Status
Not open for further replies.
Not to my knowledge, at least in that sense.

My take-

-Inadvertent VMC into IMC fatal GA accidents have always and still happen at a nauseating rate. If we could get rid of those we'd make huge ground.

Usually a high profile crash will cause change but it appears JFK Jr's death did nothing for GA safety.
 
Thanks, Patrick, for the the response. I have to admit I'm a little baffled by the shortage of responses to the question. Which might just be a good sign that this vein is worth mining...
 
I read some of these articles, and not being an academic, I got lost in the language. I am always looking for new ways to approach my warbird safety presentations and I would like to know more.

The thing that continues to baffle me is that inspite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary how many pilots are in serious denial about the risks of various aspects of aviation...

I do not raise these points to get people to quit flying, but to proactivly work to drive the unnecessary risks out of the higher risk aspects that many of us participate in.

I believe that step one is to acknowledge the risks, and too many people are totally unwilling to do that.

John and Martha King call it "The Big Lie." That flying is safer than driving. It is not.

Tailwinds.
Doug Rozendaal
 
a search for the truth

I am not an academic, either, but living here in the Boston area, I rub elbows with some. I also once passed a class in epidemiology, though probably with a low grade, iirc.

Nonetheless, epidemiology is, loosely defined, the application of scientific methods to improve health outcomes. Our safety issues are no less public health issues than auto accidents or high blood pressure or fast food with too much salt.

Maybe the discipline could help GA pilots in addition to those in Alaska.

I admit I don't really know the next step with this idea, but that seems like a familiar objection to taking on an outlandish project... so there might be hope....
 
John and Martha King call it "The Big Lie." That flying is safer than driving. It is not.

While flipping through the channels one day, I ran across Dr. Phil who was also spreading “The Big Lie” telling the wife of one of his guests that aviation is safer travel than driving by car, and that he was a pilot himself and knows about such things. I imagine this is the story he told his wife as well. He didn’t bother to distinguish between commercial jetliners and general aviation which is a big difference in safety records.

I was bothered enough by his comments to write in on his web site, but only got the standard form reply that all get.
 
I have to wonder...

It surprises me that on the one hand we have lots of pilots who actually believe stats are on our side. On the other are those who are well-acquainted with the truth of the matter, but argue that GA can never be made as safe as cars.

I just scratch my head and wonder why we would set the bar so low. People get killed every day in cars; driver training is negligible, and drivers are even more blase, or perhaps in denial than pilots are. With all of our training and increased regulation why shouldn't GA be much safer than driving? I think it is possible to make it so. If we start by believing that progress is not only possible, but imperative, maybe we can improve the record and preserve our numbers.
 
I agree. There will always be Dumb***'s out there but the average GA pilot would listen. It will take a culture change to be sustained. I think a significant GA organization needs to take on the leadership role. Insurance companies, AOPA, or maybe another one, hmm..... oh yeah, the EAA!

It's disappointing that no one has really stepped up to the plate.
 
resistance

as long as more safety sound like, or comes with, more regulation, of course we are going to resist, even if it kills us!
Look at helmet laws. Freedom = risk. safety = loss of freedom

as long as this is the perception, it's an uphill battle.

I need more training in my RV. It is not easy to get in my opinion. Do I go and practice forced approaches every time I do circuits. well, kind of. without having 100% faith in myself and my machine, and perhaps a saefety pilot or instructor sitting beside me, practicing engine outs comes with higher risk than just going to the next field for gas.

For every bit of proficiency and knowledge that we gain, our insurance rates and fatalities will go down.
Isn't that enough to overcome the resistance factor?
 
Bob Miller's 'Over the Airwaves' has been talking about this

Bob Miller has been lambasting the GA accident rate for years. He has lots of great ideas on how we can improve. I sent a link to AOPA for their input. I don't remember what they said, but something like 'we'll look into it'. Bob has not had a lot of good to say about the alphabet groups. He specifically targets goals like increasing the time between training (more often than every other year), which has been fought by AOPA, among others, for the cost. Of course, looking at the personal and media cost of all the accidents we (collectively) are having, I think the cost of some training is pretty minimal. I have to go to the sim every 6 months at work for a reason.

