in some places, and don't in others. That's OK, and how it's always been.

Paul

 

[ProCoach]

David, you just proved my point... I have no idea who Dan Lloyd is or what happened. (I'll research that when I'm done with this post). You ASSume the context I in which I wrote and then based your position on that erroneous context. Let the wall come down and your eyes/mind might open. Just carefully read what was said. Then I'll be open to your correction. Until then, save it.

I like Webb's idea of fly smart vs. fly safe. If you want to be safe, stay on the couch. Airplanes are not safe environments.

Be smart(er). Build your skill sets. Push to learn about lift vectors, VG diagrams, and L/D charts. Develop outstanding muscle memory. Make good decisions. Once you do these things and can recognize them in others without assuming, help others. I'm all for that. Until then' avoid judging other's stupidity based on your own ignorance.

Wrapping that ignorance in a caring attitude is just rationalization. If you are happiest in the very middle of your plane's envelope, that's fine. Stay there. Just don't transpose that to me or my skill sets.

Paul, perhaps I have missed the point (I'm trying here) but I have not judged you to be a judger of others. In fact, I love the thread you started for one main reason. Your position as originally posted requires THOUGHT followed by COURAGEOUS ACTION. This is avoided like the plague by too many these days.

 

[B25Flyer]

Great Thread Paul...

The only pilot we have much control over is the one we see in the mirror in the morning..... A lot of pilots spend a lot of time pointing out what other pilots should, or should not do....

I struggle with this concept when I go out and speak about Warbird Safety... I try to make it clear that I am speaking as much to myself as the crowd, and as a way to hold myself accountable.

Lets face it, most of us have several of those unsafe character traits deeply rooted in ourselves or we would not fly homemade airplanes, acro, and formation. (I am flying a low altitude airshow acro in a P-51 in Baraboo WI this weekend, I have a high apetite for risk.... stop by and say hi if you're here)

If we can honestly acknowledge that we have those traits, only then can we find strategies to control those behaviors...

They call it self-discipline.....

With that said, when there is someone who needs peer counsel we have to step up.... Carefully, respectfully, and at the proper time, in the proper tone, and in a constructive well thought out manner... Lots of times this is done poorly.

If that person is no longer our friend afterwards, so be it.... At least you don't have to go to the funeral.....


Tailwinds,
Doug Rozendaal

 

[L.Adamson]

No, its a matter of free choice not unlike the motor cycle helmet issue. But sometimes this amounts to is boarder line suicide which is illegal. Being stupid is not illegal, yet.

Yes, but it depends on who's definition of stupid...

For example, a bunch of us around here fly single engine over trecherous mountain country. Afterall, we're pretty much surrounded by mountains.

However, many of our commercial airliner piloting friends; who use to do it; but have now become dependent on much more reduncency (as in extra engines, altitude)..............feel, that this type of flying is "stupid". They just know better, now...

So in the meantime, I have to compare the statistics of engine failure, versus the panaramic beauty of mountain areas at lower altitudes. Personally, I'd rather see the sights, than "always" remain over flat country and highways for the extra margin of safety. But to some............I'm "stupid".

However, I'm always on the lookout for flat meadows, dirt roads, and airstrips. I don't have to be entirely dumb.

L.Adamson RV6A (flying)

 

[Webb]

Don't forget to add risk asessment to the mix.

Doing the intelligent thing (smart), you reduce your exposure to risk. Yes, flying single engine over rough terrain has exposure. However, we do things like check fuel, preflight, have O2 (if needed), plan a good route, check weather, make sure the pilot doesn't have squawks, make sure the plane doesn't have squawks, etc.... "all those little things that add up or subtract from out risk exposure".

Oh yeah, and fly the plane using our brain....as if our lives depend on it because it does. It's amazing that some pilot do everything right until the get in the cockpit (see above). Then the brain just goes into hibernation. It must be those fancy glass screens that look like a TV to them (ok folks, this is a joke.....I have no ideal why they go brain dead).

Again.....fly smart.

Good thread..... hope it's pissed somebody off...it's thought provoking..... along the same lines that we should as ourselves.... how will this read on the NTSB report?

 

[Bill Wightman]

Lessons learned

This is a difficult subject to bat around within the confines of a message board, but I am impressed with the results anyway.

Pro - I understand what you're saying, I think. There are some people whom I call "aggressively passive"; that is they forcefully aviod any possiblility, or even the thought of risk beyond what we'd call "milk toast". They can be so focused (afraid) of things they become their own worst enemy. So I see dangers on both ends of the risk/reward scale.

