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Stamper RV-10 accident Preliminary Report

The reason he'll unlatch it the second time is that he'll interpret that checklist item as "operate latch."

LOL, that's funny, but if true it's also sad. "There is no substitute for thinking" and that includes checklists.
 
Human factors..

So, you have just spent numerous years building an aeroplane, and you have invested a lot of time, energy and money in it. You built your dream hanger.

You have been racing around to finish the last bits, the list is endless.

You start your test phase, it's great...you are looking forward to taking the family away.

Then...it all goes wrong, there is no way you are going to let your pride and joy lose it's door. I can't even imagine how distracting it must be for a door (large aperture) to come open in flight.

The right thing to do is fly the aeroplane...but sometimes we all do stupid things...that we regret later. I had two good friends that I considered to be much better aviators than me. They had survived active duty during the Gulf War, one was a Boscombe Downe test pilot and both were very good pilots. But they still managed to get killed in aircraft accidents.

The -10 door is not ideal, but it is not a show stopper if treated correctly.

The whole incident is just so very sad.
 
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Then...it all goes wrong, there is no way you are going to let your pride and joy lose it's door. .

Yes. The "Save the Plane" mentality. It's very hard to accept bending metal on something you just spent 5 years of your life building. There have been at least 2 fatal RV-10 accidents where the airplane was stalled at low altitude, following a power loss. The pilots just could not bring themselves to accept the circumstances.
 
Yes. The "Save the Plane" mentality. It's very hard to accept bending metal on something you just spent 5 years of your life building. There have been at least 2 fatal RV-10 accidents where the airplane was stalled at low altitude, following a power loss. The pilots just could not bring themselves to accept the circumstances.

We will never know for sure, as the pilots are not with us anymore. But I would submit that "saving the plane" may not be what is actually going through their mind. As GA pilots most of us don't get the chance to go through rigorous training that instills in you how to react in a sudden emergency. Unless you do it multiple times so that it becomes habit to ignore the massive noisy interruption, most people's first instinct is to deal with the problem. It can be so overwhelming that the potential consequences don't even enter into the thought process until it is too late. It's a lot like sneaking up on someone and hollering at them when they least expect it. Only the coolest can look back at you without jumping and reacting.

It really is important to spend some time before flying Phase I sitting in the cockpit and practicing how to deal with a potential failure. And there's no harm in flying with a good instructor prior to the test flights in ANY kind of airplane (doesn't have to be the make/model you are going to fly) and make it a really hard workout dealing with emergencies.

This approach has saved me more than once.

Vic
 
It can be so overwhelming that the potential consequences don't even enter into the thought process until it is too late. It's a lot like sneaking up on someone and hollering at them when they least expect it. Only the coolest can look back at you without jumping and reacting.

Agree totally - instinctive action before the brain can get in gear. Exactly my experience with the tipover canopy lifting during take-off, the reaction to immediately reach for it was automatic.............much to my detriment.
 
Flight #2 with my new RV7 and guess what, forgot to latch the canopy (hot day taxing with it open bla bla bla). When it popped open on lift off (probably about 8") those famous words were all I could hear "fly the airplane" until I came around and landed. Never even tried to grab it as I was just to busy/focused on keeping flying. Turned out to be a non issued but it was a great "learning" experience. Back then VAF was just getting started (MATRONIX days) and I never remember seeing anything about what would happen to the canopy if you left it open, so it was pretty exciting.
 
Rather than get into arguments about redesigning the aircraft, let's either get back on track about checklists, best practices, and flying the aircraft whenever something unexpected happens, which I think can really add some valuable knowledge here to everyone, especially the new builders/flyers, or we can close the thread.

Vic

Avi8tor857 suggested that there could be good grounds for a redesign of the RV10 door. You strongly disagree and believe that adherence to a proper checklist would be sufficient. I think that both parties are surely entitled to their opinion.

However you are intimating in the post above that if Avi8tor857 and others continue to disagree with you then you will exercise your privilege as a moderator to close the thread. Some on VansAirforce may consider that to be an inappropriate intimidation of posters with an opposing view to your own.
 
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There are two issues being argued here.

1) Be a pilot. Follow your checklists, and in the event that something happens, concentrate on your main responsibility of flying the airplane. I don't think anyone disagrees with this.

2) Something as simple as a door should never (on its own) be a safety of flight issue, even if improperly operated. Door latches need to be simple and reliable. They shouldn't have a gotcha where they can result in the departure of a door when improperly latched.