Bob's web site: http://www.overtheairwaves.com/

Seb Trost
RV-7A 420 hours!
Boulder City, NV
 
It is interesting to compare the US and Canadian accident stats as we have far less stringent recurrent testing here in Canada. The accident rates between the countries are not a whole lot different suggesting that maybe skills and training may be less important than good decision making and risk assessment skills.

There are still lots of CFIT and fuel exhaustion accidents and these have little to do with stick and rudder skills.

I'm always surprised to read about the rather large numbers of accidents involving CFIs and high time airline pilots in both countries and sometimes wonder what they were thinking. If anyone should be on top of their game with regards to current skills and decision making, it should be these groups. Just proves that any pilot at any skill level can make bad decisions although often the process and types of decisions are different between the groups. No group is immune for sure.

I feel that more resources need to be directed at risk management and decision making processes.
 
Decisions

There are still lots of CFIT and fuel exhaustion accidents and these have little to do with stick and rudder skills.

I'm always surprised to read about the rather large numbers of accidents involving CFIs and high time airline pilots in both countries and sometimes wonder what they were thinking. If anyone should be on top of their game with regards to current skills and decision making, it should be these groups. Just proves that any pilot at any skill level can make bad decisions although often the process and types of decisions are different between the groups. No group is immune for sure.

I feel that more resources need to be directed at risk management and decision making processes.

Ross, you are so right. I always cringe when I read the news report with the friends of the deceased pilot saying things like "he was a X thousand hour (military, airline) pilot." Inferring that the pilot couldn't have been at fault. Safety is all about decision making and risk management and applying it to what you are doing at the time. I had a co-worker die while scud-running in the Rocky Mountains. High time ATP, clean record, but not a lot of recent GA experience. Classic CFIT issue that had to make one wonder "what was he thinking?" Flying an airliner in the flight levels, on a dispatcher supplied IFR flight plan, playing with the FMS and talking to center for thousands of hours doesn't keep one sharp on real time, out there by yourself decision making. Just as flying an RV around the pattern won't prepare you for crossing oceans in the flight levels.

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA
 
I can look out my hangar office window here and see the Rockies about 40 miles away. I usually just admire their beauty but sometimes think of all the guys from this airport who have perished crossing them in the last 10 years... Way too many.

Low performance aircraft + mountains + marginal weather often = disaster. Even in something like an RV in good weather you can get a good scare as one of my friends found out when the downer far exceeded the max climb rate of his O-360 CS 6A- for about 10 minutes. He is lucky to still be here and has new respect for the rocks and a lesson he'll never forget.

I recently read an accident report where two highly experienced jet jocks tried to land on an unfamiliar runway after a very messed up high approach. The runway was way too short, wet, they had a tailwind, 30 knots over Vref and landed way long. There did not seem to be any little voice screaming in their heads that this was going to kill them which it did. How many cards do you need stacked up against you before you decide not to do something unwise?

Big egos don't belong in the cockpit in most cases.
 
good ideas

This is the sort of discussion I had hoped for.

So the next step would be to come up with a design for a study. First we propose one or more interventions, identify a test group and a control group. The control group gets an already well-studied intervention, or possibly, a placebo. The test group gets the intervention. You track the outcomes for all groups and then a statistician crunches the numbers to see if the intervention influenced the outcomes.

So do we have any specific proposed interventions?
 
This is the sort of discussion I had hoped for.

So the next step would be to come up with a design for a study. First we propose one or more interventions, identify a test group and a control group. The control group gets an already well-studied intervention, or possibly, a placebo. The test group gets the intervention. You track the outcomes for all groups and then a statistician crunches the numbers to see if the intervention influenced the outcomes.

So do we have any specific proposed interventions?

Unlike the famous Framingham study concerning heart disease
http://www.framinghamheartstudy.org/about/history.html
what you propose would concern mental attributes rather than physical.

This is a huge problem. Even the FAA, the agency charged with determining pilot competency, is not much into the mental evaluation of individuals. Certainly off the wall kooks can be identified, but looking backward at some accidents, how could the event have been prevented when it is clear it was a mental attitude issue?

This is a slippery slope. How is the mental attitude of anyone in this business evaluated? How does one insure the mental competence of the evaluator or method employed?