However, for those of us who do not allow fear to run rampant in our thought processes, we make decisions where risk is balanced against reward on the scale of personal experience. We have rational thought processes, that unfortunately don't always produce the best conclusions. You've heard it: "Good judgment comes from experience and experience comes from making mistakes."

With over 20 years and 12k hours in the book now, I've flown with a few guys, and have seen a few things. We in this profession know who the best are, and IMHO it simply boils down to who cares about doing the job more. Ever since Orville and Wilbur, man has accumulated hard lesson after hard lesson on how NOT to fly airplanes. Lets not ignore those lessons.

There is a voice in this business, the voice of decades of hard earned experience tempered by thousands of hours of training and judgment. Those who are smart, who care and want to do it the right way listen to that voice. Thanks Paul.

 

[Captain Avgas]

I find it interesting that the seed of this thread lies in the Dan Lloyd crash. And the basis of the Dan Lloyd accident is rooted in abominable workmanship, builder impatience, the incorporation of untested technologies, and the refusal of a builder to study and learn the basic tenets of aviation best building practices.

Sure, Dan Lloyd may have been an inexperienced pilot but my reading of the official report is that what eventually killed him was an engine failure resulting from substandard wiring that starved his electrically dependent powerplant of electrons.

But in the end these threads always seem to gravitate back to self righteous pontifications about pilot error and risk-taking.

I've come to the conclusion that the Experimental fraternity is much more comfortable about discussing pilot error than it is about discussing builder incompetence.

My best guess is that the level of pilotage skills in the Experimental category is no better, or worse, than the level of pilotage skills in private GA generally....and yet the accident rate in the Experimental category is statistically higher (and that's a fact). One can only logically conclude from this that many Experimental aircraft are not built and/or maintained to the equivalent levels of reliability as exhibited by certificated aircraft...and I believe that is particularly true of firewall forward systems where there is very little, if any, redundancy.

Thus the real task ahead for the Experimental category is to acknowledge this fact and to provide better vehicles for the education of amateur builders. And similtaneously we need to reject and condemn shoddy, unproven and unsafe building practices with the same vigour that we readily condemn unsafe flying practices.

 

[Bill Wightman]

However, many of our commercial airliner piloting friends; who use to do it; but have now become dependent on much more reduncency (as in extra engines, altitude)..............feel, that this type of flying is "stupid". They just know better, now... (snip)

Jeez Larry! Come on now! Can you tell me who started flying over mountains in the first place? How many consecutive Atlantic crossings would you like to attempt in your RV? Polar routes, anyone? No takers here.

Uh huh, ok.... see?

Those little rocks waaaay down there don't play into our route planning much any more. (but sometimes they do....)

 

[David-aviator]

David, you just proved my point... I have no idea who Dan Lloyd is or what happened. (I'll research that when I'm done with this post). You ASSume the context I in which I wrote and then based your position on that erroneous context. Let the wall come down and your eyes/mind might open. Just carefully read what was said. Then I'll be open to your correction. Until then, save it.

I like Webb's idea of fly smart vs. fly safe. If you want to be safe, stay on the couch. Airplanes are not safe environments.

Be smart(er). Build your skill sets. Push to learn about lift vectors, VG diagrams, and L/D charts. Develop outstanding muscle memory. Make good decisions. Once you do these things and can recognize them in others without assuming, help others. I'm all for that. Until then' avoid judging other's stupidity based on your own ignorance.

Wrapping that ignorance in a caring attitude is just rationalization. If you are happiest in the very middle of your plane's envelope, that's fine. Stay there. Just don't transpose that to me or my skill sets.

Paul, perhaps I have missed the point (I'm trying here) but I have not judged you to be a judger of others. In fact, I love the thread you started for one main reason. Your position as originally posted requires THOUGHT followed by COURAGEOUS ACTION. This is avoided like the plague by too many these days.

Hi Pro,

Sorry if I ASSumed in error the context of your message. It has been reread several times and quite frankly I do not know where you are coming from. If a point was proven, it was unintentional.

Your message above (and the previous) include thoughts that appear to come out of a motivational speech. Lines like "...THOUGHT followed by COURAGEOUS ACTION" don't mean a whole lot without some specific details. I am too much of a realist to be stimulated but such boiler plate jargon.