Instructors need to handle item #1 on BFR's and at other opportunities.

Engineers need to address #2. Band Aid fixes such as extra latches are an improvement, but the goal should be to solve the underlying issue of a top hinged door with fiddly latches,
 
There are two issues being argued here.

1) Be a pilot. Follow your checklists, and in the event that something happens, concentrate on your main responsibility of flying the airplane. I don't think anyone disagrees with this.

2) Something as simple as a door should never (on its own) be a safety of flight issue, even if improperly operated. Door latches need to be simple and reliable. They shouldn't have a gotcha where they can result in the departure of a door when improperly latched.

Instructors need to handle item #1 on BFR's and at other opportunities.

Engineers need to address #2. Band Aid fixes such as extra latches are an improvement, but the goal should be to solve the underlying issue of a top hinged door with fiddly latches,

I would submit that if you follow #1, then #2 will not be a safety of flight issue.
 
Touchy subject...

I don't think it reasonable to demand a redesign from Vans. The current door is satisfactory, given due care by the PIC. However, few things are so good that they cannot be improved.

Humor an example. My RV-8 has a one-piece tip-over canopy. I think it is superior to the stock slider. That doesn't mean the slider is wrong. Nor does it make the designer a heretic. It is just another way to meet a design requirement.

There is no reason to think a door design is any different. Should someone develop an alternative door, let's judge that actual design on merit when we see it.
 
Avi8tor857 suggested that there could be good grounds for a redesign of the RV10 door. You strongly disagree and believe that adherence to a proper checklist would be sufficient. I think that both parties are surely entitled to their opinion.

However you are intimating in the post above that if Avi8tor857 and others continue to disagree with you then you will exercise your privilege as a moderator to close the thread. Some on VansAirforce may consider that to be an inappropriate intimidation of posters with an opposing view to your own.

Sorry you read it that way. I think there are lots of lessons that pilots can learn from accidents. And there's lots of experience on this forum from pilots who in a similar situation (reacting to an inflight emergency) and they survived. Getting them to share, as is happening, is very fruitful and productive. I don't think I even weighed in until the thread drifted to somewhat demanding an design change. I asked that the thread get back on track. Perhaps I should have said lets take the design change discusion to another thread?



Vic
 
I'm curious about why this particular accident would have people thinking about a door redesign. I understand the impulse to look first to the equipment and design. Considering the hierarchy of safety engineering, which I may discuss in a separate post, it is not unreasonable to consider a design change or engineering control to minimize a risk.

However, I have seen very little discussion on a particular part of the preliminary accident report. The prelim report notes that the door that departed the accident airplane was found not to have the factory safety latch installed. Now, I do not wish to get involved in speculation before the final report is out, but if the factory design was not followed in construction, arguments that the design must change to improve safety must be scrutinized carefully.

Now, saying that the factory designed safety latch was not installed is not the same as saying that there was *NO* safety latch installed or that some other design of safety latch was not installed, and we should wait until the final report is issued to address those possibilities.
 
Perhaps I should have said lets take the design change discusion to another thread?



Vic

Yes.

Too many times we have had a thread get off the original topic and get locked down even though genuinely useful points were being discussed. Splitting topics is much preferable to simply locking it down, because participants are unlikely to continue a conversation in which they've already had their hand slapped.
 
Trying to design warning systems and adding extra latches is approaching the the problem from the wrong direction. You don't fix an safety problem by making it more complicated you fix it by making it simpler. The simplest solution would be one that made the door opening below maneuvering speed an non-event.
This is exactly what I have been thinking ever since the first report of a door departing, and it was only reinforced by the first time I saw the doors and the locking mechanism in person.
 
We will never know for sure, as the pilots are not with us anymore. But I would submit that "saving the plane" may not be what is actually going through their mind. As GA pilots most of us don't get the chance to go through rigorous training that instills in you how to react in a sudden emergency. Unless you do it multiple times so that it becomes habit to ignore the massive noisy interruption, most people's first instinct is to deal with the problem. It can be so overwhelming that the potential consequences don't even enter into the thought process until it is too late. It's a lot like sneaking up on someone and hollering at them when they least expect it. Only the coolest can look back at you without jumping and reacting.