The evidence would suggest that training, procedures and discipline are key elements of a safe flight operations. Such methods work day in and day out, but once the pilot is flying outside that restricted box, left to his own designs (typical airline pilot), he looses it. That is the result of a mental attitude.

Your interest in this matter is commendable. But it is a tough nut to crack. What would prevent some of the accidents mentioned here is much stricter government control over what we do. That may come some day but meanwhile I believe the majority here would favor leaving it alone. We cherish our freedom.

If some choose to go out do themselves in for very preventable reasons, so be it. There are plenty of avenues to educate but some simply do not avail themselves of it and do not wish to have their mental attitudes messed with.
 
There is apparently a strong correlation between credit history and accident history. Fast and loose with money, fast and loose with safety. Perhaps an Equifax report on every medical?;)
 
Attitudes

There is apparently a strong correlation between credit history and accident history. Fast and loose with money, fast and loose with safety. Perhaps an Equifax report on every medical?;)

I can hear the complaining from here, but there is a lot of truth in Snowbird's comment. This discussion comes down to the "Fearsome Five," the issues that are almost always involved in poor decision making:


Anti-Authority: "Don't tell me!" - When people have this attitude they may resent having someone tell them what to do or they think of rules and regs as silly or unneeded.

Impulsivity: "Do something quickly!" - This is what people do when they feel the need to do something, anything and now. Usually they do the first thing that pops into their head.

Invulnerability: "It won't happen to me!" - Accidents happen only to other people. Thinking this may lead to taking more unnecessary risks.

Macho: "I can do it!" - These guys we all know. Trying to prove that they are better than anyone else and taking more risks. Both sexes are susceptible to this attitude.

Resignation: "What's the use?" - These people think that they do not make a great deal of difference in what happens to them. When things are going well they think: "Good luck". And when things are not so well, they seem to think that someone is out to get them.

John Clark ATP, CFI
FAA FAAST Team Member
EAA Flight Advisor
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA
 
I understand that the source of the malady starts between the ears. Nonetheless, I think we have to try to find solutions. The airlines went through a safety revolution decades agao and it worked, saving many, many lives. Now, the solutions for the airlines won't always fit our situations, but that just means we have to keep looking for other interventions which might work for us. The alternative is to invite the very increased regulation which I think we all fear. If we can't fix the problem ourselves, regulators may find a way to save us, but we might not like the treatment...
 
I understand that the source of the malady starts between the ears. Nonetheless, I think we have to try to find solutions. The airlines went through a safety revolution decades agao and it worked, saving many, many lives. Now, the solutions for the airlines won't always fit our situations, but that just means we have to keep looking for other interventions which might work for us. The alternative is to invite the very increased regulation which I think we all fear. If we can't fix the problem ourselves, regulators may find a way to save us, but we might not like the treatment...

The airlines have it easy - do it their way, or go looking for another job. We simply don't have that kind of club to use on pilots who don't want to "play by the rules". There are very, very few "original" mishaps - they are all repeats with well-known and documented causes. In order to get folks to pay attention, you have to figure out how to MOTIVATE them to pay attention. I am certainly not in favor of legislating safety. So how do we make "following the safety rules" more enticing to the pilot community?
 
...how do we make "following the safety rules" more enticing...

Yes, that seems like the key question. But I'm suggesting an "experimental", scientific approach to finding answers, rather than a regulatory approach.

Maybe if we recruited some very sharp minds, students possibly, who may know little of aviation, but understand epidemiology and the scientific method, together maybe we could design some interventions to test. Part of the difficulty may be that our perspective is obscured by our proximity to the trees... We'd also need to recruit cohorts of subjects to be, well, guinea pigs...

It would require some funding, not much different from drug discovery and development. And maybe folks more clever than I could imagine creative interventions, like, just thinking out loud here, adding some simulated maneuvers involving not the usual stick and rudder stuff, but actual training in how to make the decisions better. Put them in a simulated scenario, and see how they make decsision, then review and remediate poor performance. Think about it. Most of us have logged over a hundred hours of "instruction", but how much of that was ADM-related or even more broadly about how to make safer decisions? Or how about some additional knowledge area study. For example, here's a potential multiple choice question many ppl candiadates might struggle with:

Of NTSB accident findings from 2000-2005, about how many contain the phrase "the pilot's failure"
A- 10%
B- 50%
C- more like 90%+

Again, I'm not proposing this as additional regulation, but as a search for potential ways to reduce the disease....