I stand by my response. It is not a directive to change nor is it judgmental. It is a point of view from one perspective concerning survival in this business. Anyone can take it or leave it. It is FWIT, as always.

I've been tagged a few things in life but this is the first time ignorant has showed up. I will in good spirit take it under advisement. Strange things can and do happen as one grows older.

 

[David-aviator]

Yes, but it depends on who's definition of stupid...

For example, a bunch of us around here fly single engine over trecherous mountain country. Afterall, we're pretty much surrounded by mountains.

However, many of our commercial airliner piloting friends; who use to do it; but have now become dependent on much more reduncency (as in extra engines, altitude)..............feel, that this type of flying is "stupid". They just know better, now...

So in the meantime, I have to compare the statistics of engine failure, versus the panaramic beauty of mountain areas at lower altitudes. Personally, I'd rather see the sights, than "always" remain over flat country and highways for the extra margin of safety. But to some............I'm "stupid".

However, I'm always on the lookout for flat meadows, dirt roads, and airstrips. I don't have to be entirely dumb.

L.Adamson RV6A (flying)

Larry, I deleted that message but not quick enough. Not even I the author agreed with it after the fact.

The type of flying you do over mountains is not stupid, it is a calculated risk. We calculate the risk every day and that's how it is done. Sometimes we go, sometimes we don't.

 

[alpinelakespilot2000]

My best guess is that the level of pilotage skills in the Experimental category is no better, or worse, than the level of pilotage skills in private GA generally....and yet the accident rate in the Experimental category is statistically higher (and that's a fact). One can only logically conclude from this that many Experimental aircraft are not built and/or maintained to the equivalent levels of reliability as exhibited by certificated aircraft...and I believe that is particularly true of firewall forward systems where there is very little, if any, redundancy.

I think one can "logically" infer something else as well. It is logical that people who build their own airplanes (especially in order to acquire higher performance than can reasonably or affordably be found in the certificated marketplace) are more prone to taking risks, flying or other. The high speed, low pass, doing rolls right after takeoff, etc. type of flying accident seems to be more common among higher performance experimentals than it seems to be for the typical Cessna. Thus, I would suspect that experimental pilots are indeed significantly responsible for the higher accident rates.

 

[WhiskeyMike]

Not a Pilot Problem - a Human Problem

This thread is quite interesting indeed. The core issues that the subject and comments herein speak to are not really about flying as much as they are about how the human mind works. Afterall, before we fly, climb, race, blast off or do anything else "adventureous" we are ALL human beings. It is accurate to say that anyone flying airplanes cannot claim to be totally risk averse, so we are talking about degrees of acceptable risk here.

In the psycological sciences there is principle call "familiarity bias". Familiarity bias is the tendency to under-assess the risks associated with things that we become familiar with. ALL human beings are affected by and succeptable to this bias to one degree or another. Doug Rozendaal and others have accurately spoken to this - flying really is dangerous, yet we are naturally inclinded to diminish these real risks in out minds. Self discipline is really the only ally we have to fight this bias and keep our recognition of the risks we accept as accurate and "REAL".

Another strong tendency of the human mind when risk is involved is to "Objectify". We first set our own limitations on what is and is not an acceptable level of risk (this is necessary and a good thing!). But then we tend to "objectify" that standard, meaing that OUR standard becomes what we hold others too. This tendency can create problems because not everyone's risk tolerance, experience, ability, training and talents are the same, and what some people can (or are willing to) do within a reasonably margin of safely others cannot. I think that this is the underlying issue behind ProCoach's comments.

So what am I saying here? First off, I agree that when someone needs "peer counseling" the community should step up in a constructive way. But as others have recognized this may not always achieve the intended goal, and at the end of the day, as much as we may wish to, we cannot control the behavior of others. If we have to reduce the number of bad examples to successfuly improve safety I'm afraid we are in serious trouble. This is where the slipery slope of role models comes in. "The "if so-and-so can do that, I can too"! thinking that often falls out of role model emulation creates more problems IMHO than it solves. That is why I believe so strongly in the principles of personal responsibility. I feel that safety CAN be improved by teaching, mentoring and encouraging ourselves and others to take responsibility for our decisions and NOT subjugate our own judgements and decision making to others. Others may feel differently.

 

[Captain Avgas]

It is logical that people who build their own airplanes (especially in order to acquire higher performance than can reasonably or affordably be found in the certificated marketplace) are more prone to taking risks, flying or other.