How many of us have been driving with something sitting on the passenger seat or the dash or in the cupholder, and then as we sense it go sliding in a turn or hard braking we reached out to grab it without really thinking about it? All of us sitting here right now would agree that's a dumb thing to do, but we still do it. I did it one morning on the way to work, trying to catch the lunchbox flying off the seat while I went around a sharp curve. I saved the food but hit the curb and ripped open a tire :eek:. Fortunately I'd purchased a spare for my car and wasn't stranded in the dark, but that instinctive reach cost me $200 for a new tire--and a lot of embarassment. I can easily see how something like that can happen in an airplane, but with much worse consequences.

It's like reaching to catch that hot or very sharp item that just fell off the table, or the heavy metal plate that's falling over--you instinctively go to do it even though objectively it's a bad idea. You have to condition yourself not do it.

It's very easy to say "this is how you should respond in an emergency". It's much more difficult to actually do it when you're the one in the hot seat, if you haven't trained and practiced to overcome the instinctive reaction.
 
Someone pointed out to me once that in this situation, there's a possibility that the first time, the pilot will latch the canopy. The second time, he'll unlatch it. The third time, he'll swear a bit and latch it.

The reason he'll unlatch it the second time is that he'll interpret that checklist item as "operate latch."

If he misses the third reading the canopy remains unlatched.

Perhaps for subsequent checklist items, it might be better to have the list read "Visually check canopy."

Dave

I'm assuming the pilot is flying HIS plane and HIS checklist and will know that "lock canopy" means check the canopy.

All words aside, the point is I have it in three different places on *my* checklist.

Selling it next week at 350 hours and was never confused by what my checklist meant. :D
 
Yes. The "Save the Plane" mentality. It's very hard to accept bending metal on something you just spent 5 years of your life building. There have been at least 2 fatal RV-10 accidents where the airplane was stalled at low altitude, following a power loss. The pilots just could not bring themselves to accept the circumstances.

Whenever I read stories of successful emergency landings, the one sentence or phrase you almost always hear are "my training took over."

That seems to confirm the obvious solution to any worry about what will happen in an emergency: training. If only we put as much focus on it as we do some other aspects of building RVs.

In addition to flying the plane, there's another thought process that you must imprint on your mind BEFORE the emergency, to help you respond properly to it.

You must learn to tell yourself the moment an emergency occurs (but AFTEr "fly the plane" ) that the insurance company now owns your plane.

That will help you focus on the task at hand which is getting the plane on the ground and staying alive.
 
Vic Syracuse I understood where you were coming from, I figured I would wait a while and post a new thread about the door design unrelated to a specific event since it wasn't the direction you wanted this thread to go. I really want to build a 10 but the door design is a risk I can't accept so I haven't ordered the kit yet. There are things you can't change and you protect yourself with a check list, there are things you can redesign to make your check list shorter reducing your workload.

I'm not saying any changes to the door would of changed the outcome of this accident, I took great care to avoid the specific accident and intended not to conjecture about the actual cause. Any accident is caused by a chain of events, any safety discussion should identify the links and remove as many as possible.

I'm curious about why this particular accident would have people thinking about a door redesign. I understand the impulse to look first to the equipment and design. Considering the hierarchy of safety engineering, which I may discuss in a separate post, it is not unreasonable to consider a design change or engineering control to minimize a risk.


For me -- everyone that owns a 10 is weary of the door, so much so you get the "I don't even let my passengers close the door" statements. Given this weariness of the door you are that much more likely to try to protect the door if it did open. I just can't imagine that wasn't a factor in the decisions made. The Door separating if opened has been discussed often and if you google RV10 issues it is usually one of the top hits. If nothing else this weariness has to effect your enjoyment of the plane.
 
The Door separating if opened has been discussed often and if you google RV10 issues it is usually one of the top hits. If nothing else this weariness has to effect your enjoyment of the plane.


The door issue has not affected my enjoyment of my airplane one bit. I agree, and will tell anyone that asks, that the door design is one of the very, very, few design weaknesses on the airplane. I go back to Carl Froelichs post #4 at the beginning of this thread. Have the discipline to follow his 5 item door checklist every time you operate the airplane, and your risk of having a door emergency is very low. Of course, the discipline to do everything "right" every time is what we are all supposed to be striving for. We all get away with a bit of complacency at one time or another, but the risk goes up, and sometimes it bites us. I used to fly for a living and saw this and experienced it first hand, more than once. Running through a checklist dozens of times, or hundreds of times, or thousands of times and being disciplined enough to really "check" each item, every time, is the hard part of flying. I believe that is true whether it is the simplest memorized checklist on a light airplane or a long and complex written/electronic checklist on a modern jet.
This is the same discipline we strive for in our pre-flight planning, our pre-flight inspection, our Condition Inspections, our in-flight decision making, etc. It's not easy and there is no such thing as a perfect flight.