Yes, this would be an expensive and difficult project. The alternative is, best I can see, continuing with the discredited (by the accident record) current system which could lead to all of us losing our privileges... I think we have to try.
 
Maybe if we recruited some very sharp minds, students possibly, who may know little of aviation, but understand epidemiology and the scientific method...

Yeah, because intelligent scientists familiar with epidemiology have never studied human factors in aviation before.
:rolleyes:

Epidemiology is not Dumbledore's magic wand, it's just another tool in a research scientists tool box. The practice of epidemiology is simply the study of (preferably large, for statistical reasons) population groups to determine if there are identifiable environmental / cultural/ genetic correlations to a given disease.

See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epidemiology

This sort of study has been performed on pilots a great many times. Here is one link out of many: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11194994

The take-away was: "Neither pilot age nor gender was independently associated with the odds of pilot error. With adjustment for pilot characteristics and crash circumstances, flight experience as measured in total flight time showed a significant protective effect on pilot error in general aviation crashes."
So, if you can accumulate plenty of hours without removing yourself from the game, it would seem you are a safer bet. To some degree, Circulus in Probando, hmm?

We could ask the FAA to mandate increased training requirements for the PP certificate, and we could expand the medical to include formal psych testing. This brings to mind the saying: "Be careful what you wish for, you just might get it."
 
I am a big advocate of a written set of personal minimums. the FAA has a nice template for constructing one. http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/guidance/media/personal%20minimums%20checklist.pdf

There is a concept they mention in the brochure know as "Conservatism Without Guilt". This is a huge factor for pilots as it is for all people. It's the basic "Peer Pressure", that has caused problems since the Garden of Eden. Somehow we feel guilty if we simply say NO! However, the time to decide on what you are going to do in a crisis situation is NOT when you are faced with the pressing decision, but when you are at home, alone and in unbiased contemplation.

Here's a story of mine own experience that happened just last weekend. One of my former flight students, Mike and I planned our trip to Vetterman's Fly-In and I said "we need to put together a set of weather personal minimums for the flight." I am not IFR current and we decided that 5 miles visibility and 1500 ft ceilings would be the minimum weather that we would fly in. Well, guess what. Half way through our trip we hit weather. Pretty soon we were at our minimum. Since time was still on our side we decided to land. Soon after we were on the ground conditions continued to deteriorate and we had LIFR. After several hours, time "was no longer on our side" and if we were going to make it to SD we had to launch. So suddenly I was struck with "GETTHEREITIS" One of the most proliferate killers of pilots. I actually went out in LIFR conditions and fueled the plane, thinking that if it would "just lift a little" I would launch. Fortunately, Mike (whom I taught to fly) became the "voice of reason" and said, "Tony, what about our personal minimums". I looked at him and said "we're staying here for the night". So we enjoyed Pocahontas, IA and the next 2 days of flying were the best we could imagine.
 
I am a big advocate of a written set of personal minimums. ....


So this is just the sort of hypothesis that could be tested. Recruit some test subjects, help them develop personal minimums, give another group the alternate intervention, or a placebo. Track their progress over a number of years, and see how the numbers turn out.

Eventually we will find ways to reduce the accidents, just as they did in the Alaska project in the OP.

It sounds diffficult and expensive. I think it could done.
 
Ted,

The cited study, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11194994 sought associations between demographics and causal factors.

That's not what I'm proposing. We need to find ways to improve outcomes, not just improve our understanding of the age of the pilots.

You are suggesting that solutions are not possible? Or that there is a better way to go about it?



Actually, the above study does, somewhat indirectly, suggest some strategies:

Good: more total time and more ratings
bad: bad weather

Well, I guess we can use those suggestion, though a quick review of recent accidents involving RV-x shows that weather is not a big causal factor.

So another intervention we could possibly test would be pilots earning additional ratings. That would not be too complicated to design such a study, though expensive to say the least.
 
Last edited:
Huh?

Pierre, you always have something interesting to offer, but you lost me on this one. Would you care to expand on that a bit?
 
Yep, it's simple....

..I've seen similar actions at racetracks, airports and so on...people doing stupid stuff and taking unreasonable risks for whatever reason. The consequences can be harsh and/or fatal. So, if you're gonna be dumb, you'd better be tough.