That's an interesting theory....but it is just a personal intuitive theory and I doubt that there is any readily available data to support it. On the other hand there is quite a lot of data to support the fact that Dan Lloyd died because his engine failed due to poor construction practices. And that incident, after all, is what prompted this thread. In fact in his initial post Paul directly referred to the problem of poor judgement in respect of building deficiencies...and yet the thread promptly became another endless argument about nothing more than acceptable (or unacceptable) flying practices.

I'm beginning to suspect that the Experimental fraternity at large is in substantial denial about the extent of unsafe construction that goes into many amateur built aircraft.

It's like the reclusive uncle with the suspected tendencies to paedophilia...the family just finds it too painful to talk about it.

 

[az_gila]

The AOPA Nall Report...

That's an interesting theory....but it is just a personal intuitive theory and I doubt that there is any readily available data to support it. On the other hand there is quite a lot of data to support the fact that Dan Lloyd died because his engine failed due to poor construction practices. And that incident, after all, is what prompted this thread. In fact in his initial post Paul directly referred to the problem of poor judgement in respect of building deficiencies...and yet the thread promptly became another endless argument about nothing more than acceptable (or unacceptable) flying practices.

I'm beginning to suspect that the Experimental fraternity at large is in substantial denial about the extent of unsafe construction that goes into many amateur built aircraft.

It's like the reclusive uncle with the suspected tendencies to paedophilia...the family just finds it too painful to talk about it.

...says this about Amateur Built Aircraft --

The accident factor distribution is not markedly
different from that in manufactured airplanes, with
the exception of a somewhat higher proportion of
maneuvering accidents (Figure 44).

-- suggesting that it is indeed the flying, and not construction techniques that make a difference.

http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/08nall.pdf

However, it must be remembered that the average age (both in calendar years and flying hours) of the GA fleet is most certainly a lot higher than the average age of the Amateur Built fleet.

 

[rvbuilder2002]

...says this about Amateur Built Aircraft --

The accident factor distribution is not markedly
different from that in manufactured airplanes, with
the exception of a somewhat higher proportion of
maneuvering accidents (Figure 44).

-- suggesting that it is indeed the flying, and not construction techniques that make a difference.

http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/08nall.pdf

However, it must be remembered that the average age (both in calendar years and flying hours) of the GA fleet is most certainly a lot higher than the average age of the Amateur Built fleet.

I agree with Gil (at least what I think he is implying) that Amateur built aircraft (having been built by amateurs) is not the cause of a slightly higher accident rate compared to the certificated side of GA.

The higher rate of maneuvering accidents is I believe caused by two factors.

1. Amateur built aircraft are generally higher in performance (some much higher. Like Lancair IV, etc.) and this causes a higher rate of landing type accidents.

2. Because many amateur built aircraft do tend to be higher in performance, they have what I consider a higher level of show-off factor. Face it, a cherokee 140 on a high speed (relatively speaking) low pass just does not have much wow factor. An RV at 200+ mph has much more and it is too much for many people to resist. Often the high speed pass turns into low altitude stall/spin after the pull up.
Their are also many other accident situations that get lumped into the maneuvering category (low level aerobatics, etc).

 

[az_gila]

Scott...

I agree with Gil (at least what I think he is implying) that Amateur built aircraft (having been built by amateurs) is not the cause of a slightly higher accident rate compared to the certificated side of GA.

The higher rate of maneuvering accidents is I believe caused by two factors.

1. Amateur built aircraft are generally higher in performance (some much higher. Like Lancair IV, etc.) and this causes a higher rate of landing type accidents.

2. Because many amateur built aircraft do tend to be higher in performance, they have what I consider a higher level of show-off factor. Face it, a cherokee 140 on a high speed (relatively speaking) low pass just does not have much wow factor. An RV at 200+ mph has much more and it is too much for many people to resist. Often the high speed pass turns into low altitude stall/spin after the pull up.
Their are also many other accident situations that get lumped into the maneuvering category (low level aerobatics, etc).

...you are correct in what I was implying.

However, the Nall Report did separate landing accidents from maneuvering accidents, so the Nall conclusion I quoted really goes to your item (2) above - apparently Amateur Built landing accidents are essentially similar to certified planes.

The accident factor distribution is not markedly
different from that in manufactured airplanes, with
the exception of a somewhat higher proportion of
maneuvering accidents (Figure 44).