Now hopping off my soapbox. :)
 
I really want to build a 10 but the door design is a risk I can't accept so I haven't ordered the kit yet. There are things you can't change and you protect yourself with a check list, there are things you can redesign to make your check list shorter reducing your workload.

Mitigating risk can be done in many different ways......

Sometimes it is good to do it in more than one way.

Proper use of a check list is a very good place to start. That, coupled with a physical check of both doors and the door latched indicator system that is standard in the kit should catch a mistake.

Since it is true that none of us are perfect, when there are easy to implement secondary checks it is a good idea to use them.......

As already mentioned in an earlier post, the modern EFIS systems a lot of builders choose now a days are capably of sensing an unsecured door and warn visually and aurally warning you when the throttle is advanced for take off. This would be way # 2.

How many different ways are needed?

Sure, the doors could be made to open differently. But that in itself would not guaranty no more door related RV-10 accidents.
The Cirrus has doors that open more fwd. They tend to stay mostly closed if unlatched in flight. There is a high profile accident that occurred near KDVT years ago all because of an unlatch door. There is security camera video of the airplane just before impact that clearly shows the door unlatched.
The investigation determined probably cause as being the same as what it likely will for this RV-10 accident.
 
Mitigating risk can be done in many different ways......

Sometimes it is good to do it in more than one way.

Proper use of a check list is a very good place to start. That, coupled with a physical check of both doors and the door latched indicator system that is standard in the kit should catch a mistake.

Since it is true that none of us are perfect, when there are easy to implement secondary checks it is a good idea to use them.......

As already mentioned in an earlier post, the modern EFIS systems a lot of builders choose now a days are capably of sensing an unsecured door and warn visually and aurally warning you when the throttle is advanced for take off. This would be way # 2.

How many different ways are needed?

Sure, the doors could be made to open differently. But that in itself would not guaranty no more door related RV-10 accidents.
The Cirrus has doors that open more fwd. They tend to stay mostly closed if unlatched in flight. There is a high profile accident that occurred near KDVT years ago all because of an unlatch door. There is security camera video of the airplane just before impact that clearly shows the door unlatched.
The investigation determined probably cause as being the same as what it likely will for this RV-10 accident.

Yes agree completely, the checklist is the only way to prevent the door from coming open. However except for the distraction a door opening event shouldn't be a safety concern.

Approaching my concern from a different direction if you need to open it because of smoke in flight, how worried would you be that it could hit someone on the ground? How would that effect our hobby if it did?

Does anyone know which latch was on the door, the NTSB report was obviously written by someone with above average knowledge on the design based on the detail and length.
 
Yes agree completely, the checklist is the only way to prevent the door from coming open.

Actually, it is not......
I listed two ways to help mitigate an open door.

If the warning system is installed and coupled to an EFIS system, even if a pilot missed "confirm both doors closed and latched" at three different places in their check list(s), as they advanced the throttle for take-off, they would begin getting a a visual and audio warning ("check door latch").

Of all of the door opening incidents I am aware of, only one did any damage to the airplane (and we don't know many if any details of that incident... I.E. if it was at high speed, etc.).
All of the rest should have done nothing other than startle the pilot and passengers.
In fact, one bold RV-10 pilot flew 200 miles back to home base rather than land after losing a passenger door after take-off.
 
One of the best classes I have taken as a firefighter was on "physiological response to stress". The takeaway was that "you don't rise to the occasion, you sink to the level of your training". Unless you have practiced responding to a situation repeatedly, you will very likely get it wrong under severe stress. In these situations, you lose all fine motor skills (which could make it hard to secure a door), get narrowed vision, and have almost no critical thinking skills. There is simply no way to assure the proper response until you've ingrained it in your subconscious mind. As they say, don't train until you get it right, train until you can't get it wrong.

I have learned to temper judgement of actions taken by people under severe stress.

Chris
 
One of the best classes I have taken as a firefighter was on "physiological response to stress". The takeaway was that "you don't rise to the occasion, you sink to the level of your training". Unless you have practiced responding to a situation repeatedly, you will very likely get it wrong under severe stress. In these situations, you lose all fine motor skills (which could make it hard to secure a door), get narrowed vision, and have almost no critical thinking skills. There is simply no way to assure the proper response until you've ingrained it in your subconscious mind. As they say, don't train until you get it right, train until you can't get it wrong.