I had a bowl that I was turning on my wood lathe explode on Saturday afternoon but fortunately, I was wearing glasses and had eye protection that I would not have had if not for my vision correction...I thought hard about that saying..."If you're gonna be dumb....

Best,
 
..I've seen similar actions at racetracks, airports and so on...people doing stupid stuff and taking unreasonable risks for whatever reason. The consequences can be harsh and/or fatal. So, if you're gonna be dumb, you'd better be tough.

I had a bowl that I was turning on my wood lathe explode on Saturday afternoon but fortunately, I was wearing glasses and had eye protection that I would not have had if not for my vision correction...I thought hard about that saying..."If you're gonna be dumb....

Best,
Glad to hear you came through it okay! I'm inferring, of course that you still have use of your fingers as well as your eyeballs...
 
maybe our opinions are useless...

According to this rather old study:
http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com...ser&checksum=4FF7D0D6B5927B2DD9C84326B276EF42

"...pilots underestimate their occupational fatality risk."


And rather grossly if you read the fine print. It doesn't get much more dangerous than part 135 in Alaska, except maybe part 91 in Alaska. At least at the time of the publication in 2004. The pilots surveyed said they thought their jobs were actually safer than other occupations!

So now I'm wondering if pilots are the people to ask about how to fix this problem. Nonetheless, I think we have some good ideas. Next step is to get together a specific, detailed study design and then try to get it funded and recruit professional help.

Then I'll start a new thread. How do I close this one?
 
the answer is "no", mostly

...Has epidemiology been pursued as a strategy for mitigating GA accidents?

So, having read a bit further and taken a bit (okay, a lot), more time to think and even calculate a bit, napkin-back style, I conclude that the answer is: No, it hasn't really been tried, but it probably isn't economically feasible in the real world.

The trouble is that, as the drug companies know well, it's real expensive to do real science to find novel interventions to old diseases. Furthermore, and this is the part I had to figure out so apologies to those who already knew, it gets even more expensive when the disease is rare.

See, if you take a real common disease, say bad breath, it's fairly economical to recruit some subjects who suffer the malady and try some simple treatment and measure its efficacy. Then, if you find an effective intervention and the price of development isn't too high you also have a real big potential market.

But if you look at a rare disease, you have two major problems: obvioulsy a smaller market, but if the disease is also short-lived and fatal, then you have another problem; how do you find subjects to do the tests? Let's say there is an infection which randomly infects only one person in a million in any given year and is always fatal. You have a drug you think might work, but we don't know how the disease is transmitted so we can't put the fix in for testing our drug candidates (anyway you can't infect them on purpose, it's always fatal). How do you test the drug? Simple; if you want a clear answer regarding efficacy of your drug you have to recruit millions of test subjects and give half the drug, half a placebo, and wait for statistics to happen, or some similar variation. With even passable luck within a couple years the outcomes of the two groups should diverge if the drug is doing anything. If you're really lucky a couple in the placebo die and none in the drug group do. If you're less lucky the numbers are inconclusive. In the worst case, the drug group does even worse than the placebo group. Only the first outcome is commercially viable.

As odd as it may seem, fatal ga accidents are rare in this context. We have a few hundred thousand active pilots in the U.S. and a few hundred a year suffer the, well.., worst outcome. So, you can see that in order to try an intervention with a hope of conclusive results, you need to recruit at least hundreds of pilots into your project, and do so with minimal self-selection. That is, If I ask you "hey want to participate in my aviation safety experiment" and you answer "great but only if it's really safe" or worse "no I don't care about safety" that's a big problem for the study because whatever the numbers in the outcomes look like people will just say "duh, you probably flushed out all the pilots at highest risk".

So, let me try to clarify with a thought experiment. I'll recruit a cohort of pilots and give half some additional training and the other half some sort of "placebo". Then wait and see what happens. Problem is that for that to work we'd need about a thousand pilots in each group and we'd have to do everything we could to minimize self-selection, aka washouts. So how do you force two thousand pilots to get spin training whether they like the idea or not? Even with unlimited funds that's a tough one. With zero dollars, it's hopeless.

Back to the drawing board...
 
Status
Not open for further replies.