However, some of the GA mechanical problem accidents may be age related, which is less applicable to the younger Amateur Built fleet, slightly skewing the mechanical problem data.

 

[rvbuilder2002]

...you are correct in what I was implying.

However, the Nall Report did separate landing accidents from maneuvering accidents, so the Nall conclusion I quoted really goes to your item (2) above - apparently Amateur Built landing accidents are essentially similar to certified planes.

The accident factor distribution is not markedly
different from that in manufactured airplanes, with
the exception of a somewhat higher proportion of
maneuvering accidents (Figure 44).

However, some of the GA mechanical problem accidents may be age related, which is less applicable to the younger Amateur Built fleet, slightly skewing the mechanical problem data.

oops, I wrote landing...I meant manuvering

 

[Captain Avgas]

(The Nall Report)..says this about Amateur Built Aircraft --

The accident factor distribution is not markedly
different from that in manufactured airplanes, with
the exception of a somewhat higher proportion of
maneuvering accidents (Figure 44).

-- suggesting that it is indeed the flying, and not construction techniques that make a difference.

The actual data within the 2008 Nall report indicates that aircraft "mechanical failures" accounted for more accidents than any other accident type for both GA generally (GA), and for Amateur-built specifically (AB).

For GA generally, 15.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. For AB specifically, 20.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. This data clearly says to me that AB aircraft are substantially more prone to mechanical failure than certificated aircraft...despite the fact that the average age of the certificated GA fleet is perhaps 2 decades older than the AB fleet.

The data confirms that many amateur builders have not developed the skill set to safely instal and subsequently maintain their powerplants. And Dan Lloyd was absolute proof of that.

By comparison "Manoeuvering" accidents (those low altitude stunts largely blamed by many for the poor Amateur-built crash record) accounted for only 6.6% of all GA prangs and only 9.3% of AB prangs.

The Experimental category needs to foster a greater culture of safety in respect of both pilot skills AND aircraft construction in order to secure its future. Why tackle only half of the problem.

 

[az_gila]

Thanks Bob...

The actual data within the 2008 Nall report indicates that aircraft "mechanical failures" accounted for more accidents than any other accident type for both GA generally (GA), and for Amateur-built specifically (AB).

For GA generally, 15.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. For AB specifically, 20.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. This data clearly says to me that AB aircraft are substantially more prone to mechanical failure than certificated aircraft...despite the fact that the average age of the certificated GA fleet is perhaps 2 decades older than the AB fleet.

The data confirms that many amateur builders have not developed the skill set to safely instal and subsequently maintain their powerplants. And Dan Lloyd was absolute proof of that.

By comparison "Manoeuvering" accidents (those low altitude stunts largely blamed by many for the poor Amateur-built crash record) accounted for only 6.6% of all GA prangs and only 9.3% of AB prangs.

The Experimental category needs to foster a greater culture of safety in respect of both pilot skills AND aircraft construction in order to secure its future. Why tackle only half of the problem.

...You are correct.

I put too much emphasis on the reports conclusion without fully checking the figures. I would rate a 30% increase in Amateur Built mechanical accidents over GA a measurable difference.

I had already guessed on no correction for aircraft age issues...

I also wonder how many of the "minor" accidents (but with major airframe damage) with no injury actually get reported.

 

[B25Flyer]

In the psycological sciences there is principle call "familiarity bias". Familiarity bias is the tendency to under-assess the risks associated with things that we become familiar with. ALL human beings are affected by and succeptable to this bias to one degree or another. Doug Rozendaal and others have accurately spoken to this - flying really is dangerous, yet we are naturally inclinded to diminish these real risks in out minds. Self discipline is really the only ally we have to fight this bias and keep our recognition of the risks we accept as accurate and "REAL".

To support WhiskeyMike's post, I heard a speaker once talking about the safety culture at NASA, (Paul can step in here) If my memory serves this was in regards to before the O-ring accident. (no, I'm sorry, I dont recall who it was speaking..)

This speaker spoke about the "normalization of deviance." He spoke about Space Travel had become so routine that they could send a school teacher, the symbol for risk averse, into Space...

The word "deviance" resonated with me..... Hauling freight was like this for me...

We flew in ice, thunderstorms, and heavy, in tired airplanes with marginal maintenance.... This behavior was normal, everyone did it... It was the culture of the freight dog world, and it was dangerous....

I will spare you all pointing out the parallels in the RV world....