I have learned to temper judgement of actions taken by people under severe stress.

Chris

One of the best posts I've seen on any message board on any subject. Thank you.
 
Very informative thread

It saddens me to think it sometimes takes a tragedy like this to remind us how easily each of us could be brought down by an unexpected event that we would never anticipate nor train for. Rarely do inflight malfunctions follow a precise pattern that can be immediately resolved with a handy step-by-step written checklist that is routinely practiced. In my 50+ years of aviation I am fortunate to have survived, not necessarily by any suburb flying skills but by dedication to intense training programs and learning from various mishaps of others and myself. Reading all the posts the one overriding message says it all: No matter what action is required - fly the airplane first. The military acronym was FTFA. Indulge me with one related war story. I'll try to keep it brief.
A fairly new left seat KC-135A Captain taking off hot and heavy at a tropical military deployment base in the late 1960s. Immediately after rotation at about 170 knots a very loud bang, a smell of burning rubber, and an amber light on the panel illuminated which is one I hoped to never see inflight. It indicated when either the lower crew entry hatch or the cargo door were unlatched. From the cockpit the boom operator reported the crew entry hatch was secure. Those few seconds of hauling that overloaded Jurassic Jet off the meager remaining runway and cleaning it up while waiting for the cargo door to rip off and take some tail surfaces with it seemed like an eternity. That is called "pucker time".

I'll skip the technical details and obviously the aircraft remained intact to complete that mission because due to a series of circumstances one critical checklist item was inadvertently omitted by one of my crewmen. I took the heat from the commander but it taught me a valuable lesson that has stayed with me throughout my flying career. NEVER stop flying the airplane and checklists are sacred.
 
It would be interesting to compare statistics on loss of control accidents on military or even ATP pilots vs the rest of us. I'd be willing to bet that in the military you gained some experience flying under stress, which helped you keep your calm when it hit the fan.

I think in GA we do a horrible job of training pilots for stressful situations. Some instructors will pop ooen a door or window on takeoff, which is great, but probably not going far enough. I don't have the answer, but I know that your local Delta pilot sits in a simulator every year for many, very stressful hours, practicing responding to the worst possible situations. Having his job on the line probably adds a good bit of stress, which is a good thing.

I think I'm a good pilot, and I know I'm pretty good under stress if you hand me a choking baby. But kill my engine on takeoff, and even I don't know how I'd REALLY respond. I just haven't been there except with an instructor, at idle, with the field made. We hand our new GA pilots a certificate and then say 'oh, hey, if something bad happens, just fly the plane.". Is that going far enough? I rehearse in my mind, and like to think I'd get right, but I'd be willing to bet we've lost a lot of pilots who thought the same thing.

My immediate plan is to seek aerobatic or unusual attitude training.

Chris


It saddens me to think it sometimes takes a tragedy like this to remind us how easily each of us could be brought down by an unexpected event that we would never anticipate nor train for. Rarely do inflight malfunctions follow a precise pattern that can be immediately resolved with a handy step-by-step written checklist that is routinely practiced. In my 50+ years of aviation I am fortunate to have survived, not necessarily by any suburb flying skills but by dedication to intense training programs and learning from various mishaps of others and myself. Reading all the posts the one overriding message says it all: No matter what action is required - fly the airplane first. The military acronym was FTFA. Indulge me with one related war story. I'll try to keep it brief.
A fairly new left seat KC-135A Captain taking off hot and heavy at a tropical military deployment base in the late 1960s. Immediately after rotation at about 170 knots a very loud bang, a smell of burning rubber, and an amber light on the panel illuminated which is one I hoped to never see inflight. It indicated when either the lower crew entry hatch or the cargo door were unlatched. From the cockpit the boom operator reported the crew entry hatch was secure. Those few seconds of hauling that overloaded Jurassic Jet off the meager remaining runway and cleaning it up while waiting for the cargo door to rip off and take some tail surfaces with it seemed like an eternity. That is called "pucker time".

I'll skip the technical details and obviously the aircraft remained intact to complete that mission because due to a series of circumstances one critical checklist item was inadvertently omitted by one of my crewmen. I took the heat from the commander but it taught me a valuable lesson that has stayed with me throughout my flying career. NEVER stop flying the airplane and checklists are sacred.
 
Seeking aerobatic training

I like to think of myself as a responsible, well read pilot, but i lived in fear of that plane escaping my control for over 500 hours of private flying.