Tailwinds,

Doug Rozendaal

 

[RVbySDI]

The actual data within the 2008 Nall report indicates that aircraft "mechanical failures" accounted for more accidents than any other accident type for both GA generally (GA), and for Amateur-built specifically (AB).

For GA generally, 15.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. For AB specifically, 20.8% of all accidents fell into the "Mechanical Failures" category. This data clearly says to me that AB aircraft are substantially more prone to mechanical failure than certificated aircraft...despite the fact that the average age of the certificated GA fleet is perhaps 2 decades older than the AB fleet.

The data confirms that many amateur builders have not developed the skill set to safely instal and subsequently maintain their powerplants. And Dan Lloyd was absolute proof of that.

By comparison "Manoeuvering" accidents (those low altitude stunts largely blamed by many for the poor Amateur-built crash record) accounted for only 6.6% of all GA prangs and only 9.3% of AB prangs.

The Experimental category needs to foster a greater culture of safety in respect of both pilot skills AND aircraft construction in order to secure its future. Why tackle only half of the problem.

Hi Captain AVgas,

I am writing not to dispute your statements but to clarify something about your statement(s) that stood out in my mind. I had to do a quick calculation on the trusty spreadsheet to look at what those numbers represent.

Below is a quick synopsis of the data you provided (sorry about the formatting. It appears there is not an easy way to create a quick table):
GA | E-AB | Aircraft Type Diff.
Mechanical Failure | 15.8% | 20.8% | 31.65%
Maneuvering Flight | 6.6% | 9.3% | 40.91%
Failure Type Diff. | 139.39% | 123.66%

Of these two types of accident causes in these two types of aircraft the total percentage numbers are striking. In both GA and E-AB type aircraft one is more than twice as likely to experience a Mechanical Failure accident than a Maneuvering accident (139.39% and 123.66% respectively).

One interesting part to me is that when comparing GA and E-AB accidents, when compared to all accident types, E-AB pilots have a greater percentage of accidents due to maneuvering flight than do GA pilots (40.91%).

I am not a math whiz so if my numbers cause anyone heartburn please feel free to correct any errors you may find in my analysis.

 

[Captain Avgas]

Hi Captain AVgas,

I am writing not to dispute your statements but to clarify something about your statement(s) that stood out in my mind. I had to do a quick calculation on the trusty spreadsheet to look at what those numbers represent.

Below is a quick synopsis of the data you provided (sorry about the formatting. It appears there is not an easy way to create a quick table):
GA | E-AB | Aircraft Type Diff.
Mechanical Failure | 15.8% | 20.8% | 31.65%
Maneuvering Flight | 6.6% | 9.3% | 40.91%
Failure Type Diff. | 139.39% | 123.66%

Of these two types of accident causes in these two types of aircraft the total percentage numbers are striking. In both GA and E-AB type aircraft one is more than twice as likely to experience a Mechanical Failure accident than a Maneuvering accident (139.39% and 123.66% respectively).

One interesting part to me is that when comparing GA and E-AB accidents, when compared to all accident types, E-AB pilots have a greater percentage of accidents due to maneuvering flight than do GA pilots (40.91%).

I am not a math whiz so if my numbers cause anyone heartburn please feel free to correct any errors you may find in my analysis.

Steve,
I think all of your conclusions are reasonable. The Nall accident statistics indicate quite clearly that there are two main areas where the Experimental category needs to clean up its act....mechanical failures and manoeuvering accidents. In both cases our track record is GROSSLY worse than GA generally. In my prior post I was not playing down our poor Experimental record in manoeuvering accidents....I was just pointing out that in terms of pure accident numbers mechanical failures account for more than twice as many accidents as manoeuvering stunts.

I stated this because it was concerning me that while many on VansAirforce are happy to continually beat the drum on our poor flying practices there is substantally less enthusiasm to deal with our poor building practices.

Our goal should be to preserve and protect the future of the Experimental Category. To that end it should not unduly disturb us that Experimental pilots have accidents. GA is an intrinsically dangerous activity (as Doug Rozendaal is constantly pointing out) and we must accept that there will be mishaps.

However as long as our accident record as Experimental builders and pilots is no worse than GA generally we have a legitimate claim to exist.

As an exampe, from a purely pragmatic point of view it does not matter that the Experimental fraternity has a lot of fatal CFIT weather accidents....as long as we do not have more weather accidents than GA generally (and we don't) we will not attract the attention of the regulators.

But if the statistics continue to show that we are substantially less competent than GA generally at building and maintaining our aircraft (which they do) then our future will be less secure.

I believe that the Experimental fraternity needs to develop a new mindset on build quality right across the board. Through forums like VansAirforce we need to act as a group to promote a culture of both construction excellence and safety. We need to move beyond the "bog it up and build on" mentality that is currently so pervasive.

 

[Ron Lee]

You are right Bob. I just read the Factual report on the Lloyd RV-10 fatality. To say that it was abhorrent is mild. Yes I do harp on the need to DECREASE our piloting accidents/pilot error/fatalities but the building/maintenance quality control needs work too.

 

[AME at Large]

good point

Hello all
I think Ron is on to the point Paul is trying to make and building practices/maintenance is a big part of it as the statistics indicate.
The builders that we hold in high regard as "craftsmen" are the role models and teachers of others but as Paul has said be careful who those role models are.
I think if we want to continue to enjoy the freedom of building and flying our own airplanes we must do more in the arena of maintenance and building practices.
Many RV builders have raised the bar with excellent workmanship and attention to detail which is great. However there are gaps in the knowledge of owners/builders and in my experience it's mainly maintenance issues.
The skills required to build the plane are not quite the same as those required to inspect and maintain it. I'm not saying that if you don't have the maintenance skills you should not build an airplane. By all means go for it, add to your life skills, meet some great people and have fun.
What I'm talking about is learning what to look for, troubleshooting, failure analysis and inspection techniques. These things can be taught or picked up but by whom and is the information and are the practices correct??
I've seen airplanes that have been flying for many years with problems and an almost complete lack of maintenance. You mean to tell me in those X number of years and X number of condition inspections nobody saw the corrosion?, or chafing?, or loose connections???
The cause of such neglect could be ignorance of what needs to be done to keep the plane "in a condition for safe operation" or the attitudes of the owners that it's a great plane and never needs anything because nothing ever breaks and that is perhaps where to start.
EAA has done much with the Tech Counselor program and now with the Sportair Workshops on Repairman Certificates. In Canada it's a workshop on Annual Inspections. I think with the resources available now to builders in the form of Tech Counselors, EAA, AME/A+P mechanics, forums like this one, etc.. there are very few excuses for poor workmanship and maintenance. But it's a human problem as was pointed out. How do you make the information accessable to the people who think they know everything or think they don't need it??
Knowing the inner workings of your plane may be just as important as knowing how to fly it.
Phil

 

[jrs14855]

JUDGEMENT

On Dec 22, 1996, I was running up a Navajo on the ramp at Bullhead City, AZ. There was an RV6A parked next to me on the right. There had been some very ugly weather thru the area the day before, the weather was now clear with very strong wind but straight down the runway. A man and woman loaded luggage in the RV and took off to the south. I knew the weather was very bad toward the LA area, and I hoped that they were headed east toward the good weather. The news headline the next day reported the RV missing. It iced up and crashed near Julian vor, less than an hour after I watched it take off. The only way I would have considered going in that direction with the Navajo would have been thru Banning pass and then down the coast. The accident report is very sobering, especially the multiple airmets and sigmets for turbulence and icing. faa.gov and look for the monthly lists.

 

[jrs14855]

RV6 ACCIDENT

Forgot to mention the RV6 was registered in Apr 96. Crash was in Dec 96. The N number still shows as active, which is not unusual.

 

[johnny stick]

Another nice guy gone-what it means to me

A pilot friend died yesterday at KHHR. New pilot with lots of money. Was on the fast track with SEL rating last year, and Instrument 6/3 this year. Appears he was demo ing a Bonanza, (I think he should have been looking at an RV10 instead). Appears to be a classic case of engine trouble on take off followed by stall spin.

Turns out I will probably hold off on my RV10 until the kids are older. But I figure I can start building while they are young and finish when they are in college

As a community, I think we need to find a way to teach better judgement on low altitude engine failures that lead to stall-spin crashes. How about instructors doing simulated engine failures on take off in sparsely populated areas? or showing at altitude how to do a turn back to airport (Thuis demo will show how much altitude is really lost in a turn back)? I think a new private pilot training chapter should be introduced. Comments?

 

[the_other_dougreeves]

Slight OT, but .... One of the best and safest pilots I ever knew (or probably will ever know), Dean Carswell, passed away suddenly last week from a massive brain aneurysm. He flew as CFIG with several students (including me) on his last day and we, as usual, sat around the picnic table and had a cold beer once the flying was done.