That is until i strapped a 7ECA on and did some loops, rolls, lots of stalls and recovery. Wow did this make me feel better, I mean the plane keeps flying if YOU keep it flying.

I haven't pursued the endorsement for aerobatics but 5 hours of it made me a more relaxed, less stressed pilot.

Things like this event happen, fortunately not too often. Design can help but in the end it is the pilot and his or her reaction and training that come to play. Again it is unfortunate to discuss these things on such a tragic event but perhaps it will encourage us all to "visualize" and ask ourselve..... What would i do........!
 
We hand our new GA pilots a certificate and then say 'oh, hey, if something bad happens, just fly the plane." Is that going far enough?


Regardless of how much we improve safety, we will never have done enough, there will always be room for more improvement.
But I do think that saying "Fly the airplane" is a great start, but it obviously needs to be taught and reinforced differently than it is right now. Because in simple terms, "Fly the Airplane" is what prevents the loss of control accidents (which we should all know by now is the leading cause of fatalities in experimental aircraft).
The most typical accident scenario that gets labeled loss of control is low altitude stall or stall / spin. So, if any pilot that finds him/her self in a difficult situation "fly's the airplane" in a manor that simply prevents it from stalling before contacting the ground, they have in my mind succeeded. It doesn't matter to me whether they are able to maneuver the airplane into a tiny little field and land with no damage..... in fact it is that type of maneuvering that often leads to the loss of control accident.

In a nut shell.... there is no reason for a fatal accident at a location that has relatively flat open terrain all around. Not that I am advocating people do this, but there are a lot of people that would be alive today if when the engine quit they trimmed for a lowest sink rate glide and then sat on their hands and took what they got.... A minimum speed, in control impact with the ground is probably survivable in most all light aircraft.

It seems we are often afraid to talk about the "save the airplane" syndrome. This isn't meant as speculation towards this particular accident, but I am mentioning it because I think it is a very real factor in many loss of control accidents. It might even be some of the reason for the high loss of control accident rate in experimentals (because of the personal investment in the airplane that the builder/pilot has). In fact it is the prime reason that I am a big proponent of someone else doing the first flight(s) on a new airplane, but that is a subject for another time.

I think this subject should be discussed more openly.

A while back I did something I have never done before.... in an effort to mitigate any tendency I might have towards saving my airplane.....
I purchased hull coverage insurance.

I have now attempted to develop an attitude that if anything bad ever happens while flying it, I mentally relinquish the ownership of the airplane to the insurance company and from that moment on my entire focus will be on the physical protection of myself and anyone else that is with me. If the end result is a successful forced landing with no damage, great. If not, no hard feelings.

You can probably see that I am rather passionate about reducing loss of control accidents, as many others are.
I have immensely enjoyed working in this business, but the news of accidents that result in unnecessary fatalities is hard to take.

History shows that there is a high probability that a few of you reading this in the VAF forums will be the subject of a similar discussion here in the future. A rather morbid statement maybe, but hopefully it will encourage everyone that hangs out here (myself included) to do some deep self evaluation, and try to come up with ideas that will help you primarily focus on"Flying the Airplane", if things ever begin to not go as planned.
 
but there are a lot of people that would be alive today if when the engine quit they trimmed for a lowest sink rate glide and then sat on their hands and took what they got.... A minimum speed, in control impact with the ground is probably survivable in most all light aircraft.

Yep.

Forty five or so years ago, my instructor had this saying--------

"When a crash is inevitable, hit the softest thing you can-----as slowly as possible."
 
Yep.

Forty five or so years ago, my instructor had this saying--------

"When a crash is inevitable, hit the softest thing you can-----as slowly as possible."

This is where I think simulator training can play a better role. I think we should use simulators to practice crashing.

Chris
 
Best advice ever

One of the best classes I have taken as a firefighter was on "physiological response to stress". The takeaway was that "you don't rise to the occasion, you sink to the level of your training". Unless you have practiced responding to a situation repeatedly, you will very likely get it wrong under severe stress. In these situations, you lose all fine motor skills (which could make it hard to secure a door), get narrowed vision, and have almost no critical thinking skills. There is simply no way to assure the proper response until you've ingrained it in your subconscious mind. As they say, don't train until you get it right, train until you can't get it wrong.

I have learned to temper judgement of actions taken by people under severe stress.

Chris

What this means for me is to stay calm and dont try anything too tough in an emergency. Never thought about it before but in my past times of stress, this was evident. Guess i am like everyone else.
 
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