He will be sorely missed. However, I'm glad he went while on the ground and not while flying. Please make that your goal as well.

TODR

 

[kentb]

Johnny, mine did..

As a community, I think we need to find a way to teach better judgement on low altitude engine failures that lead to stall-spin crashes. How about instructors doing simulated engine failures on take off in sparsely populated areas? or showing at altitude how to do a turn back to airport (Thuis demo will show how much altitude is really lost in a turn back)? I think a new private pilot training chapter should be introduced. Comments?

He repeatedly pulled the power off while we were taking off. It was a long runway, so we could have landed straight ahead, but it still got me excited when he did it.

Kent

 

[pierre smith]

Another one

VFR flight into IMC in a -7A:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090709X75206&key=1

This stuff just has to end!

 

[frankh]

Amen Pierre

Get there itis..its just not worth it guys

Frank

 

[Webb]

Too small a sample size

The biggest problem I have with all the quoting of Nall report is percentages. The sample size is to small. What may be statistically significant may not not be. In 2006, we had a total reduction of 14.9% pilot related accidents in AB fatal accidents over 2005. Sounds like a lot. It was 7...down from 47 to 40.

I don't want to seem indifferent, however when dealing with such small numbers, it is my opinion that you must look at the absolute number instead of relative number.

If we said that we reduced alcohol related fatalites in GA by 20%, that would be a lot......ONE, down from 5 to 4 - now it doesn't seem like a lot.

Not to sound callous, I think that a reduction of even 1 accident is an improvement. I think the safety programs put on by AOPA have helped. I think the forum discussions on this very site have improved safety for RV's. That's right friends and neighbors, DR is responsibile for saving another RVer's life out there somewhere. I can't improve it but these discussions have made me think about some of how I fly and I have learned a few things and shared a few things I have learned with others. (thanks Doug).

On how we can reduce RV accidents for the major catagories.....here is my opnion....

Mechanical........Most RVer's are cost sensitive. Just look at the posts on this website. Every now and then, pull the cowl for a mechanic and let an AP change the oil and take a good look around. I did that on my 3rd oil change and he found 3 things he didn't like and fixed it. Wasn't an issue then but could have been later. It was also nice not having to clean up afterwards.

Maneuvering....The majority of these accidents come from confidence. It's been done before and the pilot go away with it, therefore it's safe. If you were a 60 hour pilot, no way because you knew you couldn't pull it off. The biggest piece of safety equipment in the plane is your brain...feel free to use it.

A couple of other thoughts. Slick planes like an RV, Cirrus, Lancair, Bonanza to name a few that come to mind, are what I consider 2 mistake airplanes. I consider slow more stable planes such as a C172 a 4 mistake airplane. It's much easier to get behind in a slick plane. Take your hand off the yolk in a C172 and it will pretty much right itself. Take you hand off the stick and once my RV starts to drift, it's not coming back to neutral. I worry about pilots making those transitions from slow and draggy to fast and slick. I know from personal experience that my Bonanza experience was helpful.

As Clint would ask...do you feel lucky? If you were to fly into IMC, can you make it out? Pierre's example just makes me shake my head. Answer honestly.....If the answer is no, go practice. All pilots have had some training so you should know something about it. Look at it this way....you have another excuse to go fly.

Next time you fly practice perfection. I heard Richard Collins say that he would do things like practice holding altitude within 25 feet.

And one last thing....Get your head out of the cockpit. I'm beginning to wonder if pilots aren't going to kill themselves fiddling with all those fine gadgets......glass panels, GPS, switches, dodads, PC's, tablet readers, EMS, DVD players, CD players, MP3 players, etc....... It's as bad as some of these folks texting while driving.
Enjoy the flying for the pure fun of it when you can.

As I said before, fly smart out there people. If you do safe will take care of itself..............later.

 

[L.Adamson]

VFR flight into IMC in a -7A:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090709X75206&key=1

This stuff just has to end!

That report, as well as this one, caught my eye this week. As both were avoidable mistakes.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090706X11335&key=1

L.Adamson --- RV6A

 

[N395V]

When it comes to safety an old series of Burma Shave signs said it best.

NO MATTER THE PRICE
NO MATTER HOW NEW
THE BEST SAFETY DEVICE
IN THE CAR (airplane) IS YOU
BURMA SHAVE